


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China/Taiwan Aff & Neg





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INTRO


Taiwan is an interesting example of the United States getting themselves into a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation. In 1979, the United States passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), giving the government a legal obligation to provide “arms of a defensive nature” to Taiwan. 7 years later, in 1986, the US passed a treaty agreeing to significantly reduce their arms sales to taiwan, and to continue to reduce the level of arms sales over time.

More than 30 years later, we are in the exact same situation, where there is a legal obligation for the US to both provide arms to Taiwan and NOT to provide arms to Taiwan. This means both sides of the debate have very strong claims. On the one hand, because it is an important cultural issue for the Chinese government to assimilate Taiwan into the mainland, a reduction in US arms sales to Taiwan improves the relationship between the US and China. At the same time, however, the US’s assistance is one of the last things keeping Taiwan from being able to resist modern-day imperialism. Students must argue whether it is more important to stand in solidarity with Taiwan and continue to provide them with arms, or to let them fend for themselves in order to strengthen our relationship with China, which could lead to increased cooperation in science, technology, the environment, etc. Not to mention continued world peace, as China’s military spending is beginning to beat even the US.




Glossary

- PRC: People's Republic of China
- Kuomintang: "Nationalist party of China". China-friendly political party in Taiwan.
- PLA: People's Liberation Army, the armed forces of China.
- Communique: An official announcement or statement, especially one made to the media.
- Rhetoric: The art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing, especially the use of figures of speech and other techniques.
- Retaliation: The action of returning a military attack; counterattack.
- Bilateral: Having or relating to two sides; affecting both sides.
- Cybersecurity: The state of being protected against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic data, or the measures taken to achieve this
- Emission: The production and discharge of something, especially gas or radiation.
- Reunification: The concept of Taiwan becoming a part of the country of China, either through peace or force.
- Cross-strait: Having to do with China and Taiwan (they are separated by the Taiwan Strait)
- Imperialism: A country extending their power and influence through either diplomacy or force
- Bipartisan: Supported by both (political) parties.
- Agenda: Plan of action
- Assimilation: The process of one group coming to resemble or adopt the culture/practices of another place. Can happen by choice or by force.
- Exacerbate: to make worse
- Crimp: bad or limiting effect
- Subsidy: funding for something, usually by the government, in order to make it more desirable/easier to access something.



Affirmative evidence



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Case Arguments



1AC Advantage - Military

Our advantage is US/China Relations

Scenario one is military cooperation:

The Trump Administration has recently increased its arms sales to Taiwan, causing tension between the US and China.

Wadhams et al 19 [Nick Wadhams, Jennifer Jacobs, Jenny Leonard, Anthony Capaccio, Writers, Bloomberg, "China Protests Possible Trump Move to Sell F-16's to Taiwan", <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-21/trump-aides-said-to-back-selling-f-16-fighter-planes-to-taiwan>]]

The Trump administration has given tacit approval to Taiwan's request to buy more than 60 F-16 fighter jets, according to people familiar with the matter, **prompting a fresh protest from China amid its trade dispute with the U.S.** President Donald **Trump's advisers encouraged Taiwan to submit a formal request for the jets**, built by **Lockheed Martin Corp., which it did this month**, according to the people, who asked not be identified discussing internal discussions. Any such request would need to be converted into a formal proposal by the Defense and State Departments, and then Congress would have 30 days to decide whether to block the sale. **"China's position to firmly oppose arms sales to Taiwan is consistent and clear," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a regular news briefing Friday in Beijing. "We have made stern representations to the U.S. We have urged the U.S. to fully recognize the sensitivity of this issue and the harm it will cause."**The U.S., wary of antagonizing China, **hasn't sold advanced fighter jets since then-President George H.W. Bush** announced the sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan in 1992.

Recent increases in arms sales are a direct violation of the 1982 agreement between the US and China in order to preserve relations.

Chen, Kastner, & Reed 17 [Ping-Kuei Chen, Scott L Kastner, William L Reed, "A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait", https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents]

Washington agreed in a 1982 communique "to reduce gradually its sale of arms to Taiwan" and promised that future arms sales to Taiwan "would not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms," those of recent years, but the record of US arms sales since suggests that the communique has had little constraining effect on US behavior. **US arms sales to Taiwan, in turn, often provoke angry Chinese response, which typically includes tough rhetoric and symbolic retaliation**, such as temporarily suspending US-China military-to-military dialogues. **US arms sales to Taiwan have continued to generate frictions in US-China relations** even though relations between Taipei and Beijing improved dramatically after the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou as president in Taiwan. **In early 2010**, for instance, **PRC officials were "strongly indignant" after an arms sale announcement, calling the sale a "gross intervention in China's internal affairs" that would have a "serious negative impact" on bilateral relations.**



1AC Advantage - Military

China's military strength is growing, quickly becoming an equal to the US.

Lee 19 [John Lee, Writer, The Diplomat, "Why a US Sale of Fighter Jets to Taiwan Matters", <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/why-a-us-sale-of-fighter-jets-to-taiwan-matters/>]

In the lead-up to the 1996 Taiwanese presidential elections, mainland China conducted a series of missile tests to express its displeasure against the pro-independence leanings of then-leader Lee Teng-hui and impress on the Taiwanese electorate that returning Lee to office might lead to war. The United States' response to the so-called **Third Taiwan Strait Crisis**, which was to order two aircraft carrier groups to the area, did the trick. The largest display of American military might since the Vietnam War forced a humiliating Chinese backdown and persuaded Beijing it needed to modernize its military to counter the U.S. Navy. The Chinese move also backfired as Lee's popularity in Taiwan gained a shot in the arm for standing up to the mainland. **Back in 1996, China's military budget was only about twice that of Taiwan's and approximately 16 times smaller than that of the United States. Today, the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) budget is almost 22 times larger than Taiwan's and over one-third that of the United States. China's advanced short-range ballistic missile could destroy every runway attached to Taiwan's six air force bases and destroy almost all Taiwanese fighter planes in the early moments of a war.** The PLA has established superiority over Taiwan in the air, and on and under the water. The only thing the PLA cannot achieve is landing troops on Taiwan without suffering unacceptable losses.

Recent sales of arms to Taiwan could be putting the United States at the tipping point of conflict with China.

Lu 19 [Zhenhua Lu, Writer, South China Morning Post, "US-China tensions could ignite over Taiwan, American officials warn]

Beijing has repeatedly warned Washington to stop any official contacts and cut off all military ties with Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a breakaway province to be taken back by force if necessary. Washington has no formal ties with Taipei, but remains its major arms supplier and is bound by law to help defend the island. Last week, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen addressed a Heritage Foundation event in Washington, via a live video link, on US-Taiwan and cross-strait relations. She is scheduled to deliver a second, similar speech to the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies on April 9, a day ahead of the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, the US law which has defined its relations with the island since it switched sovereign recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979. **The message from Washington has been alarming enough to prompt a former top White House official on Asian affairs to heap scorn on the current Taiwan policymakers in the Trump administration.**



1AC Advantage – Military

China has the military strength and technology to win a US-China war, with the ability to attack before the US can even retaliate.

Kazianis 18 [John Kazianis, Writer, National Interest, “Just how bad a war with China would be (and how Beijing would win)”]

What if Beijing simply degraded and destroyed the ability of U.S. forces to have those advanced eyes and ears and brought back an old foe of U.S. forces— the much hated “fog of war?” If that was the goal, a Chinese military campaign might just begin in cyberspace. **Beijing might launch massive cyber strikes against U.S. command and control centers around the world— trying to blind America and disrupt the ability of U.S. warfighters from seeing the coming battlefield in real time.** Such strikes, at least if I was in charge in Beijing, would come from third party countries (or at least look like it thanks to proxy servers). America would know its systems were under attack, but it might not be clear from who— at least not right away. China would have the advantage, at least for now. **The next blow would come before America could ascertain who was striking at the heart of its best military capabilities—** and this one would have China’s fingerprints all over them. **Beijing would begin to attack American satellites in orbit, attempting to destroy Washington’s massive intelligence gathering machine and communications systems.** At this point, war has definitely started and there is no mistake who is behind it. First China blinds its enemy, than it drops the hammer. **A large body of recent Western literature assumes China would leverage the large amounts of cruise and ballistic weapons it has developed and deployed over the last several decades in any conflict with America and its allies.** This includes mostly accurate short, medium, and long-range weapons and the much ballyhooed anti-ship ballistic missile or “carrier-killer.” After Beijing is assured Washington and its allies are in C2 and C4ISR hell, the Chinese version of “shock and awe” would be on full display. Beijing— at least if I was at the helm— would launch a massive barrage of cruise and ballistic missiles from the land, air, and sea. The likely targets: U.S. and possibly allied air bases with many of their advanced aircraft on the tarmac like sitting ducks, physical command and control centers, and U.S. naval vessels around the Pacific. **China would attempt to do as much damage in one massive blow, and hope that it was strong enough to would induce either a meager U.S. and allied response or possibly none at all.**



1AC Advantage - Military

Even a small scale conflict could spiral out of control into a nuclear war.

Talmadge 18 [Catilin Talmadge, Associate Professor of Security Studies (adapted from a speech), Foreign Affairs, “Why a US-Chinese war could spiral out of control”, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option>]

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. **Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.** A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but **the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.** Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as **“somewhere between nil and zero.”** This assurance is misguided. **If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation.** Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. **China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.** As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. **They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place**



1AC Advantage - Environment

Scenario two is environmental cooperation

The US and China are working together to invest in green technology. Recent economic and political tensions cause this program to lose funding.

Liao 19 [Rita Liao, Tech writer with a focus on China, TechCrunch, “this \$550M fund is bringing green tech from the west to china, despite trade tensions”, <https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/28/us-china-green-fund/>]

Escalating trade frictions between the U.S. and China have a range of businesses and investors in both countries sweating, but some believe there remains a bright spot where the antagonists can find common ground — fighting

environmental issues. One of them is the **U.S.-China Green Fund**, which does exactly as the name suggests — financing projects in the U.S. (and the west in general) and China that yield both financial and environmental returns. The fund recently closed its maiden fund of 3.7 billion yuan (\$550 million) and has already started to raise a second and larger yuan fund, it told TechCrunch. “The U.S.-China Green Fund believes that cleantech and environmental products are a positive, apolitical sector of focus for U.S.-China cooperation,” said Annie Zhou, the fund’s director of U.S. external affairs. **Currently, trade tensions have elevated some concerns from companies in**

both countries but have not affected our investments.” With the fresh capital, the firm will continue to back companies that could address China’s environmental challenges, areas that it believes are far and remote from the kind of cybersecurity concerns that underpin the current wave of bilateral tensions. “We are looking for win-win opportunities — improving the environment in China, which will benefit the rest of the world and also help Western companies tap into large markets in China,” added Zhou. In China alone, the fund has poured 2.8 billion yuan (\$420 million) into a portfolio of 13 companies with the likes of a **marketplace for green home appliances** serving more than 300,000 households and an **energy performance service provider** that’s completed 100-plus projects at public facilities like hospitals, hotels and supermarkets. **Aside from the more conventional categories of energy efficiency and pollution prevention, the fund also eyes technology companies that could benefit the environment in less obvious ways.** One example has been **Alpark**, a startup offering real-time parking maps that can eventually mitigate congestion

and thus CO2 emissions. The cross-border investor is one-of-a-kind. It was borne out of a **landmark joint effort** by business leaders and diplomats from China and the U.S. — the world’s No.1 and No.2 carbon emitters — to build a climate-resilient future following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2015 meeting with former U.S. President Obama. Some of the fund’s notable founders include Henry Paulson, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and founder of the **Paulson Institute**, a think tank dedicated to U.S.-China relations. The other crucial founding member is China’s Office of the Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs, which is headed by Vice Premier Liu He and plays a key role in China’s economic policymaking. **Trade tensions aside, another potential roadblock exists stateside for the fund: President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and his denial of climate change’s devastating effects on the earth.**



1AC Advantage - Environment

In this unstable time, any increase in arms sales to Taiwan could mean we reach the point of no more cooperation with China.

Panda 19 [Ankit Panda, Editor, The Diplomat, Are the US and Taiwan about to face off over American Fighter Sales to Taiwan?"]

The United States authorized the sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in 1992. The Obama administration, after receiving a request from Taipei, turned it down, initiating a set of upgrades instead to Taipei's existing fleet. The issue hasn't gone unnoticed in China, where Taiwan is seen as an inherent part of the country. Relations across the Taiwan Strait have been particularly strained since Tsai's inauguration in 2016. The Taiwanese president hails from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), though she herself has not explicitly supported independence — long a red-line for Beijing — Tsai, however, has refused to endorse the so-called "1992 consensus," which her predecessor had supported and which forms what Beijing sees as the baseline for cordial cross-strait relations. **"China's position to firmly oppose arms sales to Taiwan is consistent and clear,"**

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng **Shuang** said during a press briefing on Friday. "We have made stern representations to the U.S. We have urged the U.S. to fully recognize the sensitivity of this issue and the harm it will cause." **The prospect of a fighter sale to Taiwan this time comes at a time of particularly heightened U.S.-China**

tensions. The Trump administration has been known to seek leverage with Beijing across issues and it is possible that this may turn into the latest case of Taiwan being used as a possible bargaining chip as Trump seeks to clinch a favorable trade deal with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Trump, however, has been unconventional on Taiwan policy in the past. As president-elect, he broke expectations by receiving a telephone call from [President] Tsai. That call occurred at a time when Trump had yet to endorse the United States' one-China policy as president — something that he did for the first time in February 2017. Either way, **[President] Tsai's fighter request and the Trump administration's reported acceptance could set up another major area of turbulence between the United States and China.** Taiwan's fleet of multi-role fighter aircraft consists of three squadrons of Mirage 2000-5/E/D fighters, three squadrons of the F-5E/F Tiger II, six squadrons of the F-16A/B Fighting Falcon, and five squadrons of the indigenously developed F-CK-1 Ching Kuo series of fighters. In an interview with CNN last month, Tsai assessed Taiwan's defense readiness against a possible invasion by China, noting that the island was "well prepared for an attack at any time — for any situation where we would need to fend China off for 24 hours." She added that she "would hope that after withstanding any first wave of attacks ourselves, other countries throughout the world would stand up in unison and put strong pressure upon China in response."




1AC Advantage - Environment

We are at an environmental tipping point now. A loss of US-China environmental cooperation means a laundry list of disasters that result in extinction

Sengupta 18 [Somini Sengupta, int'l climate reporter, "US-China Friction Threatens to undercut the Fight against climate Change" <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/climate/us-china-climate-change.html>]

They have the largest carbon footprints. Also the largest economies. Now, as diplomats meet in Poland for high-stakes climate negotiations, a pitched standoff between the United States and China threatens to slow global action on climate change precisely at a time when the risks of catastrophe are accelerating. **The tensions between Washington and Beijing range from trade to cybersecurity to military rivalry** in the Pacific. **And while some of those issues have simmered for years, cooperation in the fight against climate change had once been a bright spot, so much so that it propelled the creation of the landmark global agreement in Paris** in 2015 to curb greenhouse gas emissions. **But then the Trump administration announced its intention to pull out of the Paris pact altogether, rejecting the scientific consensus that greenhouse gas emissions are warming the planet.** That represented perhaps the most consequential diplomatic reversal of the Trump era. **"The biggest threats to the planet are the lack of U.S. climate leadership at home and the unwillingness of the U.S. to engage with China,"** said Joanna Lewis, a China specialist at Georgetown University. **"The rest of the world looks to the U.S. and China for leadership, and it has become clear that, as the alliance has waned, global momentum to address climate change has slowed."** **Taken together, the emissions produced by the United States and China account for more than 40 percent of the global total. In both countries, emissions went up this year,** according to an analysis issued this week by the Global Carbon Project in which one scientist likened the acceleration of global emissions to "a speeding freight train." That fact hovers over Katowice, the Polish city where the United Nations is leading two weeks of talks to figure out how to implement the Paris Agreement. **Adding to the urgency of that meeting, the promises made so far under the Paris pact are nowhere enough to avert the worst effects of climate change. A United Nations scientific report issued this fall warned that, if emissions continued to rise at the current rate, the planet would warm so fast that it could lead to widespread food shortages, wildfires, and floods.**



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1AC Plan

Plan: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales to the Republic of China.



1AC Solvency

A reduction in arms sales to Taiwan removes tension and competition between the US and China.

Chen et al 17 [Ping-Kuei Chen, Scott L. Kastner and William L. Reed, “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait”]

Given the tensions—and the anger in Beijing—that are generated by US arms sales to Taiwan, some in the United States propose that Washington end (or at least scale back) weapons sales to the island. Doing so, proponents suggest, would remove a major irritant in the US-China relationship and would increase trust and cooperation in bilateral relations. More fundamentally, proponents of a reduced US commitment to Taiwan suggest that such a policy approach would help lower the risk of armed conflict in East Asia. This argument is developed most fully by Charles Glaser, who suggests that ending the US commitment to defend Taiwan would bring with it two significant benefits for the US-China relationship. **First, it could** improve US-China relations because such a shift in US policy would **remove a key source of mistrust in Beijing** concerning US motivations. **Second, ending US support for Taiwan**—by removing the key potential source of military conflict between China and the United States—**would reduce military competition between Washington and Beijing.** Glaser thus proposes a “grand bargain,” in which the United States would end its commitment to Taiwan in return for Chinese willingness to “resolve its maritime disputes on ‘fair’ terms” and to accept a long-term US security presence in East Asia.

A loss of US military support will actually motivate Taiwan to seek a peaceful plan of action with China.

Chen et al 17 [Ping-Kuei Chen, Scott L. Kastner and William L. Reed, “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait”]

For instance, we believe **it is likely that an end to arms sales would indeed lead Taiwanese officials to feel less confident about their bargaining power** vis-à-vis the PRC. But it is not obvious why this should in itself make them less likely to negotiate with Beijing: it is also plausible that, **in such a scenario, Taiwan’s leaders would feel they had no other choice but to negotiate with an increasingly powerful PRC.** Similarly, while a shift in the cross-Strait balance of power would indeed imply that Beijing could more easily utilize a military option, it isn’t obvious that this would in turn make the relationship less stable: it is conceivable, for instance, that **Taiwan would respond with more accommodating policies that would remove Beijing’s incentives to consider military force.** In short, how a shifting cross-Strait military balance of power would affect stability in the Taiwan Strait is not straightforward; in the following section, we consider the topic more systematically.



2AC AT: Invasion Turn

Taiwan arms sales INCREASES risk of war

Xiangwei 18 (Xiangwei is the post-editor in chief for the South China Morning Post), "Are The US and China Headed For War Over Taiwan", <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2142674/are-us-and-china-headed-war-over-taiwan>

The state media said Beijing was sending a loud and clear warning to Taipei and Washington amid heightened tensions caused by Taiwanese leaders' open advocacy for independence and increased American support for the Taiwanese government. Over the past few weeks, Chinese officials and state media have ratcheted up the rhetoric against Taipei and Washington, the largest supplier of arms to the island.

Trump's trade war with China is just his opening gambit. SUBSCRIBE TO THIS WEEK IN ASIA Get updates direct to your inbox. SUBMIT By registering for these newsletters you agree to our T&C and Privacy Policy Referring to Thursday's live-fire drills, Cui Tiankai, the Chinese ambassador to US, warned in a lecture at Harvard University that China would try every possible means to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Earlier this month, a spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office, said any outside forces that attempted to "play the Taiwan card" would find their efforts "futile" and would hurt themselves if they went "over the line", according to the official China Daily. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen speaks on the telephone to Donald Trump. Photo: EPA Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen speaks on the telephone to Donald Trump. Photo: EPA Share: The remark was clearly aimed at US President

Donald Trump and his administration which in recent months has taken a number of significant steps to warm ties with Taipei. **As Beijing and Washington are**

currently positioning themselves for a possible trade war, Trump's intention to play the Taiwan card again is even more dangerous because this would further destabilise bilateral ties or even worse, could lead to a real war.

A nasty US-China fight is inevitable. But it needn't be terminal. True to Trump's unconventional and unpredictable presidency, he first started to play the Taiwan card in the transition to the White House when he took a congratulatory call from the Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen, breaking a nearly 40-year-old diplomatic protocol governing China-US ties. At that time, Trump made it clear his intention was to use Taiwan as a play to force more concessions on trade from China. His suggestion then was overwhelmingly met with criticism and cynicism almost everywhere, even in Taiwan where it raised concerns that the island could be used as a pawn and discarded easily. **China sees Taiwan**

as a province and usually reacts strongly to any foreign country having official contacts with the Taiwanese government or sale of arms to the island, particularly from the United States.

Now one year later, Trump's intention to play the Taiwan card again signals a much broader agenda targeting China. Almost all the moderating voices in his administration have been forced out and replaced by more hawkish officials including the soon-to-be secretary of state Mike Pompeo and the National Security Adviser John Bolton – both of whom are known for tough stances against China and pro-Taiwan views. Tough on China: US national security adviser John Bolton. Photo: Reuters Tough on China: US national security adviser John Bolton. Photo: Reuters Share: In recent months, his administration has approved licences for American firms to sell Taiwan technology to build submarines and signed the Taiwan Travel Act to encourage visits between American and Taiwanese officials. All these have invited protests from China. A major test will come in June when the American Institute in Taiwan, the US de facto embassy, is slated to move into a new building. There has been growing speculation that Bolton or some other senior US official will attend the ceremony. If that happens, Beijing will regard it as a major provocation. **It is**

interesting to note that amid the war of words with Washington over trade, some elements in Beijing's propaganda machine have been using warlike language to give the impression that China will not back down from the trade spat and will fight the US to the very end. That could well be a negotiation tactic, as trade issues are negotiable after all. But from the Chinese perspective, the Taiwan issue is absolutely non-negotiable. It is a clearly marked red line.

The Taiwanese leaders, encouraged by the latest warming signs from Washington, have started to openly advocate independence, which is a major taboo for Beijing and seen as breaking the status quo President Xi Jinping has been trying to assert China's power on the international stage. Photo: AFP Share: China's official line has always been that it will seek peaceful reunification with Taiwan but not rule out using force to take it over. In the past, officials and state media have tended to emphasise the peaceful reunification part – more recently they have highlighted the bit about using force. reunification with Taiwan has to be an integral part of the dream. So will the US join the fray if push comes to shove? Many people have mistakenly assumed the Taiwan Relations Act requires the US to come to

Taiwan's defence. In fact, the law contains no explicit guarantee. Besides, there is a big question over whether the US would risk waging a full-blown war with China over Taiwan. **In the**

short term, if the current trend continues with the US determined to play the Taiwan card – which in turn helps embolden the pro-independence movement in Taiwan – China will probably feel

compelled to accelerate its military preparations and increase the frequency of military shows of strength like the one last week. All this means that tensions over the Taiwan Strait will get much worse unless Trump rethinks his plan to play the Taiwan card.



2AC AT: Invasion Turn

Arms sales to Taiwan undermine Taiwan's own defense industrial base

Grady 19 John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News, <https://news.usni.org/2019/06/12/experts-say-arms-sale-to-taiwan-answer-defense-needs-but-spur-new-questions>, Experts Say New Arms Sales to Taiwan answer defense needs but spur new questions

A pending sale of F-16 fighters, Abrams tanks, anti-armor and anti-aircraft missiles, to Taiwan drew rebukes from Beijing but **also set off alarms on the island about its ability retain talent and develop home-made defenses, one of its**

leading security experts said Wednesday. I-Chung Lai, president of the Taiwan-based Prospect Foundation, said **the large arms, aircraft and ship sales of the 1980s and again in the 1990s inadvertently set off "a brain drain" from the island and threatened its defense industrial base.** "Our capabilities and talents started to filter away" to Korea, he said while speaking at the Heritage Foundation. Shipbuilders and engineers started working for businesses and industries in Korea that were direct competitors with Taiwan but also "filtered into civilian industries," especially in technology where the island's expertise is well-respected. "How can we avoid these things happening again," Lai asked? **Aside from considering what such sales do to the Taiwanese industrial base, another question is whether these the right weapons Taipei needs to defend itself from**

an aggressive Beijing. Scott Harald, from RAND's Asia-Pacific policy center, said the danger is Taiwan's believing it needs a "one to one" match with China in weapons and systems. **Instead,** Harald suggested **the island needs "dynamic, agile, survivable, lethal" forces, not** necessarily **airfields and ports that would be subject to long-range Chinese missile or air strikes, to deter or defend against an all-out assault.** Taiwan should consider truck-based anti-ship missile systems, air-launched cruise missiles, mines, helicopters armed with anti-armor missiles to attack landing craft, fast attack missile boats "over big shiny thing" that costs billions, Harald said. Taiwan also needs to decide what type of submarine is necessary; one built domestically or bought overseas. Meanwhile, Taiwan needs to assess the current and future levels of military threats. China already operates its navy east of Taiwan and routinely flies strike aircraft around the island. Taiwan must understand whether China could mount a cross-strait invasion and provocations and incidents similar to the late 1970s confrontations between China and Vietnam. Taiwan also needs to understand Beijing's short-term goals beyond Taiwan and determine President's Xi Jin-ping's timeline for achieving reunification with the mainland, Harald and Lai said. "Is the fight primarily in the heads of people?" of Taiwanese citizens, leaders of foreign nations and international organizations, Harald asked. Szu-chien Hsu, Taiwan's deputy minister for foreign affairs, said Beijing's military intent is clear and it is "breaking through the First Island Chain," closest to mainland China to achieve its "very evident ... global strategic ambitions" of being the leading superpower.

A strong Taiwan defense industrial base solves deterrence better

Bandow 15 (Doug, is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire; "Arm Taiwan, America. But Don't Defend It." <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/arm-taiwan-america-dont-defend-it-14695?page=2,12/21/15>)

Indeed, the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity has become more dangerous as China's power has increased. **Taiwan matters much more to the PRC than America.** Thus, as a Chinese general not so subtly argued, **the United States won't risk Los Angeles for Taipei.** Indeed, it would be madness for America to do so. **It might seem equally foolish for China to risk, say, Shanghai to regain Taiwan. But** it is far more plausible that the PRC might do so. **Enabling Taiwan to defend itself is the best way out of this conundrum.** So long as the residents of Zhongnanhai value prosperity and stability, they have reason to avoid costly conflict. **No arms sales would enable Taipei to defeat a determined PRC in war.** The former's objective, however, should be deterrence, not victory. "The idea is to complicate China's scenarios, to make them pause, to get them to think twice before they attack," explained Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. The higher the price any PRC government would pay for attempting to coerce Taipei, the less likely it would try to do so. Continued patience would remain good sense. That doesn't mean there won't be costs to the U.S.-China relationship as a result, but they are worth bearing. There's likely diplomatic turbulence. In the past military meetings have been suspended, though only temporarily. There could be economic retaliation, though the threat seems overblown: defense companies are barred from supplying the PRC and sanctions against civilian sales would hurt the PRC as well.



2AC AT: Invasion Turn

Arms sales don't solve – they're ineffective and don't deter chinese aggression – causes china lashout

Hua 15 (Zhang, assistant research fellow at the Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Arms sales to Taiwan do not help the US, Global Times, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/959549.shtml>)

Washington has to accept it **is becoming far less capable of containing China's rise**. It may upset the government of the Chinese mainland by making a fuss with Taiwan, but it won't have a real effect. **Washington's primary intent in forging a military relationship with Taiwan is to maintain military balance across the Taiwan Strait. However, the strategy is stretched too thin.** Given the mainland's swift and prominent ramp-up in military spending, a **military balance can no longer be stricken between the mainland and Taiwan, no matter how many advanced weapons the US sells to Taiwan.** **The possibility of using Taiwan to suppress the mainland's growing leverage in its periphery is vanishing. The mainland's economic aggregate is more than 20 times larger than Taiwan's, so the latter has no chance to engage in a military race with the former. Selling arms to Taiwan doesn't mean Washington would hold on to its promise to "come and rescue" Taiwan when the island is in trouble with the mainland. It is not even a commitment to include Taiwan in its umbrella of protection.** Even some Taiwanese strategists have pointed out that Taiwan is too obsessed with the delusion that Washington will come all the way to defend Taiwan. **Washington** also cunningly **argues** that the **weaponry deal will bolster Taiwan's confidence** when it needs to negotiate with the mainland in other respects. In fact, in such talks, **it is always the mainland that makes more room for Taiwan's wellbeing, not because Taiwan has a strong military capability that is feared by the mainland, but because the mainland regards Taiwan as family.** Although the US, especially its arms enterprises and political brokers, could reap fat profits from such practices, these companies and individuals might risk losing the second biggest market. The pros and cons are not hard to weigh. In fact, some companies have started to reflect on the deal. **Washington seems to have gone on the offensive in the arms deal, but Beijing can find opportunities to strike back.** From the Diaoyu Islands to the South China Sea disputes, the US keeps stirring troubles against China in recent years during the implementation of its "rebalancing to Asia" strategy. China could have resorted to countermeasures but is too prudent to take real action. On the occasion of this arms deal, for which the US has neither moral nor legal ground, Beijing should take the chance to carry out down-to-earth countermeasures, such as halting bilateral communications over military matters and sanctioning relevant US enterprises. It becomes increasingly obvious that playing the **Taiwan card is no longer an effective approach to countering China's rise**. On the contrary, it makes Washington take bigger risks to jeopardize a relationship with the Chinese mainland, which is clearly more important. The **US government must have realized that it is necessary to reduce the harm caused by arms sales**. During President Barack Obama's administration, the US government slowed down the frequency of arms sales to Taiwan. The last four years has seen just two arms sales. Besides, Washington knows the mainland's red line, and decided not to fulfill Taiwan's request for sensitive weaponry such as submarines and F-16 C/D fighters. Given that Taiwan's strategic significance is diminishing, to abandon it or not has raised years of debates in the US. High-level military and government officials and well-known academic experts have also expressed their concerns that arms sales to Taiwan are not helping the US gain a competitive edge. In the short term, the US won't stop selling arms to Taiwan, let alone abandon it. But the mainland's rise will eventually make the US realize that **arms sales to Taiwan are not helping Washington.**



2AC AT: Appeasement Turn

China doesn't need Taiwan for power projection

Glaser 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ("A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?" International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

Taiwan's geographic location creates another possible military danger by giving China the opportunity to deploy its forces further forward.⁹⁰ For example, Chinese control of Taiwan would provide China's navy more direct access to the open Pacific, which might increase China's power project capabilities.⁹¹ Chinese analysts identify the importance of Taiwan for enabling China to "break through" the barrier created by Japan, including the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines.⁹² In a similar vein, Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, of the U.S. Naval War College, argue: "Control of Taiwan... would allow the PLA to erect its own Great Wall at sea, giving Beijing some say over the exercise of foreign naval and military power in nearby seas and skies. . . . Analysts view Taiwan as the one geographic asset that can grant Chinese forces direct access to the Pacific. If the island is a guard tower in an offshore Great Wall, then its offensive value is unmatched."⁹³ Dissecting the strategic value of

Taiwan requires assessing how Chinese control would influence China's ability to perform specific military missions. **Available analyses provide little reason to worry that possession of Taiwan would significantly increase China's military reach or its ability to project power**⁹⁴ Control of Taiwan would, however, enhance China's A2/AD capabilities by increasing its ability to send submarines into the Philippine Sea. Owen Coté explains that Taiwan plays an important role in enabling the United States "to form effective acoustic barriers through which Chinese [diesel attack submarines/guided missile diesel submarines] must pass in transiting" from the shallow waters along China's coast into the deep water of the Philippine Sea.⁹⁵ This access is valuable because the United States plans to operate carrier battle groups in the Philippine Sea and Chinese diesel submarines would make these operations more difficult and riskier.

The impact of losing this anti submarine warfare barrier might not be large, however, because China increasingly has a **variety of other ways to threaten U.S. carrier battle groups and undermine their effectiveness, such as antiship cruise missiles** that can be launched from a diverse array of platforms (including guided missile diesel submarines), **systems designed to counter U.S. space and cyber capabilities, and an emerging antiship ballistic missile capability**.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, U.S. carrier battle groups would experience some reduction in effectiveness.



2AC AT: Appeasement Turn

Plan reduces the motive for Chinese power projection and the US can still effectively respond to it

Glaser 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

A second potential threat to U.S. security is that **territorial accommodation could reduce U.S. military capabilities**. Although numerous analysts suggest that China’s control of Taiwan would have this effect, little sustained analysis of this issue is publicly available. One possibility is that **U.S. accommodation would free up military forces** and investments that China now commits to coercing and if necessary attacking Taiwan, which would in turn enable China to shift resource to better challenge the U.S. ability to protect the East Asian SLOCs and possibly beyond.⁸² According to this argument, because the Taiwan mission has absorbed the vast majority of the Chinese army’s force modernization and organizational training,⁸³ the resources made available for other missions would be large.⁸⁴ **This danger is smaller than critics suggest**, however. If **China decides to fully pursue more ambitious missions, it would have to make large investments that would likely dwarf the amount it is spending on Taiwan-specific missions**. Consequently, **whether China eventually gains control of Taiwan is unlikely to be decisive in determining China’s ability to invest in efforts to control the South China and East China Sea SLOCs**, and beyond. Related, it is likely that Chinese capabilities dedicated to Taiwan will eventually become so effective that Beijing will be able to reallocate some of its future military investment to other missions.⁸⁵ Moreover, **ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan could reduce China’s determination to pursue more challenging distant naval missions because the United States will not interrupt these SLOCs**, except possibly during a severe crisis or major war. **Eliminating the possibility of war over Taiwan would therefore greatly reduce Beijing’s incentives to make investments in these missions. China could, however, pursue greatly expanded power projection capabilities for a variety of other reasons,⁸⁶ including worst-case planning that imagines the United States will interrupt its SLOCs** under even the most unlikely conditions, a Mahanian view of naval power that connects “commercial health with naval primacy,”⁸⁷ or the belief that superpower status requires power projection capabilities.⁸⁸ Finally, one should not exaggerate the security risks of being unable to fully control these SLOCs. The United States does not need to control the Strait of Malacca and the East Asian SLOCs to enable shipping to reach Japan during a war with China. Instead, bypass routes could allow shipping to reach oil ports on Japan’s east coast.⁸⁹ Also, the ability to deny China use of these SLOCs would be sufficient to preserve the U.S. ability to coerce China.



2AC AT: Appeasement Turn

The US can beat the Chinese navy regardless

Tang 16 Professor of Contemporary Chinese studies and Director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, UK (Steve, "The U.S. Military and American Commitment to Taiwan's Security," Asian Survey, Vol. 52, No. 4, University of California Press, Jstor)\BPS

The first and foremost of the long-standing key assets for area denial in the inventory of the PLA Navy remains its modernizing fleet of 59 attack submarines, to which new boats are still being added. The submarines have increasingly **posed a grave potential threat to the safety of U.S. carrier strike groups**. Since 1995 the Chinese submarine fleet has been upgraded by 28 modern vessels, including 12 Russian-made Kilo-class boats.³¹ **The quality and capabilities** of the more recent indigenous submarines, such as the Song- and Yuan-class boats, **have** also improved **dramatically**.³² Indeed, a Song submarine surfaced within five miles of the USS Kitty Hawk, inside its screen of escorts, in October 2006.³³ This put the carrier within range of anti-ship missiles and torpedoes. However, **whether Chinese submarines can breach the three-dimensional anti-submarine surveillance of a fully alert carrier strike group in combat conditions remains uncertain**.³⁴ In any event, **the increasing threat from the improving Chinese submarines is one that the U.S. Navy has regularly taken into account in its planning**. Thus, at this point **the growing potential threat still cannot deliver the deterrence that the PLA High Command may wish to achieve**. The most significant capability enhancement in area denial that the **Chinese have been developing is a new anti-ship ballistic missile** (ASBM) system based on the DF-21D or CSS-5 land-based mobile missile, **with a range of over 1,500 km**.³⁵ It is equipped with maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) capable of hitting moving ships at sea and has reportedly reached the testing stage.³⁶ **No other state has developed such a capability**. If it proves effective, it **will be extremely difficult to defend carriers within its range. The deployment of such a weapon system may require the U.S. to devote significant resources to counter it**. However, **the efficacy of an operational ASBM system in deterrence remains doubtful. The vulnerability of carrier battle groups may lead Washington to "pre-emptively destroy or disable missiles or supporting assets" such as the satellites that guide the missiles, instead**.³⁷ **It is unlikely that the PLA will succeed in deterring the U.S. through this new weapon system**. For example, **firing a missile that deliberately misses hitting a carrier battle group will probably escalate, not deter**. More likely, **U.S. forces will attack and eliminate such a threat, whether it scores or not**. Even though an operational Chinese ASBM capability will be taken very seriously, **the U.S. Navy has never shied from putting its capital ships in harm's way if necessary**. Furthermore, **alternative platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles can be deployed to perform some of the functions now commonly carried out by carrier-based strike aircraft, should the deployment of carriers become restricted**. In any event, how effective the Chinese ASBM system will be in knocking a carrier out of action remains to be seen. Should the U.S. Navy find itself fighting a war with the PLA, the prospect that America could lose a carrier or more has been taken into account, similarly with the possibility of a major battle with the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. **Any idea that China, by crippling a carrier or demonstrating that it can, will deter the U.S. armed forces from fulfilling orders to go to Taiwan's defense is based on a misreading of the ethos of the U.S. military establishment**. On the contrary, if **a U.S. carrier should become a "mission kill" or be rendered operationally ineffective** (even if not sunk), **this would have a huge psychological, perhaps galvanizing, impact on the Americans**. The **U.S. Navy has not suffered such a loss since the end of World War Two. Such a blow**, particularly if it resulted from a stealthy, preemptive strike, **is likely to have a "Pearl Harbor" or "September 11" effect on U.S. forces, spurring them to fight back**. The **assumption that they would withdraw**, as after the 1993 "Black Hawk Down"³⁸ incident in Somalia, **defies U.S. military tradition**. Whether the general public, and in particular the political establishment, in the U.S. will react in line with the military establishment in a crisis over Taiwan will depend on the political reality at the time and cannot be predicted. But **in a real crisis, "rally round the flag," persevere**, and expect to win in the end have long been part of the American ethos and national experience; these are likely to be the default reaction.



2AC US/China War Coming

The most recent evidence shows that Taiwan is quickly becoming the most dangerous and tense part of the US-China relationship.

Carpenter 19 [Ted Galen Carpenter, senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest, June 8th, 2019, "Forget the U.S.-China Trade War: Is a Conflict Over Taiwan the Real Threat?" <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/forget-us-china-trade-war-conflict-over-taiwan-real-threat-61627>]

Tensions between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are surging to an alarming extent. The latest indicator is the recent exchange of heated rhetoric between Gen. Wei Fenghe, China's Minister of National Defense, and Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, the Taiwanese government's chief policymaking body dealing with cross-strait relations. **As Taiwan's self-proclaimed protector, Washington should be extremely worried about these developments.** Speaking on June 1 at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual multilateral conference on Pacific security issues, Wei warned against efforts either in Taiwan or foreign countries to thwart China's goal of reunification. Moreover, **"any underestimation of the PLA's resolve and will is extremely dangerous."** Wei added ominously, **"If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military will have no choice but to fight at all costs,** at all costs, (sic.) **for national unity.** If the PLA cannot even safeguard the unity of our motherland, what do we need it for?" The Mainland Affairs Council responded with equally harsh and uncompromising language. In a statement issued **the following day, the council reasserted that Taiwan has never been a part of the PRC and would never accept Beijing's control or threats. It accused China not only of "challenging international norms and order," but added** the gratuitous slap **that Beijing's claim to seek peaceful development was "a lie of the ages."** Lest anyone not fully grasp the extent of Taipei's hostility toward the PRC, the statement went on: **"We need to remind the public that the Chinese Communist Party is practicing anti-democracy, anti-peace between the two sides of the strait and further resorting to war. This is the main cause of the tension in the Taiwan Strait and the region, and it is the source of danger and provocation against peace and stability.**



2AC US/China War Coming

A US-China war is increasingly likely, and China's military forces are slowly becoming more powerful than the United States'.

Farley 19 [Robert Farley, Professor & Contributor to The National Interest, "We Dreamed Up a U.S.-China War in 2030 (And It's Terrifying)", <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/we-dreamed-us-china-war-2030-and-its-terrifying-55792>]

We can imagine a significant threat to a U.S. ally, whether it be Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), India, Taiwan, or perhaps the Philippines. The seeds of conflict between China and all of these countries have already been planted, even if they never bloom. **If a militarized conflict developed between the PRC and any of these countries, the United States would almost invariably be drawn in.** A war involving India and the PRC would undoubtedly carry the greatest stakes, threatening to bring not only the United States into the fray, but also Pakistan and Russia. But war between China and Japan could also have catastrophic consequences. We should also remain open to the prospect of significant strategic changes, such as rivalry between the ROK and Japan that leads to a militarized dispute that then leads to a confrontation involving China and the United States. While the field of battle will depend on the cause of conflict, we can expect that the crucial theaters of war will be the East and South China Seas. This will place an emphasis on the air and naval capabilities of each country, granting that the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps have worked hard on developing ways to contribute to the ensuing "multi-domain battle." **There is every reason to believe that the military balance will shift in China's favor over the next twelve years. This does not mean that China will have an advantage, but, compared to the status quo, time favors the PRC. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is growing faster than the United States Navy (USN), even if the latter can find its way to 355 ships. In addition, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is modernizing faster than the United States Air Force (USAF), even as F-35s and B-21s come online.**



2AC Ext. Tension High Now

US-China relations low now - 2020 Taiwan elections

Tay 19 [Shirley Tay is a CNBC coordinator out of the Asia Pacific headquarters in Singapore. Jun 11, 2019. <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/11/as-us-china-relations-sour-taiwans-value-as-a-chess-piece-may-rise.html>]

Taiwan is set to have its presidential elections in January 2020 — and experts said the **polls would likely determine the direction of cross-strait ties.** Grossman said that **if the incumbent Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-Wen is re-elected,** which is “likely,” **cross-strait tensions are likely to escalate further from 2020 to 2024.**

Glaser from CSIS echoed that sentiment, adding that **if a candidate from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected, China would ratchet up military, diplomatic and economic pressure.** “I think **the Chinese would be worried that** there’s always this potential for things to go in a very negative direction because the combination of **Trump being president and the possibility that Tsai gets re-elected ... could really embolden Tsai to move toward the direction of independence,**” she added. According to Grossman, **the best hope for keeping tensions under wraps** would be if a **candidate from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party wins the next Taiwan presidential race and recognizes the “One China” policy.** That said, Grossman added, **public opinion polling in Taiwan has shown that voters will not likely support the opposition KMT** in doing so. “The Taiwanese have been observing how China’s ‘One Country, Two Systems’ approach has worked out in Hong Kong, and it isn’t too inspiring,” Grossman added. A public opinion survey conducted by the Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council in May also found **that 83.6% of Taiwan opposes Xi’s “one country, two systems” policy.** Asked if an armed conflict was a possibility, Grossman said: **“Absolutely a risk – albeit a small one.”** However, he emphasized that he did not want to get anyone alarmed, and highlighted that “those out there saying the risk is very high are probably wrong.” “I would say the risk has escalated under Tsai from maybe a 1% to 5% chance of armed conflict,” Grossman added. “But **that’s still uncomfortably high considering that China has nuclear weapons and the U.S., also with nukes, would likely intervene to save Taiwan** were China to invade or attack the island.” Similarly, Bucknell’s Zhu said that while the possibility of an escalation is always present, in reality, “neither side wants to face military confrontation.” However, economic and diplomatic confrontations are “highly likely,” he added. That may come in the form of Beijing poaching the island’s allies to ramp up pressure on Taiwan as cross-strait tensions escalate, he said. “Economically, Taiwan is heavily dependent on the mainland market, so China could restrict Taiwan’s agricultural exports to the mainland.” **Washington should “carefully deliberate” its exchanges with Taiwan and ensure the wrong signals are not sent to Beijing,** Glaser from CSIS pointed out. **“China could miscalculate and think the United States would get involved in a conflict, and that would really be a very dangerous situation,”** she added.



2AC Ext. Arms Sales Key

US- Taiwan arm sales increases US- Chine tensions- Pulling out key

Chen et al 17 (an assistant professor at the Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. I received my Ph.D. from the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park. My research interests include conflict studies, security institutions, alliance cohesion, East Asia affairs, Cross-Strait relations, and global governance..A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A670d73206c4be00d8dc650e34a1aa552>)

Continued US security ties with Taiwan, and in particular US weapons sales to the island, have long been a source of tension in the US-China relationship. The People's Republic of China (PRC) found it **unacceptable that Washington insisted on selling weapons to Taiwan even after US-PRC normalization in 1979**; the Taiwan Relations Act, which contained explicit references to continued US arms sales to Taiwan, further angered Chinese leaders.¹ **Washington agreed in a 1982 communiqué "to reduce gradually its sale of arms to Taiwan"** and promised that future arms sales to Taiwan "would not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms," those of recent years,² **but the record of US arms sales since suggests that the communiqué has had little constraining effect on US behavior.**³ **US arms sales to Taiwan, in turn, often provoke an angry Chinese response,** which typically includes tough rhetoric and symbolic retaliation, such as temporarily suspending US-China military-to-military dialogues.⁴ **US arms sales to Taiwan have continued to generate frictions in US-China relations even though relations between Taipei and Beijing improved dramatically after the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou as president in Taiwan.** In early 2010, for instance, **PRC officials were "strongly indignant" after an arms sale announcement, calling the sale a "gross intervention in China's internal affairs" that would have a "serious negative impact" on bilateral relations.**⁵



2AC Ext. Arms Sales Key

Ceasing sales dramatically improve relations – sales are seen as American interference

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master's in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 ("A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation," *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. First, U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly the most important, policy-driven sources of China's suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of "strategic distrust." A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that **Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan "as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs** and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest." In a similar vein, their report argues that "continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons ... is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China's power position is secondary to America's."⁶⁸ Nathan and Scobell conclude that "most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down."⁶⁹ Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: "The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations."⁷⁰ Xu Hui, a professor at China's National Defense University, holds that **"U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. ... I assure you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation** by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people."⁷¹ In short, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.



2AC Ext. Arms Sales Key

Congress' support of Taiwan via arms sales is angering China

Lu 4-1 (Zhenhua Lu - covers US-China bilateral diplomacy and defense for the Post. He was previously a Beijing and Brussels correspondent for the 21st Century Business Herald. April 1, 2019, "US-China tensions could ignite over Taiwan, former US officials warn," South China Morning Post, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3004175/us-china-tensions-could-ignite-over-taiwan-former-officials>)

Numerous former US officials have warned of a tense year ahead in relations across the Taiwan Strait under an increasingly anti-China US Congress and a whole-of-government approach advocating for closer US ties with the self-ruled island. They include Susan Thornton, a former top US diplomat for East Asian affairs, who is also concerned that President Donald Trump may lack sufficient understanding of the sensitivity of cross-strait relations, which could quickly become a flashpoint in US-China relations if not handled properly. Their alarming assessment follows the Trump administration's tacit approval of Taipei's request to buy more than 60 F-16V fighter jets – a move Beijing has described as “extremely dangerous” – and a flurry of legislative and other support from the US for the island in the past week. The activity in Washington comes hard on the heels of the first participation by a US coastguard vessel in a ‘freedom of navigation’ exercise conducted by the US in the Taiwan Strait. Last Tuesday a bill was introduced in the US Senate requesting a government review of its policy on Taiwan and an elevation of military ties with Taipei. “Hardliners in the US are taking their political grandstanding on Taiwan to new heights,” said Thornton, who is now a senior fellow at Yale Law School's Paul Tsai China Centre, after retiring from her diplomatic posting last July. “I expect there will be continuing defence sales but the legislation is dangerous and Trump has no understanding of this issue,” she said. If passed, the Taiwan Assurance Act would mandate a review by the US president of the State Department's guidelines on US-Taiwan relations and direct the Defence Department to include Taiwan in military training exercises, as well as support arm sales to Taipei. The legislation echoes an appeal for the US to revisit its one-China policy which was made by Trump's national security adviser, John Bolton, in an opinion article published by The Wall Street Journal in early 2017 before he joined the White House. “The bill confirms that the Congress strongly supports Taiwan politically, in part because the sentiment in Congress is fairly anti-China,” said Richard Bush, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Brookings Institution. He is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto US embassy on the island. However, Bush said that the bill's requirement of a Taiwan policy review was “not unprecedented” and predicted the US government would regard the other two items, aimed at furthering military ties, as “a clear intrusion on the president's commander-in-chief powers and in effect refuse to carry them out”. In a US House of Representatives hearing last week, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also vowed to take more action on the Taiwan Travel Act, which was passed unanimously by Congress early last year and permits high-level visits between Washington and Taipei. Beijing has repeatedly warned Washington to stop any official contacts and cut off all military ties with Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a breakaway province to be taken back by force if necessary. Washington has no formal ties with Taipei, but remains its major arms supplier and is bound by law to help defend the island. Last week, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen addressed a Heritage Foundation event in Washington, via a live video link, on US-Taiwan and cross-strait relations. She is scheduled to deliver a second, similar speech to the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies on April 9, a day ahead of the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, the US law which has defined its relations with the island since it switched sovereign recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979. The message from Washington has been alarming enough to prompt a former top White House official on Asian affairs to heap scorn on the current Taiwan policymakers in the Trump administration. “In every corner of the [current Trump] administration, the wrong people are calling the shots,” the former official said, on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue. “These guys think Beijing will just surrender on trade, Taiwan and technology, whatever,” the former official added. Edwin Feulner, founder and former president of the Heritage Foundation, an influential conservative Washington think tank, said that the US and Taiwan should further their “special relationship with increased practical cooperation”, such as a bilateral US-Taiwan free-trade agreement. “The Trump administration is more open to ways to demonstrate American support than any other administration in recent memory,” Feulner said. “Support in Congress for Taiwan from both political parties is higher than it has been for more than 20 years.” Derek Grossman, a senior defence analyst at the Rand Corporation, said that “clearly the Trump administration – and, quite significantly, the US Congress – are fully on board with bolstering US-Taiwan relations, to include in the defence domain”. Grossman said that Washington had been proceeding with a “whole-of-government” approach to countering China in nearly every dimension. “This is likely to include more frequent and higher-calibre arms sales to Taiwan and further integration of the island into Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy,” he said.



2AC AT: Alt Cause

Taiwan is key---Xi memos prove

Gamboa 18. [Florence Principe Gamboa is a research analyst at Asia Pacific Pathways to Progress and a graduate student of International Studies at the University of the Philippines Diliman, Taiwan: The Linchpin Of US-China Relations – Analysis, <https://www.eurasiareview.com/03122018-taiwan-the-linchpin-of-us-china-relations-analysis/>]

Chinese President **Xi Jinping** **has made it clear to Trump that Taiwan would be the “most important, most sensitive core issue in China-US relations”**. **Taiwan is considered to be one, if not the number one, on China’s list of its core interests**. While China has been slowly negotiating with other claimant states in the South China Sea for a Code of Conduct, reunification with Taiwan is deemed non-negotiable. **Xi** himself **stated that** any **actions** and tricks **to split China will meet the ‘punishment of history’**. Hence, **it is no surprise that in response to this perceived threat to its sovereignty, China stepped up its legal and military pressure towards Taiwan**, including suspending regular diplomatic contact due to Tsai’s refusal to endorse the 1992 consensus since she took office. In April this year, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed a revised version of China’s surveying and mapping law intended to safeguard its claims in the South China Sea and Taiwan. At the same time, China conducted live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait, sending signals to both Taiwan and the United States. China has moreover used its economic muscle to show Taiwan its place by buying diplomatic recognition of smaller countries. In 2018, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Burkina Faso cut ties with Taiwan in favor of recognizing the One China principle and establishing ties with Beijing. In another vein, the Chinese government also demanded that foreign airlines revise their website references to Taiwan to reflect China’s claim on Taiwan.



2AC AT: Alt Cause

G20 meeting fallout proves

Lopez, 6-11-19 (Linette Lopez, senior finance correspondent at Business Insider Forget the trade war — a bigger conflict between the US and China is playing out right under our noses, accessed 6/29/19, <https://www.businessinsider.com/us-arms-sales-to-taiwan-bigger-threat-to-us-china-relations>)

The world has its eye on the trade war **between the US and China**, but **a more dangerous confrontation between the two nations is playing out in the background: the worsening disagreement over the "One China" policy. Last week, Reuters reported that Washington was on its way to approving \$2 billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan.** The move indicates **the Trump administration isn't trying to create an atmosphere conducive to trade negotiations and suggests that disputes between the US and China are more likely headed toward escalation than resolution.** **"Taiwan is the thing the Chinese care most about hands down,"** said Susan Thornton, a former assistant US secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. **"Anything where the US is interfering with Taiwan hits a national third rail."** **The One China policy** — under which the US acknowledges China's claim that Taiwan is not an independent nation but rather a part of China, without taking a side — was developed during the Nixon administration to improve US-China relations. The idea **is central to China's identity as a modern world power, and since President Donald Trump took office the US has challenged that notion repeatedly. Despite protests from Beijing, Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act, legislation permitting high-level talks between US and Taiwanese officials,** last year. In May, the US national security adviser, John Bolton, met with David Lee, one of Taiwan's top security officials. This meeting came just after Taiwan renamed its unofficial embassy in Washington the Taiwan Council for US Affairs. The old name, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, neglected to mention Taiwan or the US. **The Trump administration has also sold arms to Taiwan before,** as have previous administrations, **but this \$2 billion arms sale digs at a delicate wound during a delicate time. It's a big sale,** even in a world where weapons are becoming more and more expensive. And though it does not include the US's top fighter jets, **it is sure to antagonize Beijing before the G20 meeting** at the end of the month in Osaka, Japan, where US and Chinese heads of state are expected to meet. On Thursday, **a Chinese Foreign Ministry representative, Geng Shuang, responded to the news of the arms sale with a warning,** according to the Chinese state media outlet Xinhua. **"We urge the US side to stop arms sales to Taiwan and sever their military ties, prudently and properly handle Taiwan-related issues, to avoid serious damage to China-US relations as well as to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait,"** Geng said.



2AC AT: Tensions Low

Sino-Taiwan hostility is at a record high—2020 election primaries have prompted increased military encirclement

Wang 5—30. [Kent Wang, A research fellow at the Institute for Taiwan American Study (ITAS) based in Washington, DC, where he analyzes the United States-Taiwan-China trilateral equation “Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election is crucial” <https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/05/opinion/why-the-2020-presidential-election-is-crucial-for-taiwans-future/>]

As the 2020 presidential election **campaign rages on, debates related to the** status and **future of Taiwan**, and **whether** economics or **sovereignty should be the top priority** for the Blue and Green camps, **are becoming more** and more **acute**.

China’s hostility toward the Taiwan independence leanings of the DPP government **is** also **escalating**. **The next presidential election** in the Republic of China **is scheduled to be held on January 11, 2020**. Voters will either elect a new president or re-elect the incumbent. **The process of** presidential **primary elections and nominations is likely to start within the next few months**.

Too many entangled problems are awaiting the next president for him/her to turn the tide. **Next year will be a crucial time** for Taiwan; **the new government must**, in the shortest possible time, restart cross-Taiwan Strait consultations, **smoothing out the tensions created by** People’s Liberation Army (PLA) **planes circling Taiwan**. Only by doing so can they create favorable conditions for foreign investment and the return of Taiwan businesses to China. The new government must stop Taiwan’s bleeding from an ever-increasing isolated international situation and start returning to the functional organizations of the United Nations.



2AC AT: Trade War Thumper

Taiwanese sovereignty is the central issue

Olsen 18. [Kelly Olsen, Hong Kong correspondent for CNBC, “Military tensions around Taiwan could make it harder to resolve the trade war”, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/26/military-tensions-on-taiwan-could-resolving-us-china-trade-war-harder.html>]

The United States and China are currently engaged in a tit-for-tat tariff war, and **military tensions surrounding Taiwan** could **further complicate efforts at resolving the trade standoff**. U.S. President Donald Trump “may also be attempting to put more pressure on China on multiple fronts in order to gain negotiating leverage on trade,” Kovrig said. “If so, **this kind of linkage** between issues **is a risky tactic that could backfire** by deepening the rift between the U.S. and China.” Kovrig said China’s **“heavy-handed” responses to Taiwan add to frustration** among local independence advocates while eliciting stronger shows of support for the island from the U.S., potentially **setting the stage for escalating tensions**. “It would be better for China to take a more relaxed and confident approach,” based on soft power and positive incentives, rather than threats and punishments,” he said.



2AC AT: Trade War Thumper

End arms sales with Taiwan means no tensions with China-- trade talks are concluding don't give another reason to start war

Rapoza 19 [Kenneth Rapoza is a reporter who focuses on businesses and investing in markets for Forbes. Taiwan Just Became A Huge Variable In The China Trade War. April 1st, 2019.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/04/01/taiwan-just-became-a-huge-variable-in-china-trade-war/#4c55b78c5948>]

Washington knows how to do one thing well: pick a fight. **Potential sales** of F-16 fighter jets and M-1 Abrams tanks **to Taiwan is a sure fire way to tick off Xi Jinping**, the Chinese president with whom Donald Trump is trying to sign a "great trade deal" as early as this month. Following another Steve Mnuchin/Robert

Lighthizer lackluster showing in Beijing last week, all bets are off that China and the U.S. sign anything should the two presidents meet later this month as discussed. **Taiwan is a new sticking point**. The U.S. hasn't sold fighter jets to Taiwan since 1992 in an effort to appease China, which sees Taiwan as a breakaway province designed to sow political

discord between Beijing and the West. Last week, the **Trump administration responded to the Taiwanese president's request for some of the biggest weapons made in the U.S., saying he was fine with the order**. The formal request still needs congressional approval. Beijing will lobby hard against it before Trump and Xi meet. No meeting date has been set. **Taiwan's request is an unwelcome risk**

for ongoing U.S. China talks, says Chris Rogers, a senior analyst for Panjiva, the trade research division of S&P Global Market Intelligence. Taiwan's president Tsai Ing-wen seems willing to ruffle feathers and challenge Trump, asking for the F-16 and the M-1 tank in order to "show the world the U.S. is committed to Taiwan's defense," Reuters reports.

Should the U.S. approve the orders it would ... jeopardize relations between the U.S. and China just as trade talks are due to reach a conclusion, Rogers says. Defense contractors will love this order. Those who would like to see the trade war end, won't

love it as much. Lockheed Martin builds the F-16V model that the Taiwan Air Force is after. The M-1 Abrams tank is built by General Dynamics Land Systems and is used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Panjiva analysis of official figures shows that order approvals fell 16.6% year over year in 2018 to \$48.1 billion. That was the worst year for heavy defense equipment—namely aircraft—since at least 2015 and was 23.6% below the final year of the Obama administration. The new year has also opened slowly with just \$9.2 billion of orders in the first three months of the year from \$14.5 billion at the same time in 2018. Given President Trump's prior focus on promoting the defense industry, there may be pressure to approve the orders and send them to Congress. Worth

noting, **Taiwan was the third-largest buyer of U.S. military systems, including vehicles and weapons, in 2018 and the ninth-largest buyer of aerospace equipment including jets and helicopters, according to Panjiva**. Combined exports reached \$436 million in 2018, up 18.5% year over year with aerospace accounted for 82.9%. For context, the tank order, which was first tried by Taiwan back

in July 2018, would be worth \$990 million, according to Jane's Defense. **Even though China has seen U.S. weapons imported into Taiwan before, this size of the order and its timing could be a huge deal breaker for Trump. China was ranked as the biggest security threat to the U.S.** based on January's World Threat Assessment published by the U.S. intelligence agencies. **Trade wars are just part of the escalating crisis between the two sides**, with the South China Sea being the newest military flashpoint.

Taiwan was always a sleeping giant threatening to rattle China-U.S. relations, but sales of F-16s put an unwelcome spotlight on Taiwan. Last Thursday, China's defense ministry spokesperson Wu Qian said China "resolutely opposes" any weaponry sales to Taiwan, adding that any words or actions that undermine the one-China policy are "extremely dangerous," Quartz magazine reported. **Foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang also reiterated**

Beijing's insistence on peaceful ties between Taiwan, the U.S. and China. "We urge the U.S. to fully realize the high degree of sensitivity and severe impact of this issue, honor its commitment to the one-China principle, and ... stop arms sales to Taiwan." China's Air Force buzzed Taiwan on Sunday by allegedly flying across a no-fly zone for Beijing military in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan scrambled fighter planes on Sunday morning to chase away two Chinese made J-11 Flanker B+ fighter jets. Tsai and Xi are not on speaking terms. She has refused to accept China's goal to eventually absorb Taiwan, and the latest call for U.S. war planes now puts Trump in the middle. Any

sale before a trade deal would be a huge stumbling block for Xi within the Communist Party back home, and **any sale to Taiwan after a trade deal would be seen as a breach of trust by Xi**. If Washington is looking for "enforceable" trade action, they are unlikely to get it if Beijing doesn't get an enforceable agreement on Taiwan.



2AC AT: Cease Fire

The cease-fire doesn't solve the relationship

Wiseman and Chan 6-29 (Paul Wiseman and Kelvin Chan - journalists for the Associated Press. July 29, 2019, "Cease-fire in US-China trade war doesn't bridge differences," AP NEWS, <https://www.apnews.com/5611d33f259c41808bab230accf8b3fb>) <TMS>

WASHINGTON (AP) — Once again, Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping have hit the reset button in trade talks between the world's two biggest economies, at least delaying an escalation in tension between the U.S. and China that had financial markets on edge and cast a cloud over the global economy. But when U.S. and Chinese negotiators sit down to work out details, the same difficult task remains: getting China to convince the United States that it will curb its aggressive push to challenge American technological dominance — and then to live up to its promises. At the Group of 20 meeting in Osaka, Japan, Trump and Xi agreed to a cease-fire in the trade conflict. Trump said Saturday he would hold off for the "time being" on plans to impose tariffs on \$300 billion more in Chinese imports — on top of the \$250 billion he's already targeted. This decision will jump-start trade talks that stalled last month. "We're going to work with China where we left off," Trump said Saturday. He also said China had agreed to buy more American farm products. Andy Rothman, an investment strategist with Matthews Asia and a former economic official with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, said the Trump-Xi meeting was more conciliatory than he expected. He was struck by Trump's use of the term "strategic partner" to describe U.S. relations with China after other administration officials have played up the geopolitical rivalry between the two countries. Addressing another contentious issue, Trump said he will now allow U.S. companies to sell some components to Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, which last month was put on an American blacklist as a threat to national security. Trump said that Huawei will stay on the blacklist, however, and that its future won't be decided until the end of the trade talks. Neil Shearing, London-based chief economist at Capital Economics, predicted that financial markets will rally with relief when they reopen Monday. "But I don't think this marks the turning of the tide," he said.

Talks will ebb and flow, but the direction over the next 12 months will be toward renewed escalation because issues around industrial strategy will prove to be so intractable. "The Trump administration says China is trying to cheat its way to dominance in the cutting-edge technologies of the future such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. In a report last year, the Office of the United States Trade Representative accused Beijing of resorting to predatory tactics to challenge American technological supremacy. These include forcing foreign companies to hand over technology in exchange for access to the Chinese market; subsidizing its own companies (especially those owned by the state) while burying foreign firms in regulations; providing government money so Chinese firms can buy sensitive foreign technology at above-market prices; and stealing trade secrets outright. Eleven rounds of talks failed to end the standoff. The United States has imposed 25% import taxes on \$250 billion in Chinese products and threatened to target \$300 billion more — a move that would extend the tariffs to virtually everything China ships to the United States. China has lashed back with tariffs on \$110 billion in American goods, focusing on agricultural products in a direct and painful shot at Trump supporters in the U.S. farm belt. **The last time**

Trump and Xi met — in early December at a G-20 gathering in Buenos Aires, Argentina — they also reached a cease-fire that injected new life into the talks. But **the momentum didn't last.** Until May, it appeared that the two countries were slowly closing in on a deal. But then U.S. officials accused their Chinese counterparts of renegeing on commitments they'd made earlier, and talks broke down. Getting them back on track could prove difficult. Beijing is reluctant to end subsidies to Chinese companies and to write any commitments into Chinese law. The Chinese also want the United States to drop its tariffs as a condition of any deal. But the Trump administration insists on keeping tariffs to use as leverage to make sure that China keeps its promises. For now, business groups are relieved that the tariffs aren't expanding and optimistic the two countries can reach a deal. "We are encouraged that China and the United States have agreed to continue negotiations without further escalation of the mutually damaging trade war," said Jason Oxman, president of the Information Technology Industry Council. "We are also relieved that President Trump has reconsidered his threat to impose additional tariffs, which would have accelerated harm to all American consumers, workers, and businesses of all sizes." Still, the decision to go easy on Huawei drew immediate fire politically. "Huawei is one of few potent levers we have to make China play fair on trade," said Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y. "If President Trump backs off, as it appears he is doing, it will dramatically undercut our ability to change China's unfair trades practices." The Commerce Department put the firm on a blacklist because of the possibility its equipment could be used for cyberespionage. Trump suggested that his administration will review the company's status on Commerce's so-called Entity List and cleared the way for U.S. firms to sell it some components. Both countries have economic and political incentives to reach a deal. Xi is overseeing a decelerating economy and likely won't want to be engaged in a destructive trade war when China's ruling Communist Party meets in October. Trump, too, is confronted with an economy that, though still healthy, has looked a bit wobbly. And the trade hostilities with China have hurt his supporters in rural America as he campaigns for re-election in 2020. "This is a truce for now - for Xi, ahead of the Communist Party celebrations in October and for Trump, dependent on how his re-

election campaign progresses," said Diana Choyleva, chief economist at Enodo Economics. "But as we've said before, **fundamentally, this dispute is** about much more than trade - it's **part of a longer-term Great Decoupling that stems from a conflict over technological supremacy and geopolitical power.** This is about redefining the world political and economic order, a process that will see periods of relative calm and also periods of significant turbulence." "Both Chinese and U.S. leaders recognize the importance of bringing the relations back to the right track," said Li Yong of the China Association of International Trade. "President Xi said we hoped to see normal relations. It's hard to predict what will happen tomorrow, so I cannot say when the relations will return to right track."



2AC Environmental Cooperation

China's green tech sector is booming now, they are already the new global leader in climate change, and is set to only get bigger. Cooperation with the United States could create a new future of combating environmental issues.

The Economist 18 [The Economist, "China is rapidly developing its clean-energy technology", <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/03/15/china-is-rapidly-developing-its-clean-energy-technology>]

WHEN IT COMES to energy, no country generates such bittersweet superlatives as China. It is the world's largest consumer of coal and the second-largest of oil, after America. It has the largest power-generation capacity, by a wide margin. It also produces more carbon dioxide than any other country. **China is hoping to deal with this over-dependence on fossil fuels partly by rebalancing the economy away from energy-intensive industries. But it also leads the world in clean energy. In recent years, through a combination of subsidies, policy targets and manufacturing incentives, it has spent more on cleaning up its energy system than America and the EU combined. Last year alone it shelled out \$132bn,** according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), a consultancy.

The effects of climate change are irreversible, and even the best green technology does not solve the issue.

COL 14 [Consortium of Ocean Leadership, Effects of Climate Change 'Irreversible,' U.N. Panel Warns in Report, <https://oceanleadership.org/effects-climate-change-irreversible-u-n-panel-warns-report/>]

The Earth is locked on an "irreversible" course of climatic disruption from the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and the impacts will only worsen unless nations agree to dramatic cuts in pollution, an international panel of climate scientists warned Sunday. "Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts," concluded the report by the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which draws on contributions from thousands of scientists from around the world. The report said **some impacts of climate change will "continue for centuries," even if all emissions from fossil-fuel burning were to stop.** The question facing governments is whether they can act to slow warming to a pace at which humans and natural ecosystems can adapt, or risk "abrupt and irreversible changes" as the atmosphere and oceans absorb ever-greater amounts of thermal energy within a blanket of heat-trapping gases, according to scientists who contributed to the report. In cautious and often technically complex language, the new report cites soaring emissions of carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases in the past 60 years as the cause of nearly all the warming seen so far. **While carbon dioxide is a naturally abundant gas essential for plant photosynthesis, it has been accumulating in the atmosphere at** an unprecedented rate as a byproduct of the burning of fossil fuels by automobiles, power plants and factories. Concentrations of the heat-trapping gas is 40 percent higher than in pre-industrial times, **a level "unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years," the report states.**



2AC AT: Warming Inevitable

Mitigation is possible through CO2 reductions

Peters et al 12 – Glen (“The challenge to keep global warming below 2 °C”, Natural Climate Change, Dec 2, 2012, Available at: <file:///Users/Izzy/Downloads/nclimate1783.pdf>, Accessed on: 7/16/2014, IJ)

Although current emissions are tracking the higher scenarios, it is still possible to transition towards pathways consistent with keeping temperatures below 2 °C (refs 17,19,20). **The historical record shows that some countries have reduced CO2 emissions over 10-year periods**, through a combination of (non-climate) policy intervention and economic adjustments to changing resource availability. The oil crisis of 1973 led to new policies on energy supply and energy savings, which produced a decrease in the share of fossil fuels (oil shifted to nuclear) in the energy supply of Belgium, France and Sweden, **with emission reductions of 4–5% per year sustained over 10 or more years** (Supplementary Figs S17–19). **A continuous shift to natural gas — partially substituting coal and oil — led to sustained mitigation rates of 1–2% per year** in the UK in the 1970s and again in the 2000s, 2% per year in Denmark in the 1990–2000s, and 1.4% per year since 2005 in the USA (Supplementary Figs S10–12). and nuclear power).

Targetted international agreements solve

Denton and Wilbanks 14 –Fatima Denton (African Climate Policy Centre, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) Thomas Wilbanks (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) (“Chapter 20. Climate-Resilient Pathways: Adaptation, Mitigation, and Sustainable Development”, IPCC, March 31, 2014, Available at: http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIAR5-Chap20_FGDall.pdf, Accessed on: 7/16/2014, IJ)

Climate resilient pathways are development trajectories of combined mitigation and adaptation to realize the goal of sustainable development that help avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” as specified in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) outlines its ultimate objective as the, **‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system... in order to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change,** to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner’. Article 3.4 of the Convention recognizes that ‘Parties have a right to, and should promote sustainable development’. **Number of recent decisions** by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC **has attempted to recognize the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius and encourage long-term cooperative action to combat climate change.** The Decisions agreed in Cancun at COP 16 recognizes ‘... **deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required according to science,** and as documented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, **with a view to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C** above preindustrial levels...consistent with science...[and] also recognizes the need to consider... strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge’. In the preamble of the Cancun Decisions highlights the central importance of the link between climate change and employment and ‘Realizes that addressing climate change requires a paradigm shift towards building a low-carbon society that offers substantial opportunities and ensures continued high growth and sustainable development, based on innovative technologies and more sustainable production and consumption and lifestyles, while ensuring a just transition of the workforce that creates decent work and quality jobs.’ (UNFCCC, 2011, Decision 1/CP.16). The 2011 COP in a decision known as the Durban Platform increases the strength of the language in the decision 1/CP.17 to conclude, **‘... climate change** represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet and **thus requires to be urgently addressed ... with a view to accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions.**...’ This decision was followed by the decisions adopted in Doha at the 18th Conference of the Parties that noted with grave concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties’ mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emission pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. As such, the current UNFCCC negotiations have adopted +2°C or 1.5 C as the desirable target upper limit and equated this with “dangerous” in Article 2.




2AC AT: Adaptation

It's not real

Pulmer 5-6 (Brad Plumer - a reporter covering climate change, energy policy and other environmental issues for The New York Times's climate team. May 6, 2019, "Humans Are Speeding Extinction and Altering the Natural World at an 'Unprecedented' Pace," No Publication, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/climate/biodiversity-extinction-united-nations.html>) <TMS>

And with humans continuing to burn fossil fuels for energy, global warming is expected to compound the damage. Roughly 5 percent of species worldwide are threatened with climate-related extinction if global average temperatures rise 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels, the report concluded. (The world has already warmed 1 degree.) "If climate change were the only problem we were facing, a lot of species could probably move and adapt," Richard Pearson, an ecologist at the University College of London, said. "But when populations are already small and losing genetic diversity, when natural landscapes are already fragmented, when plants and animals can't move to find newly suitable habitats, then we have a real threat on our hands." The dwindling number of species will not just make the world a less colorful or wondrous place, the report noted. It also poses risks to people.



China/Taiwan
BAUDL

JV Pack
2019/2020

Offcase Arguments



2AC China Relations CP Answers

Cooperation is impossible without ending Taiwan arm sales

Freeman 11 [Chas Freeman, American diplomat - served in the United States Foreign Service, the State and Defense Departments in many different capacities over the course of thirty years, “Beijing, Washington, and the Shifting Balance of Prestige”, <https://www.mepc.org/speeches/beijing-washington-and-shifting-balance-prestige>]

Antagonistic encounters in China’s near seas are a significant factor in worsening Sino-American military relations but they do not have the impact of U.S. moves to shore up Taiwan’s resistance to reunion with the mainland. **The Taiwan issue is the only one with the potential to ignite a war between China and the United States. To the PLA, U.S. programs with Taiwan signal fundamental American hostility to the return of China to the status of a great power under the People’s Republic. America’s continuing arms sales, training, and military counsel to Taiwan’s armed forces represent potent challenges to China’s pride, nationalism, and rising power,** as well as to its military planners. These U.S. programs appear to reflect judgments by the American elite that the Communist dictatorship on the mainland is fundamentally illegitimate and should be prevented from extending its sway to other parts of China even by peaceful means. U.S. interactions with Taiwan and Tibet belie the lip service American officials pay to the notion of “one China.” The message China’s civilian and military elite get from these interactions is that the United States wants “one China in name but not in fact — not now, and perhaps never, if America has anything to say about it.” The Chinese don’t think we should have anything to say about it. **The kind of long-term relationship of friendship and cooperation China and America want with each other is incompatible with our emotionally fraught differences over the Taiwan issue. These differences propel mutual hostility and the sort of ruinous military rivalry between the two countries that has already begun. We are coming to a point at which we can no longer finesse our differences over Taiwan.** We must either resolve them or live with the increasingly adverse consequences of our failure to do so. For Chinese, the **Taiwan issue presents an increasingly stark choice between national pride commensurate with rising prestige and continuing deference to America’s** waning power. With Taiwan and the mainland integrating in practice, China sees the policies of the United States as **the last** effective barrier to the arrival of a ripe moment for the achievement of national unity under a single, internationally respected sovereignty. **Dignity and unity have been and remain the core ambitions of the Chinese revolution.** China may, for now, continue to emphasize the avoidance of conflict with the United States. But the political dynamics of national honor will sooner or later force Beijing to adopt less risk-averse policies than it now espouses.



2AC China Relations CP Answers

Counterplan can't solve without making concessions to China on Taiwan – it overshadows all other aspects of relations

Glaser 16 Esteemed professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies (Charles L. Glaser, "Grand bargain or bad idea? US relations with China and Taiwan," International Security, v. 40 #4, Spring 2016, p.178-191)

Kim and Easley prefer the United States' current policy to a grand bargain. Both recommend some modifications designed to reassure and engage China, **including joint participation in humanitarian missions, naval cooperation on counter-piracy operations, deepening of economic interdependence via the U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty**, and support of initiatives that would increase China's role in international organizations. As I argue in my article, there is much to like about the current U.S. policy toward China and East Asia more broadly. If the United States adheres to this policy, then many of these recommendations would be useful refinements. **Nevertheless, proponents of the United States' current China policy tend to underestimate the risks inherent in the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, including its role in fueling military competition and supporting Chinese elites' negative views of U.S. motives.**

Neither Kim nor Easley says much about these risks, and certain of their remarks suggest they are not small. Kim holds that China is "much more confident and ambitious" than when President Nixon visited China in 1972 and that "Chinese leaders today believe that the United States is determined to contain and divide China internally." Easley expresses similar concerns, stating that "[f]oreign policy ambition in Beijing has outgrown the 1950s and 1990s cross-strait crises; [that] Chinese internal debates tend to paint the United States as a global competitor," and that China "is pursuing a Chinese centered regional architecture." Given these views of China, **Kim's and Easley's recommendations**, though useful, **are likely inadequate to meet the challenges currently facing the United States.** This does not mean that such a modified U.S. policy would necessarily be inferior to the grand bargain I have recommended, given that all options for dealing with China's rise will involve costs or risks, or both. **The advantage of my proposed grand bargain, however, is that it confronts the challenge posed by China's rise head on. It offers a path for eliminating the most serious geopolitical disagreement between the United States and China and for moderating the concomitant political strains and military competition,** while providing valuable information about the limited nature of China's goals that, in turn, reduces the risks of accommodation. And, **in combination with policies that reaffirm and deepen the commitment of the United States to its East Asian allies, it would enable the United States to protect its key interests in the region.** Notwithstanding the points raised by Kim and Easley, the grand bargain remains the best bet available to the United States.



2AC Credibility DA Answers

Trump as US president guarantees no NATO leadership, regardless of the plan

Burns & Lute 4/2 (Nicholas Burns is a Former Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Douglas Lute is the former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council), “NATO’s Biggest Problem is Trump”, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/natos-biggest-problem-is-president-trump/2019/04/02/6991bc9c-5570-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0280c8651966

As NATO marks its 70th anniversary this week, this unique, often unwieldy, 29-member alliance is confronting one of the most difficult sets of challenges in its history. **NATO** is still the world’s strongest military alliance. But its **single greatest danger is the absence of strong, principled American presidential leadership for the first time** in its history. Starting with NATO’s founding father, President Harry S. Truman, **each of our presidents has considered NATO a vital American interest.**

President Trump has taken a dramatically different path. As former U.S. ambassadors to NATO, we interviewed alliance leaders past and present for a new Harvard Belfer Center report: “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis.” **Nearly all viewed Trump as NATO’s most urgent and difficult problem. Never before has NATO had a U.S. leader who didn’t appear to believe deeply in NATO itself.** During his first two years in office, **Trump has questioned NATO’s core commitment embedded in Article 5** of the alliance’s founding treaty — that an attack on one of the allies will be considered an attack on all. **He has been weak and reactive in defending NATO against its most aggressive adversary, Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump has also been a consistent critic of European democratic leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, while publicly supporting anti-democratic populists such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Trump is the first president to call the European Union a “foe,” rather than a partner, of the United States.** Fortunately, the vast majority of Republican and Democratic leaders in Congress disagree with Trump on NATO’s value to the United States. They should vote to approve the bills working their way through committees that would reaffirm the United States’ commitment to Article 5 and to require congressional approval should Trump try to diminish our commitment to NATO — or to pull the United States out altogether. Congress would be acting in unison with the public’s strong support for NATO, according to a 2018 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Critics who agree with Trump present three main arguments for why he is right to question NATO. First, they say NATO’s core job was finished with the end of the Cold War. That ignores, however, Russia’s campaign to destabilize NATO members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. It also ignores Putin’s attacks on the U.S. and European elections in 2016-2018, designed to weaken our democracies from within. Containing Russian power until Putin’s Soviet-trained generation passes from the scene remains a core NATO aim. And, as our report shows, there are new challenges beyond Russia confronting the alliance. **Second, Trump has claimed the allies are “taking advantage of us.”** Low European defense spending is indeed a problem for NATO’s future. Germany, in particular, must do much more. But NATO allies have produced real growth in defense spending for four consecutive years, starting with Putin’s annexation of Crimea — a collective increase of \$87 billion. On this issue, Trump would be smart to continue to push but while doing so strive to transform himself from chief critic into the unifying leader NATO desperately needs. A third criticism is that NATO no longer contributes significantly to U.S. security in the world. Consider the facts: Canada and the European allies came to our defense on 9/11 and invoked the Article 5 mutual-defense clause of the treaty. They viewed Osama bin Laden’s attack on the United States as an attack on them as well. NATO allies went into Afghanistan with us where they and partner nations have suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths. Most of those countries remain on the ground with our soldiers to this day. NATO allies have also fought with us in the successful campaign to defeat the Islamic State caliphate in Syria and Iraq.



2AC Credibility DA Answers

Breaking commitments doesn't hurt credibility, but maintaining the current Taiwan commitment hurts US allied perception

Beinart 18 (Peter Beinart, contributing editor at The Atlantic and a professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York, citing Dartmouth College political scientists Daryl Press and Jennifer Lin, September 16, 2018. "America Needs an Entirely New Foreign Policy for the Trump Age." <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/shield-of-the-republic-a-democratic-foreign-policy-for-the-trump-age/570010/>)

There are two primary arguments against the Democratic foreign policy outlined above. The first involves credibility. If the United States abandons Taiwan, the argument goes, it will undermine the credibility of its commitment to South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. Similarly, if America won't fight Russia in Ukraine, neither Moscow nor Riga will believe America's promises to fight Russia in Latvia. During the Vietnam War, this logic was dubbed the "domino theory": If the United States didn't defend Vietnam, its credibility would collapse and other anti-communist "dominoes" would soon fall. But the theory is wrong. **Decades of academic research show that**, in the words of the Dartmouth College political scientists Daryl Press and Jennifer Lind, **"there's little evidence that supports the view that countries' record for keeping commitments determines their credibility."** **The Soviets and West Germans did not conclude that because America would not defend South Vietnam it would not defend West Berlin**, because they understood that America cared more about West Berlin than it cared about South Vietnam, and had a greater capacity to defend it. Similarly, when predicting whether the United States will defend Japan, neither Beijing nor Tokyo will look at whether America defends Taiwan. They will look at whether it is in America's interests, and within America's power, to defend Japan. **Far from bolstering a country's credibility, insolvent commitments drain its finances, overstretch its military, and undermine its reputation** for sound judgment. As Kennan put it, "There is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives."



2AC Credibility DA Answers

0% chance of a Russia-NATO war – NATO’s stable, Putin cares about domestic issues, and any conflict that does occur won’t be militarized.

Trenin 18 [Dmitri Trenin is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. **Fears of World War III are overblown.** July 20, 2018. <https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-nato-crimea-fears-of-world-war-iii-are-overblown/>]

Europeans fretted about the end of NATO. But seen from Moscow, the military alliance still appears to be very much alive. Trump's harsh words to his allies on spending haven't changed that. Russia is all too aware that the alliance is focused on its eastern flank, and not only rhetorically. Since it rediscovered Russia as a threat in 2014, there have been new deployments, a higher degree of mobility, and more military exercises along the Russian border, from the Barents to the Black Seas.

Hardly a boon for Russia. It was clear at last week's NATO summit that **allies** agree on the need to upgrade the bloc's military efforts. Germany, Italy, France, the U.S. — they **all agree** members' defense **spending should go up**. Whether by 2 percent of GDP as agreed in Wales, or by 4 percent as now demanded by Trump, is, of course, important. However, with Russia's GDP often likened to that of Spain, or the state of New York, either figure is considered significant in Moscow, given that the money will be spent with Russia in mind. NATO allies also worry about Trump's comment this week that it is problematic for the U.S. to come to the defense of smaller NATO allies such as Montenegro. But let's not forget that at the height of the Cold War it was never 100 percent certain what the U.S. would do in case of an attack on West Germany. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt would not have asked for U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe in the 1970s had he had full confidence in NATO's largest member. Nor is NATO enlargement off the table completely. Macedonia has just crossed a major hurdle in its push for membership. Predictions that Trump would recognize Crimea at the Helsinki meeting were also overblown. There was never any question of the U.S. accepting Crimea's status as part of Russia, or Washington leaning on Kiev to fulfill its side of the Minsk II accords. In Helsinki, Trump and Putin simply acknowledged the issue, and moved on. The U.S. continues to support both Ukraine and Georgia in their conflicts with Russia and to promote their eventual membership in NATO, which most in the West privately regard as increasingly dangerous. NATO is still very much exerting pressure on Russia. It's considered more of an annoyance than an immediate threat in Moscow, but also keeps the country in permanent "war mode" vis-à-vis the U.S. Because Moscow is focused on Washington, this means Europeans usually get a pass.

As for Russia's own intentions, two things are clear. **There is no interest in Moscow in attacking the Baltic states or Poland.** These countries are as safe now as they were before 2014. Suggestions otherwise simply point to the deep wounds in both nations' psyche, which will not be healed for many decades. Should Ukraine's leaders decide to repeat Mikheil Saakashvili's mistake in 2008 and launch a major offensive to retake Donbas — however unlikely — the Russian response could indeed be devastating and lead to Ukraine's loss of sovereignty, as Putin recently stated. But does this mean Russia will move on Ukraine unprovoked? Most certainly not. **Putin's main concerns are largely domestic. He has an ambitious program that logically calls for more economic ties with the West. To move forward, he is looking to ease tensions with the EU and the U.S. What Putin wanted to get out of Helsinki was mainly to start a dialogue with Washington.** Those hopes are now visibly going up in smoke. It is safe to bet that Russia will continue to face the same opposition from a coalition of U.S. and EU interests. The first détente in the hybrid war between Russia and the West was indeed nipped in the bud by Trump's behavior and the vehemence of his domestic critics. So be it. **Moscow will not capitulate, and will indeed push back. But it's not likely to take the form of an aggressive, overt military attack. Fears of new wars are far from accurate.**



2AC Credibility DA Answers

Trump bullying allies into investment will make NATO allies question US credibility anyways

Belkin 3/28 [Paul Belkin has a BA in philosophy from the University of California Berkeley, a Masters in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University, and is currently a European Affairs Analyst at the Congressional Research Service. "Assessing NATO's Value", March 28, 2019. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45652.pdf>]

Although **Congress has expressed consistent bipartisan support for NATO** and its cornerstone Article 5 mutual defense commitment, **congressional hearings on NATO in the 115th and 116th Congresses have reflected disagreement on the impact President Trump is having on the alliance**. Some in Congress argue that President Trump's criticism of allied defense spending levels has spurred recent defense spending increases by NATO members that were not forthcoming under prior Administrations despite longstanding U.S. concern. **They point out that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has acknowledged that President Trump "is having an impact" in securing \$41 billion of additional defense spending by European allies and Canada since 2016. Others in Congress counter that President Trump's admonition of U.S. allies and his questioning of NATO's utility has damaged essential relationships and undermined NATO's credibility and cohesion. They contend that doubts about the U.S. commitment to NATO could embolden adversaries, including Russia, and ultimately weaken the commitment of other allies** to the alliance. Some analysts argue that European allies who feel belittled by the U.S. president might be less likely to support future NATO operations advocated by the United States. Critics also tend to downplay President Trump's role in securing recent defense spending increases by NATO allies. They argue that Russian aggression in Europe has been a greater factor behind rising defense budgets, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.

Credibility thesis is wrong - lacks empirical support

Lanoszka 2015 (Alexander, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow @ MIT, "The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Statecraft," <http://www.alexlanoszka.com/AlexanderLanoszkaIntro.pdf>)

To be sure, some scholars even dismiss the notion that policy-makers can manipulate perceptions of credibility. Jonathan Mercer writes that **states can never develop a reputation for resolve among their allies. Whatever action they implement that advances the security interests of another is explained away as rooted in self-interest rather than on 'being a good ally.'**¹³ In his study of crisis diplomacy between adversaries, Daryl Press builds on this skepticism. He argues that **balances of interest and power shape perceptions of credibility rather than past actions. It is therefore pointless to pursue policy on the grounds of appearing credible** to others.¹⁴ Not everyone agrees with such assessments of credibility. Gregory Miller demonstrates how actions can affect credibility and, by extension, the behavior of allies. However, he relies on evidence drawn exclusively from before the First World War.¹⁵ It is unclear whether and how credibility matters among allies in the nuclear age. And yet **pundits and analysts commonly assume that the United States to this day needs to appear resolved and credible to its allies, whether in Central Europe or the East China Sea. In light of the critical literature just mentioned, the validity of these intuitively appealing arguments is not self-evident. We lack an empirical study that assesses such claims.**



2AC Anti-Imperialism

Taiwan is trending towards reunification China now, and any transition would be peaceful and would benefit Taiwan as well.

Huang 19 [Kristin Huang, Senior Reporter, South China Morning Post, “Taiwan can’t resist historic trend towards unification, says head of Chinese cross-strait group”, South China Morning Post, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3001575/taiwan-cant-resist-historic-trend-towards-unification-says>]

Any effort by Taiwan to resist the “historic trend” towards unification is doomed to failure since Beijing is in a much stronger position to realise its goals, the head of a semi-official Chinese body to handle relations with the island said on Wednesday. Zhang Zhijun, **the president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, told reporters** at the annual legislative session in Beijing that **reunification was inevitable as China becomes stronger**. “The Taiwan issue happened because of the degeneration of the Chinese nation,” Zhang, **the former director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said**. “The problem will be resolved as our country rejuvenates.” “We now have greater influence across the Taiwan Strait and **we are more capable than ever of leading cross-strait relations in the right direction** ... and achieving the peaceful reunification of China,” he added. Tsai has refused to acknowledge the “one-China” principle – which holds that the mainland and Taiwan are part of one sovereign nation without defining what that means in practice – as the basis for reunification negotiations. In a speech in January, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that unification with Taiwan was a key part of China’s “national rejuvenation” and the political divide must be resolved.

After many years, both Beijing and Taiwan are opening up to the idea of peaceful reunification, and talks could begin soon.

Reuters 19 [Reuters, “China says Taiwan talks must benefit 'reunification'”, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan/china-says-taiwan-talks-must-benefit-reunification-idUSKCN1QG0CJ>]

China can talk to Taiwan as long as it helps promote peaceful development and “reunification”, Beijing said on Wednesday, after **the island’s main opposition party said it could sign a peace treaty if it wins a presidential election next year. China claims self-ruled and proudly democratic Taiwan as its own and has vowed to bring the island, which it regards as sacred territory, under Chinese control, by force if necessary. While China has not broached the idea of a peace deal in years, the chairman of the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang, Wu Den-yih, said earlier this month the party could sign a peace deal with China** if it won the hotly contested election. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), said the island will not accept any deal that destroys its sovereignty and democracy. **China’s policy-making Taiwan Affairs Office, in the government’s first official response to the Kuomintang’s peace agreement proposal, said anything that benefits the interests of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be promoted. “As long as it benefits protecting the peace of the Taiwan Strait and increasing the peaceful development of relations, and pushes the peaceful reunification process of the motherland, it can be jointly investigated by both sides,”** spokesman An Fengshan told a regular news briefing.



2AC Anti-Imperialism

US support is not essential to Taiwan; they are developing their own advanced defensive arsenal.

Cole 15 [J. Michael Cole, editor in chief of Taiwan Sentinel as well as a Taipei-based Senior Fellow with the China Policy Institute/Taiwan Studies Programme at the University of Nottingham, UK and associate researcher with the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, “Taiwan Unveils New Long-Endurance Drone, New Weapons at Defense Trade Show”, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-unveils-new-long-endurance-drone-new-weapons-at-defense-trade-show/>]

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense on August 13 unveiled a new indigenously produced long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and various weapons systems at the biennial Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition (TADTE). The centerpiece of this year’s event was without doubt the Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAV developed by the Aeronautical Systems Research Division (ASRD), a branch of the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), Taiwan’s top defense research institute. Still in the testing phase, the all-composite MALE prototype, which bears a striking similarity to the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper, can carry multiple payloads and was designed to conduct civilian/military intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, environmental research and coastal patrol operations. Although very little information was made available, a fact sheet provided by the designer indicated that the UAV can perform automatic takeoff and landing, automatic navigation, multi-vehicle control, aerial communication relay and ground network control, and real-time video transmission. The drone is designed for day and night civilian/military missions. An ASRD spokesman refused to divulge specifics on the aircraft’s weight, range, and length (visual estimate at 26~30 m). Asked about a possible weaponized variant of the MALE UAV, officials gave an ambivalent response. **The [Institute] NCSIST also unveiled the “Tan An” Coastal Defense Rocket System, a turret-mounted rotational unmanned system that can be deployed on shore and at critical locations on outlying islands for counter-landing operations.** The fixed-emplacement CDRS operates at a maximum range of 1.2 km and comprises 12x7 rocket launchers for concentrated fire. **Also unveiled for the first time was the Sea Oryx Missile System, a ship-based short-range air defense system to ensure at-sea protection against anti-ship missiles, aircraft, UAVs and helicopters.** Each launcher has eight or 16 ready-to-fire Sea Oryx missiles, a navalized version of the air-launched Tien Chien 1 (TC-1) upgraded with an imaging infrared seeker, inertial navigation, a data link system and an enhanced rocket motor. The Oryx system normally operates in lock-on-after-launch (LOAL) mode to reduce engagement reaction time and increase survivability. The Sea Oryx will be deployed on small and medium-sized navy vessels, a NCSIST official said. TADTE runs August 13-16, with 126 foreign and domestic exhibitors. Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics and Rockwell Collins are among the major U.S. defense manufacturers participating at the event. **In a sign of growing interest for unmanned aerial vehicle technology, this year’s show counts a total of 12 exhibitors in that sector, from four in 2013.** Conversely, the Defense Industry Equipment and Technology Area suffered the largest drop in the number of exhibitors, from 29 in 2013 to 19 this year.




2AC Anti-Imperialism


China is seeking peaceful means of reunification now, which benefits both sides. Either way, US meddling in the issue makes things worse.

Westerman 19 [Ashley Westerman, Producer, NPR "Morning Edition", "Xi Urges Peaceful Unification Of China And Taiwan, But Won't Rule Out Using Force" <https://www.npr.org/2019/01/02/673986174/xi-urges-peaceful-unification-of-china-and-taiwan-but-wont-rule-out-using-force>]

While **Beijing would seek a peaceful "reunification" with the self-governing island of over 23.5 million people, The Associated Press reports Xi said** China wouldn't rule out using force if necessary. **"We are willing to create a vast space for peaceful unification, but we will never leave any room for any sort of Taiwan independence separatist activities,"** he said speaking at Beijing's Great Hall of the People. Xi went on to say "independence would only bring profound disaster for Taiwan" and ensured the island a bright future under a one-country, two-system framework, according to Reuters. **The Chinese president's urging for the two to come to the table came during a speech marking the 40th anniversary of the "Message of Compatriots in Taiwan" when, on Jan. 1, 1979, China offered to open up communications and stop military action against the island.** As NPR's Shanghai Correspondent Rob Schmitz has reported previously, Taiwan split from China in 1949 when the U.S.-supported Chinese nationalist leadership fled after losing a civil war to communist forces. Then president of Taiwan Chiang Ching-Kuo turned down Beijing's olive branch in 1979, reports Reuters, and later that year came out with the "Three-Noes Policy": no contact, no compromise and no negotiation with China. Decades later, China has again been rebuffed. In response to Xi's speech, current president since 2016, Tsai Ing-wen said Wednesday that Taiwan would not accept Beijing's offered arrangement of "one country, two systems," reports Reuters. In her own speech just the day before, Tsai, who is member of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, urged China to respect Taiwan's democratic values. More than 70 percent of Taiwanese believe Taiwan is already an independent country, according to an analysis done by The Washington Post. Unification with China has also become unpopular, the Post reports only one-third of Taiwanese citizens want to be part of China against — a drop from 60 percent who supported is in 2003. **Only about 20 countries across the globe recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation, which means different governments from Latin America to Africa have become drawn into the long-running diplomatic spat over the years.** The U.S., which does not recognize Taiwan as independent from China, is no exception. While the State Department says the U.S. enjoys "a robust unofficial relationship" with Taiwan, right after his inauguration President Donald Trump called Xi and promised that Washington would stick to the "One China" doctrine. Then just a little over a year later, the U.S. dedicated a new complex for the American Institute in Taiwan, which has long functioned as the de facto U.S. Embassy in Taiwan, NPR previously reported. **Though he didn't name any country specifically, Xi warned Wednesday against foreign interference in China's "Taiwan issue," saying family matters should be resolved by family members, reports the AP.**



Negative Evidence



China/Taiwan
BAUDL

JV Pack
2019/2020

Offcase Arguments



1NC China Relations CP

Text: The United States federal government should:

- **Substantially reduce tariffs placed on the People's Republic of China**
- **consent to be bound by the Paris Climate Accord**
- **offer to work cooperatively with China on disease management, infrastructure development, and peacekeeping in Africa**
- **increase cooperation with China over counter-narcotics law enforcement**
- **end freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea**

Counterplan solves, improves Chinese relations across the board

Carter 19 (Jimmy Carter, former President of the United States, January 1, 2019. "Jimmy Carter: How to repair the U.S.-China relationship and prevent a modern Cold War.")

<https://www.denverpost.com/2019/01/01/jimmy-carter-how-to-repair-the-u-s-china-relationship-and-prevent-a-modern-cold-war/>)

The U.S. imposition of tariffs on \$200 billion worth of Chinese goods, and China's retaliatory tariffs, contribute to the deteriorating relationship, hurting both countries. The 90-day pause in further escalation of tariffs, agreed to at the Group of 20 summit in Argentina, offers the possibility of reaching a permanent agreement on U.S.-China trade. What can we do to build on this progress, and to repair the U.S.-China relationship? First, the United States' long-standing complaints — about trade imbalances, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, and unfair barriers to U.S. investments and business operations in China — must be addressed quickly and effectively. **Neither country should use "national security" as an excuse to obstruct the other's legitimate commercial activities. China needs competition for its economy to innovate and grow;** pursuing a fair and reciprocal relationship is the only way for both countries to remain economically strong. Second, **Americans must acknowledge that, just as China has no right to interfere in U.S. affairs, we have no inherent right to dictate to China how to govern its people or choose its leaders.** Though even countries with the closest of relationships may critique each other at times, such engagements should never become directives or edicts; they should rather serve as a two-way street of open dialogue. China's achievements in sustaining economic growth, alleviating abject poverty and providing developmental assistance to other countries need to be celebrated. At the same time, we cannot ignore its deficiencies in internet censorship, policies toward minorities and religious restrictions — which should be recorded and criticized. This balanced approach is key to ensuring that the United States and China continue to work together toward solving some of the most intractable global problems. Despite current tensions on other issues, Chinese support has been essential in our ongoing efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Beijing also could offer crucial help in post-conflict reconstruction in the Middle East and Africa, countering terrorism and extremism, and mediating other international disputes. **The United States should return to the Paris climate accord and work with China on environmental and climate-change issues,** as the epic struggle against global warming requires active participation from both nations. But I believe **the easiest route to bilateral cooperation lies in Africa. Both countries are already heavily involved** there **in** fighting **disease**, building **infrastructure and** keeping **peace** — sometimes cooperatively. Yet each nation has accused the other of economic exploitation or political manipulation. Africans — like billions of other people around the world — do not want to be forced to choose a side. Instead, they welcome the synergy that comes from pooling resources, sharing expertise and designing complementary aid programs. **By working together with Africans, the United States and China would also be helping themselves overcome distrust and rebuild this vital relationship.** In 1979, Deng Xiaoping and I knew we were advancing the cause of peace. While today's leaders face a different world, the cause of peace remains just as important. Leaders must bring new vision, courage and ingenuity to new challenges and opportunities, but I believe they also must accept our conviction that the United States and China need to build their futures together, for themselves and for humanity at large.



2NC China Relations CP – Counter-narcotics

Increasing US-China cooperation on counter-narcotics spills over to cooperation on every issue AND overcomes distrust over Taiwan

Bodetti 17 (Austin Bodetti is a journalist for The Diplomat that focuses on international conflict. China-US Cooperation and the New Opium War. August 16, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/china-us-cooperation-and-the-new-opium-war/>)

China and the United States **rarely agree** whereas the U.S. has threatened to bomb **North Korea**, China considers the **hermit kingdom** a troublesome but worthwhile **ally**. The U.S. has tried to **outmaneuver** Chinese warships in the **East and South China Seas** to thwart the expansionist ambitions of East Asia's largest country; China has launched countless **cyberattacks**

on the U.S., which has **long armed Taiwan** the Chinese province turned sovereign state. When the U.S. criticized China for abusing human rights, China rebranded the War on Terror as a way to extinguish activism and secessionism among Muslims in Xinjiang. Tibetans, who inhabit another province with a secessionist history, have many friends in the United States. It may surprise many observers of the Sino-American relations to read, then, that China and the U.S. have a mutual interests in pursuing the War on Drugs, a controversial American enterprise. "The competition between the U.S. and China doesn't mean there can't be cooperation on combating opiates and opioids," noted Jeffrey Higgins, a former supervisory special agent in the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). "China has a growing drug problem, despite its draconian drug laws. This gives China a compelling interest in collaborating with any country to combat drugs." The history of China and the Western world's cooperation on and conflict over drugs began with the Opium Wars in the 1800s, when the British Empire pushed China to accept the illegal drug trade. The problems that Britain started continue today: the Chinese government has established over 500 counternarcotics guidelines and laws, more than any other country in the world, including the U.S., which itself is facing an opioid epidemic from New Hampshire to New Mexico. In 2016, the Chinese government's seizures of synthetic drugs, such as ketamine and methamphetamine, soared by 106 percent, suggesting that whatever strategy China has pursued is failing to contain its own epidemic.

China's difficulties have spread to the U.S. through **fentanyl**, an opioid painkiller 50 times stronger (and thus deadlier) than heroin. This May, the Justice Department indicted six people in Utah for purchasing fentanyl from China, where clandestine chemists can purchase the precursors necessary for its production with ease. Chinese traffickers then ship fentanyl to American customers or middlemen through arrangements made on the dark web, a subsection of the Internet hidden in overlay networks requiring unique software to access. The secrecy of this method has already hindered coordination between China and Canada, which is struggling like the U.S. to battle the spread of the illegal drug trade from China through its borders. Mike Vigil, former Chief of International Operations for the DEA, praised China's efforts. "Much to their credit, they have included at least 134 fentanyl analogs in their controlled substances list," he told The Diplomat in an email. "Unfortunately, the laboratories quickly change the molecular structure of the opioids, thereby forcing China to control the new analogs. It takes eight months to a year to put them on their list of controlled substances." This June and under American pressure, China banned U-47700, a drug that acted as a legal alternative to fentanyl. Chinese chemists remain a step ahead of the of the Chinese government, though, devising new products faster than authorities in Beijing can respond. A vendor on

AlphaBay Market, a darknet market, even felt bold enough to film his Chinese operations. This March, DEA spokesman Rusty Payne noted that **stopping the shipment of**

fentanyl from China to the United States remained one of the **law enforcement agency's biggest priorities**. To

achieve its goals, **the DEA will** have to **improve cooperation and coordination** with its **Chinese counterparts**.

"The DEA has been working hard behind the scenes there for the past several years to convince the Chinese that they have a serious illegal fentanyl production problem that is entering the illegal market, and to assist with sharing intelligence and working closely with the DEA's counterparts throughout the various provinces," a former senior DEA official who had helped supervise agreements with China told The Diplomat. "It's true that, historically, the working relationship between the U.S. and China in general has been strained, but, on narcotics trafficking, there have always been fairly quiet and constructive engagements." Higgins and Vigil concurred. "While China may not be willing to designate resources to help the U.S. fight drugs in general, the Chinese should be amenable to cooperating with the investigation and dismantlement of drug trafficking organizations that pose a threat to China," Higgins argued. Vigil added: "China's efforts to curb its own opioid epidemic also help the U.S. and other countries impede the movement of illegal opioids coming from that country. China is aggressively trying to control the production of illicit opioids and is working closely with the US in the sharing of information." The DEA's work with China has yielded some significant successes. Last month, the Justice Department announced the closure of AlphaBay, which it described as "the largest online 'darknet market'" and "the largest criminal marketplace on the Internet." Thai authorities arrested AlphaBay's founder, Canadian

Alexandre Cazes, on Washington's behalf. **The enterprising nature** of American and Chinese traffickers, however, implies

that China and the DEA have **much more work to do**. Though the former DEA special agents whom The Diplomat interviewed seemed skeptical that recent tensions between China and the United States could torpedo their mutual interest in the War on Drugs, they highlighted several difficulties complicating the relationship. "Much of the world's fentanyl comes out of China, so the Chinese government did have a natural conflict of interest in stopping the flow of fentanyl to the U.S.," observed Higgins. The former senior DEA

official, who requested anonymity, concluded: "Could it be better? Yes. Is there a growing corruption problem there? Yes." **As China and the United States look**

to reach an understanding on North Korea, coordination between the world's most populous country and the world's most effective **counternarcotics law enforcement agency** could **serve as a model** for

wider cooperation between the two even if China and the DEA encounter a few hiccups along the way. If China and the U.S. can

make **common cause** in the War on Drugs, **counterterrorism** and **nonproliferation** may become the

next steps in a **rocky but valuable relationship** spanning not only the Pacific Ocean but also the

international community



2NC China Relations CP – FONOPS

Ending freedom of navigation operations in the SCS drastically decreases US-China tensions and improves relations

Carpenter 18 (Carpenter, Ted Galen. "A Modest US Concession Can Reduce Tensions in the South China Sea." Cato Institute, 13 Aug. 2018, www.cato.org/publications/commentary/modest-us-concession-can-reduce-tensions-south-china-sea.)

Tensions between China and the United States are rising on multiple fronts. The onset of dueling tariffs is threatening to trigger a full-fledged bilateral trade war. Beijing's anger is rising about Washington's growing attempts to upgrade diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan. Finally, the two countries are sparring dangerously over their respective policies and goals in the South China Sea. **All of those disputes are**

dangerous, but the Taiwan and South China Sea issues hold the most potential for poisoning the bilateral relationship and escalating into war. Compromise regarding Taiwan is inherently elusive, but a modest change in U.S. policy could significantly dampen tensions in the South China Sea.

Specifically, Washington needs to dramatically reduce its confrontational "freedom of navigation" patrols and stop treating Beijing as a disruptive element, if not an outright threat, in that region.

One longstanding reason for a large-scale U.S. naval presence in the western Pacific is the importance of unimpeded shipping to the health of the global economy. U.S. political and economic leaders fret about potential disruptions to the flow of commerce and have done so for decades. That is an understandable concern. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that 80% of world trade measured by volume and 70% measured by value travels by sea. The sea lanes transiting the South China Sea are especially crucial arteries. UNCTAD's analysis shows that one-third of global shipping passes through that body of water. A conservative estimate of the annual dollar value by the Center for Strategic and International Studies' China Power Project put the figure at \$3.37 trillion, but concedes that other estimates are as high as \$5.3 trillion. The CSIS study emphasizes that the waters "are particularly critical for China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, all of which rely on the Strait of Malacca, which connects the South China Sea and, by extension, the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean." U.S. leaders increasingly view China as a potential menace to that commerce. The root of Washington's suspicion is the extent and intensity of Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea. It is not a new issue. In December 1947, the government of the Republic of China (Chiang Kai-shek's regime) issued a map delineating an 11-dash line (later reduced to a 9-dash line) that laid claim to more than 80% of the South China Sea. The communist regime that overthrew Chiang two years later and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) subsequently embraced that claim. Until the past decade or so, though, Beijing's audacious territorial ambition remained little more than theoretical. The PRC lacked the military power to make even a credible effort to enforce its claims. But as China's economic and military power has grown, PRC leaders have become more insistent that most of the South China Sea is rightfully Chinese territorial waters. Beijing also has dredged areas surrounding partially sunken reefs to expand the land areas on those reefs into full-fledged artificial islands. Even more troubling from the U.S. perspective, China has built structures, including military airstrips, on those new islands. Although China is not the only country to pursue such reclamation projects (Vietnam, in particular, also has done so), the PRC's program is the most extensive. Washington has flatly rejected Beijing's stance regarding the South China Sea. U.S. officials have repeatedly condemned the creation of artificial islands, especially China's building of military installations. The U.S. Navy also has increased the frequency of patrols through the South China Sea and explicitly labeled them 'freedom of navigation patrols.' That term implies that Washington regards China's growing presence, including an increase in PRC

naval activities, as a potential threat to free navigation. Beijing, in turn, has reacted angrily to intrusive U.S. patrols so close to the Chinese homeland, condemning them as a serious provocation. **Washington**

needs to reconsider its policy in the South China Sea. The PRC's territorial claims are not justified by either history or law — as the International Court of Arbitration ruled in 2016 in a case brought by the Philippines against Beijing. But given its own extensive shipping that transits the South China Sea, the PRC also has a powerful incentive to keep the waterway open. The amount of Chinese exports transported through that body of water is larger than that of any other country, accounting for nearly 25% of the overall flow. Indeed, some 40% of China's total exports travel those sea lanes. PRC leaders know that if they disrupt that commerce, the United States (and other naval powers such as Japan and Australia) could easily choke-off the flow of Chinese products as well. Given its export-driven economy, causing problems in the South China Sea would be an especially foolish policy for Beijing to adopt. Chinese leaders seem to recognize that point, as evidenced by their work with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to establish a "code of conduct" that could minimize disputes in the South China Sea. Instead of viewing China as a potential threat to South China Sea commerce, the Trump administration should recognize that the PRC can be a useful partner in helping to keep the sea lanes open. One should not expect Beijing to abandon its territorial claims, and that stance will always have a somewhat menacing potential. Chinese leaders undoubtedly want their country to be recognized as the leading power in the South China Sea; Washington cannot possibly achieve the goal of having Beijing accept continued U.S. hegemony there. At the same time, the United States has no intention of acquiescing in the PRC's legal quest to convert the South China Sea into Chinese territorial waters. There is little chance of a comprehensive settlement to completely resolve such an impasse in the foreseeable future. But the two sides can reach a more limited

accommodation that would reduce the upward trend in dangerous tensions. **The main problem is China's anger about the U.S. Navy's freedom**

of navigation patrols. U.S. leaders should offer to greatly reduce the number of those patrols, and avoid sending them into the vicinity of Chinese-built artificial islands,

as long as Beijing is willing to offer formal assurances that it will take no action to disrupt shipping through the South China Sea, and will, in fact, work to combat existing threats, most notably the continued problem of piracy in waters near the vital Strait of Malacca. Such a de facto truce and modus vivendi

would not guarantee lasting harmony regarding the South China Sea. However, it would markedly reduce diplomatic strain between Beijing and Washington — and, perhaps even more importantly,

decrease the mounting tensions between the naval forces of the two countries. That potential achievement is well worth Washington taking the initiative and offering such a proposal to Beijing.



1NC Credibility DA

The plan abandons Taiwan which crushes US alliance cred globally

Stavridis 18 (James Stavridis, retired U.S. Navy admiral and former supreme allied commander of NATO, "Taiwan Is Not a Bargaining chip with china, "https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-31/trump-can-t-make-taiwan-a-bargaining-chip-with-china)

First, the **Washington must recognize that support for Taiwan is not a bargaining chip to** be put on the table to **obtain better outcomes with** mainland **China**. The U.S. has significant disputes with the People's Republic over trade imbalances, cyber-intrusions, intellectual property theft, North Korean bad behavior, and Beijing's territorial claims over the South China Sea. It is certainly tempting for the U.S. **to use Taiwan as leverage in dealing with** those issues, e.g. telling **China** to modulate its positions favorably for the U.S. in return for lessened U.S. support to the island. When he was president-elect, Donald Trump mused about doing exactly that, and as the trade dispute heats up, that temptation will grow. That **would be a significant mistake. Taiwan has been** a steadfast supporter of the U.S. for decades, and continues to perform as a **staunch ally** in a very turbulent and vital geopolitical arena. **A betrayal of trust would have a ripple effect globally, further degrading U.S. credibility as an ally.** It also misreads Beijing's intent and attitude — China has no interest in a deal involving Taiwan. The claim to the island is the ultimate red line in its foreign policy, and it is especially true that a nationalist government like Xi's will not be part of a negotiation involving Taiwan's status. The **Trump** administration **must** come to understand the overarching importance China places on eventually incorporating Taiwan into its governance structure, and display First, the **Washington must recognize that support for Taiwan is not a bargaining chip to** be put on the table to **obtain better outcomes with** mainland **China**. The U.S. has significant disputes with the People's Republic over trade imbalances, cyber-intrusions, intellectual property theft, North Korean bad behavior, and Beijing's territorial claims over the South China Sea. It is certainly tempting for the U.S. **to use Taiwan as leverage in dealing with** those issues, e.g. telling **China** to modulate its positions favorably for the U.S. in return for lessened U.S. support to the island. When he was president-elect, Donald Trump mused about doing exactly that, and as the trade dispute heats up, that temptation will grow. That **would be a significant mistake. Taiwan has been a** steadfast supporter of the U.S. for decades, and continues to perform as a **staunch ally** in a very turbulent and vital geopolitical arena. **A betrayal of trust would have a ripple effect globally, further degrading U.S. credibility as an ally.** It also misreads Beijing's intent and attitude — China has no interest in a deal involving Taiwan. The claim to the island is the ultimate red line in its foreign policy, and it is especially true that a nationalist government like Xi's will not be part of a negotiation involving Taiwan's status. The **Trump** administration **must** come to understand the overarching importance China places on eventually incorporating Taiwan into its governance structure, and display

Broad US alliance cred is key to the integrity of NATO.

Bazin and Kunertova 18 [Aaron Bazin served NATO and the US Army and has a doctorate in psychology. <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/>]

In outlining realist, economic, institutionalist, and social-constructivist theoretical perspectives, other categories of variables emerged: internal dimension of threats, bureaucracy and alliance institutionalization, and shared values and identity. What happens inside the Alliance could matter as much as **what happens outside the Alliance**. Given that NATO's endurance had not conformed to the predictions of traditional alliance theory, Ohio University professor Patricia Weitsman suggested examining internal and external threat dyads in order to understand alliance cohesion.²¹ She found that NATO survived the end of the Cold War due to low internal threat, which concerns the politics of alliances. Consequently, this alliance cohesion theory says the lower the internal threat, the more cohesive the alliance; and the greater the external threat, the higher level of alliance cohesion.²² Another important factor in alliance cohesion is the way in which intra-alliance cooperation institutionalizes bureaucratic structures.²³ For instance, some assert that consultative norms and structures **can mitigate internal threats to cohesion**.²⁴ Furthermore, the Alliance's institutional structures allow for information exchange among allies that can raise the level of alliance cohesion independently from external factors.²⁵ Additionally, **the transatlantic bond has depended on credible signaling (i.e., an ally's trust in another's assurances)**. Especially in the context of nuclear sharing, **"weak signals" of U.S. commitment** to Europe **could damage NATO's cohesion**.



1NC Credibility DA

That results in the Russians attempting to gain power

Burns 4/3 (Nicholas Burns is a Former Secretary of State for Public Affairs), “Does the US need NATO?”, <https://qz.com/1585911/does-the-us-need-nato/>)

I served as US ambassador to NATO from 2001 until 2005 during the administration of President George W. Bush. NATO remains our most important alliance. It is an irreplaceable asset for the security of the United States. We must do everything possible to work with Canada and the European allies to strengthen it for the many challenges ahead. **NATO is facing, however, one of its most difficult crises in seven decades. It is not a crisis**

of military strength or readiness. The alliance is preserving the peace in Europe and containing an assertive Russia. It is not a crisis of relevance.

NATO troops continue to serve in Afghanistan, in the fight against the Islamic State, in preserving the peace in Kosovo and in providing security in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Baltic Sea and Balkan regions. It is assisting the EU in managing the migration crisis through its maritime capacity. The allies also remain

with us in NATO’s most important mission—the defense of free, democratic countries in North America and Europe. **The crisis is one of allied trust**

and confidence in America’s leadership of NATO. During the eighteen months of the Trump administration, the president’s personal leadership of NATO has been called into question on several key fronts. For the first time in NATO’s seven-decade history, there is growing concern about an American president’s commitment to the alliance. President Donald Trump’s repeated public doubts about NATO’s importance to the US have had a highly negative impact on European leaders and European public opinion. For the first time in NATO’s seven-decade history, there is growing concern in Europe and Canada about an American president’s commitment to the alliance. The US has been the acknowledged leader of NATO since its founding in Washington DC in 1949. As the strongest ally, **the US has always played an outsized role within the alliance. While differences among allies**

are normal and criticism of each other is warranted on serious issues, our presidents also need to project confidence in NATO and its member states in order to deter potential aggressors such as

Russia and provide the leadership that alliances need to stick together. As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump called NATO “obsolete”. As president, he refused to confirm his support for NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee at this first NATO Summit meeting in 2017. He has suggested that US support for our allies will be conditioned on the level of their defense spending. While rightly pushing allies to meet their defense budget commitment of 2% of GDP, he proposed impulsively at the recent summit a doubling of that goal to 4%—a level the US had never discussed before with the allies and is itself unprepared to meet. This crisis has been exacerbated by the contrast between the president’s negative public comments about allied leaders chancellor Angela Merkel and prime minister Theresa May with his refusal to utter a word of criticism of Russian president Vladimir Putin, NATO’s most dangerous adversary, before, during or after their recent Helsinki press conference. The president did not criticize Putin publicly for his annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s nerve agent attack against the UK, its support for the Assad regime in Syria, and its cyber assault on our 2016 elections. The president’s performance in Helsinki was weak and submissive. The president was also ambivalent in a prominent interview following the Helsinki Summit about whether the US would meet our Article 5 security obligations to Montenegro, the smallest and newest member of NATO, and a victim of an attempted Russian-inspired coup just two years ago. REUTERS/JONATHAN ERNST Words matter in diplomacy. Words matter in diplomacy. **NATO’s ability to deter Russia and**

other potential foes has always rested on the strength and clarity of American presidents, starting with Harry Truman. President Trump is the first president to equivocate on the issue of America’s commitment to the security of our allies. Such lack of resolve concerns allies who worry the US may not be prepared to defend a NATO member from Russian aggression. As the NATO leader, **the US President must remain strong and clear about our resolve in order to reassure allies and to deter political foes.** Finally, the president is

seen by many Europeans as more committed to authoritarian leaders in Hungary, Poland, and Italy than democratic leaders such as Merkel. Based on recent visits to four European countries this summer, I believe allied governments are most concerned by the rise of extreme anti-democratic forces in their countries. They would welcome rhetorical support from the US in their battle to preserve the rule of law and democratic freedoms. They have not received it. The crisis in NATO today is not the first the US has had with the allies and likely will not be the last. The US disavowed the actions of France and the UK in the Suez Crisis of 1956. The US and some of the allies argued about the deployment of American nuclear missiles to Europe in the early 1980s. We experienced a major division within the alliance over the Iraq War in 2003 when I was ambassador to NATO. In none of these crises, however, did the US and the allies question each other’s basic commitment to NATO itself. This is what is happening now. It makes this crisis different from those in the past. As a result, a dangerous breach of trust has opened across the Atlantic. The former Polish defense and foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, a friend of America, summed up the fear of many in Europe after the Helsinki Summit when he said publicly, “We have no idea what president Trump would do in a crisis with Russia.” Such a situation is a gift to Putin whose strategic aim is to weaken NATO and to divide it from within. It has also caused some Europeans to prepare for a future without a strong US presence in NATO. The debate in Germany has already begun with some outside the government advocating the country consider creating its own nuclear deterrent if it cannot count on the US. The role of Congress Barring a fundamental change in president Trump’s attitude toward NATO as well as **Russia,** this crisis **calls for concerted action**

by Congress **to revive and reinforce American leadership in the alliance.**



1NC Credibility DA

Russian tensions toward NATO escalates and goes nuclear

Gray 17 – PhD, professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he is the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies (Colin, “Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict,” Foreword, in Comparative Strategy, 36.1)

Short of war itself, the international political and strategic relations between **Russia and the United States** are about as bad as they can be. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the simultaneous **conduct** of two air independent campaigns over Syria **could evolve all too suddenly into a war triggered by accident or by miscalculation**. There is little, if any, mystery about the broad political purpose fueling Vladimir Putin’s conduct of international relations. Subtlety is not a characteristic of Russian statecraft; cunning and intended trickery, though, are another matter. Stated directly, **Putin is striving to recover and restore** that of which he is able from the late USSR. There is no ideological theme in his governance. Instead, there is an historically unremarkable striving after more **power and influence**. The challenge for the Western World, as demonstrated in this National Institute study in meticulous and troubling detail, is to decide where and when this latest episode in **Russian expansionism** will be stopped. What we do know, for certain, is that it **must** and will **be halted**. It is more likely than not that Putin himself does not have entirely fixed political-strategic objectives. His behavior of recent years has given a credible impression of opportunistic adaptability. In other words, he will take what he is able, where he can, and when he can. However, there is ample evidence to support this study’s proposition that Russian state policy today is driven by a clear vision of Russia as a recovering and somewhat restored superpower, very much on the high road back to a renewed hegemony over Eastern Europe and Central Asia. **Putin’s international political objectives** appear largely open today: he **will** have Russia take whatever turns out to be available to take, preferably if the taking allows for some humiliation of the principal enemy, the United States. A practical political and strategic problem for Putin is to guess just how far he dares to **push NATO** in general and the United States in particular, before he finds himself, almost certainly unexpectedly, in a situation analogous to 1939. Just how dangerous would it be for Russia to press forcefully the Baltic members of NATO? Vladimir Putin would not be the first statesman [person] to trust his luck once too often, based upon unrealistic confidence in his own political genius and power. There is danger not only that **Putin could miscalculate** the military worth of Russia’s hand, but that he also will misunderstand the practical political and strategic strength of NATO ‘red lines.’ In particular, Putin may well discover, despite some current appearances, that not all of NATO’s political leaders are expediently impressionable and very readily deterrable. **Putin’s military instrument is heavily dependent**, indeed probably over-dependent, **upon** the bolstering value of a whole inventory of **nuclear weapons**. It is unlikely to have evaded Putin’s strategic grasp to recognize that these are not simply weapons like any others. **A single political** or strategic guess in **error could well place us**, Russians included, **in a world horrifically new** to all. This National Institute study, Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict, makes unmistakably clear Putin’s elevation of strategic intimidation to be the leading element in Russian grand strategy today. Putin is behaving in militarily dangerous ways and ‘talking the talk’ that goes with such rough behavior. Obviously, he is calculating, perhaps just hoping, that American lawyers in the White House will continue to place highest priority on avoiding direct confrontation with Russia. This study presents an abundantly clear record of the Russian lack of regard for international law, which they violate with apparent impunity and without ill consequence to themselves, including virtually every arms control treaty and agreement they have entered into with the United States since 1972 (SALT I). **The challenge for** the United States today and tomorrow **is** the need urgently **to** decide what can and must be done to **stop Putin’s campaign in its tracks before** it wreaks **lethal damage** to the vital concept and physical structure of international order in much of the world, and particularly in Europe.



2NC Credibility DA – NATO UQ

NATO alliance stable now-that weakens Russia

Shaffer 2/6 (Anthony Shaffer is a retired U.S. Army Reserve lieutenant colonel and is currently senior fellow for the London Center for Policy Research.), “NATO Is Now Stronger Than Ever”, https://www.theepochtimes.com/nato-is-now-stronger-than-ever_2789914.html)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is now stronger than ever. What was a Cold War relic is now returned to service with renewed vigor and teeth. ADVERTISING **Take it from NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg himself, who said that President Trump’s pressure on European allies to meet their military funding commitments has had “real results.”** “President Donald Trump is having an impact,” Stoltenberg told Fox News in a Sunday morning interview. In all, Stoltenberg continued, “by the end of next year, **NATO allies will add \$100 billion extra toward defense. So we see some real money and some real results. And we see that the clear message from President Donald Trump is having an impact.”** When asked if he was concerned that President Trump’s tough rhetoric might be “helping Putin splinter NATO,” Stoltenberg said the exact opposite is happening. **“What I see is that actually NATO is united because we are able to adapt to deliver,” he explained. “North America and Europe are doing more together now than before.”** For context, U.S. defense spending amounted to just under \$686 billion in 2017, equating to 3.6 percent of GDP. By comparison, Germany spent around \$45 billion on its armed forces last year, or 1.2 percent of GDP. Start My \$1 Month Trial For years, our NATO allies in Europe have shortchanged the system and relied on the United States to foot most of the bill for our mutual defense, but President Trump shocked the elites of Washington and Brussels by demanding that those countries actually meet their pledges to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. President Trump declared during the 2018 NATO summit that the United States will no longer tolerate other member states spending only a little more than 1 percent of their GDP on defense while the United States “in actual numbers is paying 4.2 percent of a much larger GDP,” saying this is not fair to U.S. taxpayers and “we’re not going to put up with it.” While some European diplomats initially reacted to the President’s pronouncement with outrage, it’s now clear that his strategy is bearing fruit. **The biggest loser in all this is Russia—a country that spent just \$66.3 billion on defense in 2017, a 17 percent decline from the previous year and the first year-over-year drop since 1998.** That means the \$100 billion in new defense spending promised by our NATO allies in Europe is nearly double that of Russia’s entire 2017 budget. **President Trump is an effective negotiator—proof’s in the pudding so to speak. Despite political criticism** (most of it free of facts) **both at home and abroad, his insistence that our allies meet their spending commitments has made NATO stronger than it’s been for years.** His policy is strength. His Reaganesque view of security is necessary. His goals of protecting the interests of the United States and our allies are being realized. Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer is a retired senior intelligence operations officer and Acting President of the London Center for Policy Research.



2NC Credibility DA – NATO UQ

The US has consistently invested in NATO to maintain its stability – Trump’s presidency has only cemented that

Kupchan 3/20 [Charles A. Kupchan is a Professor of International Affairs at the University of Georgetown and is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “NATO is thriving in spite of Trump”, March 20, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-20/nato-thriving-spite-trump?utm_campaign=reg_conf_email&utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fa_registration]

Trump’s diatribes are not the only cause of the unease. A broadening chorus of realist strategists claims that the United States is overdue for a major strategic retrenchment and that it is past time for Europe to tend its own garden. **Even staunch defenders of NATO express doubts about its future. Some worry that the growing U.S. preoccupation with East Asia will lure the United States away from its Atlantic calling and generate transatlantic tensions over how to deal with the rise of China. Others fear that democratic backsliding among members is compromising the alliance’s values-based solidarity.** Close NATO watchers are concerned that EU efforts to more deeply integrate European foreign and defense policy could ultimately weaken the Atlantic link. **And debate rages on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether NATO enlargement has enhanced or eroded European stability and whether to continue expansion despite the costs to the West’s relationship with Russia. These worries are unwarranted: NATO at 70 is actually in remarkably good shape. Yes, European allies have been laggards on defense spending, and some members—Hungary, Poland, and Turkey in particular—have tarnished democratic credentials. But NATO has demonstrated an impressive ability to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment since the Cold War’s end, ensuring that the United States and Europe remain each other’s go-to partners.** The alliance opened its doors to the new democracies that emerged from the former Soviet bloc, helping to anchor security and democracy in a wider Europe. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, members have taken important steps to strengthen deterrence against the Kremlin’s adventurism. **NATO has struck partnerships across the globe and carried out ambitious missions well beyond the territory of member states**—most notably in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. All the while, the alliance has retooled to address new hazards such as cyberthreats, terrorism, hybrid warfare, and migration. **Precisely because NATO has been so nimble and effective, it enjoys strong political support on both sides of the Atlantic, leaving Trump virtually alone as a vociferous critic.** Moreover—and paradoxically—**Trump’s withering attacks on the alliance are actually strengthening NATO.** **Defenders of the alliance are coming out of the woodwork, especially in the U.S. Congress. Trump’s regular haranguing of allies for insufficient defense spending is paying off: Europeans are finally investing more in their militaries, making it only more likely that the United States will cleave to Europe as its partner of choice. And Trump’s skepticism toward NATO expansion could help resolve continuing controversy over enlargement, guiding allies to the sensible conclusion that it is time for the alliance to begin closing its open door.**



2NC Credibility DA – Link

Our assurances towards Taiwan are key to global security commitments

Shelley Rigger, 11/29/11, (Professor of political science at Davidson), American Enterprise Institute, “why giving up taiwan will not help us with china,” <https://www.aei.org/publication/why-giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-china/>

The most-cited strategic argument for continuing US security assistance to Taiwan is that the existing security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond serves the interests of many nations. Within the network of global security relationships, Washington’s behavior toward Taiwan indicates its attitude toward security assistance generally, including its alliance commitments and willingness to honor other obligations around the world. As retired admiral Eric McVadon said, American credibility as an alliance partner and as a bulwark of peace and stability in the region and around the world would be sorely diminished were we to abandon the [Taiwan Relations Act], cease support of Taipei, and lead Beijing to conclude that it can attack Taiwan and not be repulsed.”



2NC Credibility DA – Internal Link

US alliance credibility is key to NATO – the plan breaks down cohesion

Bazin and Kunertova 18 [Aaron Bazin served NATO and the US Army and has a doctorate in psychology. Dominka Kunertova has a masters in international relations from Charles University in Prague, as well as a BA in political science from Comenius University. “An Alliance Divided? Five Factors that could Fracture NATO”, January-February 2018. <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/>]

In outlining realist, economic, institutionalist, and social-constructivist theoretical perspectives, other categories of variables emerged: internal dimension of threats, bureaucracy and alliance institutionalization, and shared values and identity. What happens inside the Alliance could matter as much as **what happens outside the Alliance**. Given that NATO’s endurance had not conformed to the predictions of traditional alliance theory, Ohio University professor Patricia Weitsman suggested examining internal and external threat dyads in order to understand alliance cohesion.²¹ She found that **NATO survived the end of the Cold War due to low internal threat, which concerns the politics of alliances. Consequently, this alliance cohesion theory says the lower the internal threat, the more cohesive the alliance; and the greater the external threat, the higher level of alliance cohesion.**²² Another important factor in alliance cohesion is the way in which intra-alliance cooperation institutionalizes bureaucratic structures.²³ For instance, some assert that consultative norms and structures **can mitigate internal threats to cohesion.**²⁴ Furthermore, **the Alliance’s institutional structures allow for information exchange among allies that can raise the level of alliance cohesion independently from external factors.**²⁵ **Additionally, the transatlantic bond has depended on credible signaling (i.e., an ally’s trust in another’s assurances).** Especially in the context of nuclear sharing, **“weak signals” of U.S. commitment to Europe could damage NATO’s cohesion.**²⁶



2NC Credibility DA – Internal Link

Weak NATO credibility sparks Russian adventurism and first-strike

Kofman 16 (Michael Kofman is an Analyst at CNA Corporation and a Fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute. Previously he served as Program Manager at National Defense University, May 12, 2016. "Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO's Crushing Defeat by Russia," War on the Rocks, accessed 9-6-2016, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/>)

Why would **Russia** make a dash for Baltic capitals, as in RAND's wargame, when the battle is decided by whether or not NATO can successfully reinforce from Poland? Instead of fighting NATO forces in the Baltics, the best way forward is to **turn** that **deterrent** into a **military hostage**. **What if**, in the time it takes **NATO** to generate forces sufficient to break through a Russian defensive position across Kaliningrad, the alliance **collapses politically**, especially given the concern over losing its units behind enemy lines in the Baltics? All analogies are imperfect, but it strikes me that advocates for a robust U.S. military presence want to replay the Battle of Dunkirk in 1940, where U.S. forces get to fill the unenviable shoes of the British Expeditionary Force surrounded by the German Army. Whether you have one brigade or three brigades, you're still going to lose that fight. U.S. planners would not be the first to think you could hold a pocket against a land power and reinforce it across a gap. The idea that a line of U.S. forces along the Russian border can achieve deterrence by denial in modern times boasts all the ingenuity of the Maginot Line. More **forces** in place **can't** always **compensate for a poor strategy** and unworkable geography. A Million Ways to Die in the East **NATO's biggest challenge is not** the balance of **forces, but** the fact that **its credibility** is attached to every square meter of Baltic terrain. **A** much more **likely scenario** is one **in which Russia** **deploys a large land force** on the borders as part of a snap exercise, as it did opposite Ukraine in early 2014, **and** then **seizes some unknown patch of dirt**. **Would NATO attack** this offending Russian force over a few square meters? It's one thing to contemplate trading Washington for Vilnius — what about some farm house on the Russian-Estonian border? Let's take another option wherein Russia simply picks up the border and moves it further into the Baltic states. That's no fantasy. Moscow has been doing this to Georgia in South Ossetia. On the one hand, NATO cannot let the Russians break its credibility through salami-slicing tactics, but on the other hand, the Baltic states themselves might not be so eager to pick a fight they can't win over a few feet of real estate. Who is willing to attack a Russian army on Russia's border? Plenty has been written on what would happen if Russian special forces tried to seize Baltic towns, leveraging the presumed camaraderie of the local ethnic Russian population. This Crimea-like scenario is improbable, especially because Russia had forces in place in Crimea from the very beginning, but it offers an important lesson that should drive NATO's thinking about the Baltic high-end fight. The challenge is not NATO's deterrence against a hypothetical conventional war, which is not only unlikely but wholly unnecessary for Russia to challenge NATO. The problem lies in compellence, because there are numerous scenarios in which Russia can set up a challenge to NATO's credibility as an alliance and compel the West against a response, thereby leading to failure. The reason Russia annexed Crimea without having to overcome resistance is in large part due to conventional compellence. Russia's military deployment and a directly issued threat compelled Ukraine's leaders to avoid even attempting resistance. There was no combat in Crimea. Those arguing for forward deployments keep envisioning a scenario where Russian troops or special forces cross the border and shoot first. That is one set of problems that militarily cannot be easily solved as described above, but the more perilous cases are those in which NATO must shoot first when faced with a large Russian conventional deployment. EUCOM's true challenge is not deterrence — it's how to handle compellence by an advanced conventional adversary capable of combining special forces and large-scale military operations. As I've written elsewhere on War on the Rocks on the establishment's obsession with hybrid warfare, the problem is also not a hybrid one. Russia has re-forged its military as a useful instrument of national power and rediscovered how to compel others using military power. Even if territorial defense was workable — a dubious prospect at best — deterrence only works if the other side plans to attack you. A smarter approach for Moscow, and one conceptually demonstrated in Crimea, is to create a crisis in which NATO's credibility is tested on the choice of whether or not to attack Russia first. What's the Right Force Posture for Nuclear Oblivion? The other problem with the fixation on conventional deterrence in the Baltic fight is that just as in the old standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, **this battle is** **fraught with opportunities for nuclear escalation**. Most Russian experts I know in the military analysis community, including those in Russia, don't see much of a chance for conventional battle with NATO to stay conventional. RAND didn't wargame that out, since theirs was an AirLand Battle exercise, but it makes the debate over how many brigades to stick into the Baltics somewhat moot. On any map, Russia's exclave of Kaliningrad is a central problem in keeping this a conventional fight, because this is a piece of Russian territory that NATO must either bypass or neutralize to reinforce the Baltics. That's not just a Russian fort, projecting long arcs of anti-access and area denial weaponry between Poland and Lithuania — it's also liable to be a nuclear landmine. There is a possibility that **if Russian forces are sufficiently degraded** or defeated in Kaliningrad that **Moscow may resort to** or threaten **nuclear first use**. Even if we fill all those hex squares with blue forces, it doesn't get around the issue that **NATO's prize** for its victory **is** not necessarily the successful rescue of the Baltics, but **an inbound** tactical **nuclear warhead**. **RAND's report alludes to the minor problem of** escalation (**all of us dying in nuclear oblivion**), **but such thoughts get in the way of gaming out how many heavy armor brigades one needs in on the eastern flank**. Nuclear escalation is not assured, but given the impact of such an outcome, perhaps **the best strategy** is to make decisions that afford the most opportunities for **managing escalation dynamics**. That means a force posture oriented toward strategic flexibility, not entrenchment.



2NC Credibility DA – Russia Impact

Russia will invade NATO countries if Putin doubts commitments— that goes nuclear
Farmer 15 — Ben Farmer, Telegraph Defense correspondent, 2015 (“Russian tensions could escalate into all-out war, says NATO general,” *The Telegraph*, February 20th, Accessible Online at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11425393/Russian-tensions-could-escalate-into-all-out-war-says-Gen-Adrian-Bradsha.html>, Accessed On 07-19-2016)

Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat to our whole being”, Britain’s top general in NATO has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir **Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize NATO territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating violence to respond**. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said **there was a “real and present danger” Mr Putin could try to destabilise the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare**. The Kremlin called those comments “absolutely unacceptable”. Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services’ Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyse NATO decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond. NATO commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia, which is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact. **He said the “resulting ambiguity” would make “collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult”**. But Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces, went further and said there was also danger that Russia could use conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize NATO territory. **He said Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used “not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize NATO territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity**. This use of so called **escalation dominance was** of course **a classic Soviet technique**.” He went on to say that **“the threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being.”**



2NC Credibility DA – Russia Impact

Unchecked Russian aggression risks extinction

Fisher 15 (Max, Foreign affairs columnist at VOX, "How World War III became possible," 6/29, <http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war>)

That is why, analysts will tell you, **today's tensions bear far more similarity to the period before World War I: an unstable power balance, belligerence over peripheral conflicts, entangling military commitments, disputes over the future of the European order, and dangerous uncertainty** about what actions will and will not force the other party into conflict. **Today's Russia**, once more the strongest nation in Europe and yet weaker than its collective enemies, **calls to mind the turn-of-the-century German Empire**, which Henry Kissinger described as "too big for Europe, but too small for the world." Now, as then, **a rising power, propelled by nationalism, is seeking to revise the European order**. Now, as then, it believes that through superior cunning, and perhaps even by proving its might, it can force a larger role for itself. Now, as then, the drift toward war is gradual and easy to miss — which is exactly what makes it so dangerous. But **there is one way in which today's dangers are less like those before World War I**, and more similar to those of the Cold War: **the apocalyptic logic of nuclear weapons**. **Mutual suspicion, fear of an existential threat, armies parked across borders from one another, and hair-trigger nuclear weapons all make any small skirmish a potential armageddon**. In some ways, that logic has grown even more dangerous. **Russia**, hoping to compensate for its conventional military forces' relative weakness, **has dramatically relaxed its rules for using nuclear weapons**. Whereas Soviet leaders saw their nuclear weapons as pure deterrents, something that existed precisely so they would never be used, Putin's view appears to be radically different. **Russia's official nuclear doctrine calls on the country to launch a battlefield nuclear strike in case of a conventional war that could pose an existential threat**. These are more than just words: Moscow has repeatedly signaled its willingness and preparations to use nuclear weapons even in a more limited war. **This is a terrifyingly low bar for nuclear weapons use**, particularly given that any war would likely occur along Russia's borders and thus not far from Moscow. And it suggests Putin has adopted an idea that Cold War leaders considered unthinkable: that a "limited" nuclear war, of small warheads dropped on the battlefield, could be not only survivable but winnable. "It's not just a difference in rhetoric. It's a whole different world," Bruce G. Blair, a nuclear weapons scholar at Princeton, told the Wall Street Journal. He called Putin's decisions more dangerous than those of any Soviet leader since 1962. "There's a low nuclear threshold now that didn't exist during the Cold War." Nuclear theory is complex and disputable; maybe Putin is right. But many theorists would say he is wrong, that the logic of nuclear warfare means **a "limited" nuclear strike is in fact likely to trigger a larger nuclear war — a doomsday scenario in which major American, Russian, and European cities would be targets** for attacks many times more powerful than the bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. **Even if a nuclear war did somehow remain limited and contained, recent studies suggest that environmental and atmospheric damage would cause a "decade of winter"** and mass crop die-outs that could kill up to 1 billion people in a global famine.



1NC Anti-Imperialism

Taiwan has had a long history of fighting against oppressive rulership. The desire to be an independent country has been growing. We have a moral obligation to assist Taiwan.

BBC 19 [British Broadcast Channel, "What's behind the Taiwan divide?"
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538>]

Starting at the beginning of the 17th Century, significant numbers of migrants started arriving from China, often fleeing turmoil or hardship. Most were Hoklo Chinese from Fujian (Fukien) province or were Hakka Chinese, largely from Guangdong. The descendants of these two migrations now make up by far the largest population group. In 1895, following Japan's victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Qing government had no choice but to cede Taiwan to Japan. But **after World War Two, the Republic of China** - one of the victors - **began ruling Taiwan with the consent of its allies the US and UK**, after Japan surrendered and relinquished control of the territory it had taken from China. **However in the next few years, the leader at the time Chiang Kai-shek's troops were beaten back by the Communist armies under Mao Zedong. Chiang and the remnants of his Kuomintang (KMT) government fled to Taiwan in 1949.** This group, referred to as Mainland Chinese and then making up 1.5m people, dominated Taiwan's politics for many years, even though they only account for 14% of the population. **Having inherited an effective dictatorship**, facing resistance from local people resentful of the 228 Massacre and authoritarian rule, and under pressure from a growing democracy movement, **Chiang's son**, Chiang Ching-kuo, **began allowing a process of democratisation**, which eventually led to the 2000 election of the island's first non-KMT president, Chen Shui-bian. **Officially, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) still favours eventual independence for Taiwan**, while the KMT favours eventual reunification. Opinion polls show only a small minority of Taiwanese support pursuing one or the other at the moment, with most preferring to stick with the current middle ground. Yet **more and more people say they feel Taiwanese rather than Chinese.** **Support for the DPP increased at the January 2016 election.** This was partly because of dissatisfaction with the KMT's handling of economic matters, from the wealth gap to high housing prices, and partly because of worries that Mr Ma's administration was making Taiwan too dependent on Beijing.

The United States are Taiwan's only significant ally. Without our support, they will have effectively no protection from China forcing Taiwan to re-join the mainland. This is modern day imperialism.

BBC 19 [British Broadcast Channel, "What's behind the Taiwan divide?"
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538>]

The US is by far Taiwan's most important friend, and are its only ally. The relationship, forged during World War Two and the Cold War, underwent its sternest test in **1979**, when President Jimmy Carter ended US diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in order to concentrate on burgeoning ties with China. **The US Congress**, responding to the move, **passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which promises to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons, and stressed that any attack by China would be considered of "grave concern" to the US.** Since then, US policy has been described as one of "strategic ambiguity", seeking to balance China's emergence as a regional power with US admiration for Taiwan's economic success and democratisation. **The pivotal role of the US was most clearly shown in 1996, when China conducted provocative missile tests to try and influence Taiwan's first direct presidential election. In response, US President Bill Clinton ordered the biggest display of US military power in Asia since the Vietnam War, sending ships to the Taiwan Strait, and a clear message to Beijing.**



1NC Anti-Imperialism

Continuing to support and protect Taiwan is the only ethical decision. Our choice to reduce arms sales will be the deciding factor in whether or not Taiwan remains independent from China. To vote affirmative is to choose the side of the conqueror.

Bowman & Smits 19 [Bradley Bowman, Mikhael Smits, DefenseNews, “Trade deal with China or not, the US must bolster Taiwan’s defense”,

<https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/06/26/trade-deal-with-china-or-not-the-us-must-bolster-taiwans-defense/>]

In the past, Taiwan’s superior technology and geography gave Taiwan a military edge when it came to a potential conflict in the strait. However, as the Pentagon noted, due to China’s military buildup, those advantages are now largely gone. In fact, as the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 report on Chinese military power assessed, **“Beijing’s longstanding interest to eventually compel Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland and deter any attempt by Taiwan to declare independence has served as the primary driver for China’s military modernization.”** Simultaneously, based on an overzealous and counterproductive desire in previous administrations to avoid offending Beijing, Washington has often been reluctant to provide Taiwan the arms it needed. Fearful to not provoke the Chinese, the Obama administration rejected Taiwanese requests for 66 new F-16 fighter jets — instead only offering modifications for its aging aircraft. **Admittedly, America’s arms sales to Taiwan are relatively modest compared to China’s military buildup. However, the failure to provide Taiwan the required weapons exacerbated the shift toward Beijing in the military balance. As a result, across most combat domains, Beijing has established both a quantitative and qualitative advantage over Taiwan.** Consequently, **there is a risk that Beijing planners and decision-makers might determine they could launch a successful offensive against Taiwan. That perception in Beijing makes aggression in the strait and a war with the United States more likely. The bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission listed aggression against Taiwan as a top concern, arguing that allowing China to absorb Taiwan by military force would constitute a “crushing blow to America’s credibility and regional position.”** In addition to genuine hard-power concerns, **there is also a matter of principle. When an authoritarian power threatens and bullies a democratic people, America is not neutral. Furthermore, providing Taiwan the means to defend itself is not just consistent with sound policy and good principle — it is the law.**



2NC Anti-Imperialism

Taiwan is a story of resistance, and Chinese takeover spills over and risks the fall of democracy throughout the region. US commitment to defending Taiwan is key.

Cole 17 [J. Michael Cole, Harvard University Press Book Review, "CONVERGENCE OR CONFLICT IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT: The Illusion of Peace? Routledge Research on Taiwan", <http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/nf4/MichaelCole.pdf>]

The new government must look to consolidate all potential unofficial ties and points of support among the democracies and emerging democracies, political parties, and democratic movements of East, Southeast, and South Asia. On the front line, together with Taiwan, are: Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Myanmar, and India. International support for the embattled and isolated democratic movement in China forms part of this united front. **Continuing to call attention to the growing crackdown in the PRC,** which has turned back incremental gains of previous periods, **strengthens the resolve of Taiwanese democrats. It also helps to galvanize awareness throughout the region for the need to counter China's threatened subversion of Taiwanese sovereignty. Her natural allies face similar pressures—in the case of South Korea,** military. **Thus, annexation by China would be a severe blow to the interests of all. The national interest of each of the Pacific Rim democracies, the United States in the first place because of its longstanding formal commitment** (the Taiwan Relations Act; TRA), coincides entirely with that of all the others. This is the overarching theme of the book, perhaps formulated in a different way in some of the chapters. The incoming Trump Administration is expected to continue to stand by the TRA, as did its predecessor. A central argument of the author turns on the conditions that will forestall the overthrow of Taiwanese democracy, the "firewall." One that commentators often overlook concerns getting its own developing institutions and civic/political consciousness in order. **The consensus on defense of autonomy and de facto sovereignty is broader than it appears;** that is, it is not restricted to the DPP and its allies. Even on specific questions of national identity, such as favouring official recognition of the Taiwanese languages, **broad layers within the Kuomintang (KMT) find common cause** with their "green" counterparts. **On some of the relevant core issues, positions surprisingly coincide.** For example, a current consensus views the offer by the PRC of a Special Administrative Region status with great skepticism. In the end, overriding imperatives of national unity and security are at stake, an understanding that the Tsai administration, in its moderate and defensive posture, has shown itself to be acutely cognizant of. **This orientation,** as the author points out, **may be related to the exceptional circumstances of Taiwan's transition to democracy, by all measure a model for the region, including for China itself. All of the above,** by the way, **should serve to reaffirm the commitment of the world's democracies in support of Taiwanese self-determination.** A number of aspects of this assessment are controversial, sparking further debate that we should all welcome. An effective united front will seek to make the cost of occupation and annexation unacceptable. Chapter 12 is an assessment of the respective military capabilities. The panorama laid out here is the most stark. Readers should pay especially close attention here to the implications, given a possible recalibration on the part of Washington regarding its current security guarantee (for example, in the case of a future PRC reprisal). Given Taiwan's robust capabilities, an invasion would commit overwhelming force of unmitigated violence to ensure that it prevails. Throughout the chapters, Cole lays a large part of the responsibility for the confusion about the situation that Taiwan faces at the feet of academia itself. Professors and experts working outside of the PRC have choices. The soft power is strong, and the "Taiwan problem" is "inconvenient" (36). The invitations, the return visits, and the access are generous. But the invoice arriving in the mail often asks too much, depending on one's specialty. Even publishing a paper, in a Western-based journal, is sometimes easier if you evade the difficult topic or soft-pedal a sensitive concept. Some researchers have made the decision that the complicity, when this happens (a complicated question), is no longer acceptable, that the sensitive topic can't be avoided, and that their next invited lecture in China might be the last. **This study of China and Taiwan points to an important parallel with the threats posed to the smaller and weaker countries on the western border of the Russian Federation. Pursuit of great power pacts and "grand bargains" at the expense of sovereign nations turns out to be shortsighted and dangerous. These considerations have become timely again.**



2NC Anti-Imperialism

Popularity for independence is rising, and now is the time that Taiwan will be looking to the US as an ally to check Chinese imperialism.

Zhu 19 [Zhiqun Zhu, PhD, is professor of political science and international relations at Bucknell University in Lewisburg, Pa., “Why Taiwan is taking a hard line against unification with China — and what it means for the U.S.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/16/why-taiwan-is-taking-hard-line-against-unification-with-china-what-it-means-us/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.55db2eb5b59e]

Chinese President Xi Jinping made a high-profile speech regarding Taiwan on Jan. 2 to mark the 40th anniversary of the 1979 “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.” That 1979 speech was the Chinese government’s first policy overture to Taiwan, which replaced “liberation of Taiwan” with “peaceful unification” as the goal. Xi’s speech marking the occasion has generated heated debates about Taiwan-China relations.

Based on Taiwan’s official reactions so far, one can expect a stormy relationship between the two sides in the next couple of years — a battle that is sure to become part of the current tensions between the United States and China.

Right after World War II, the Chinese civil war resumed between Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces and Mao Zedong’s communist guerrillas. Chiang was defeated and moved his Republic of China government to Taiwan, while Mao declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China on the mainland in 1949.

The two sides remained bitter enemies and had no official contact during much of

the Cold War. Relations gradually improved since the 1980s as Taiwan lifted martial law and the mainland started to open up.

Over the years, a distinct Taiwanese identity has grown while the Chinese identity has declined in Taiwan. Since Taiwan became a multiparty democracy, cross-strait relations have become more complicated.

But when Ma Ying-jeou was in power in Taiwan from 2008 to 2016, Taiwan-China relations were stable and friendly, and cross-strait exchanges were dynamic. That changed with the election of the Democratic Progressive Party’s Tsai Ing-wen as president of the Republic of China in 2016, and the relationship between Beijing and Taiwan has been characterized by stalemate over the past few years.

From Beijing’s perspective, 2019 was a fitting time to send a new message — and a new warning — to Taiwan. A man with a sense of historical mission, Xi has been seriously eyeing Taiwan as part of his “Chinese dream” of national rejuvenation. As he stated confidently in his speech, Taiwan must and will be united with the motherland.

In his speech, Xi reiterated Beijing’s long-standing policy toward Taiwan, with “national unification” as the objective and “One Country, Two Systems” as the model. In this sense, Xi’s speech is a continuation of previous official statements, which focused on Beijing’s intent for peaceful reunification and cross-strait exchanges while reserving the right to use force, if necessary. The move injects a level of self-determination for Taiwan into the unification model. Xi also proposed that representatives from different parties and walks of life in Taiwan should join Beijing in political consultations to discuss cross-strait relations and make political arrangements for Taiwan’s future. This might be the most intriguing and innovative part of his speech since it essentially kicks off the unification process by sidestepping the unpopular governing party. He did not set a timetable for unification, but this proposal, if implemented, would represent a giant stride

toward Beijing’s goal of unification with specific steps being taken to prepare for the future. It is unfortunate that **the Tsai administration immediately**

and categorically rejected Xi’s proposal without much deliberation. Were the Tsai administration open to discussions, or willing to offer a plan to improve cross-strait relations, Taiwan could use its vibrant democracy as a tool to shape the future of the Chinese mainland. Beijing says anything can be discussed under “one China”; Taiwan certainly can and should raise its preconditions for unification. That would put tremendous pressure on the mainland to move toward democratization. Tsai’s position toward the mainland hardened last year. Now she only uses “China” to refer to the mainland instead of the more conciliatory “Chinese mainland” that she used during her first year in office. In Taiwan, when politicians refer to the mainland as “China”, it’s a clear indication of their anti-China and pro-independence position. Tsai’s shift toward a more hard-line approach has many possible causes: loss of five diplomatic allies of the ROC during her term so far; perceived “bullying” by Beijing in international arenas; her strategy to play the China card to deflect internal discontent toward her lackluster performance; and her party’s loss in local elections last year. Though Xi has offered more flexibility in the unification process, it is clear that Beijing’s “wait and see” attitude toward Tsai is over. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office has for the first time publicly lashed out at Tsai as a “separatist.” It’s almost certain that Tsai will become more hard-line before the 2020 Taiwan elections as she struggles to be reelected. Her leadership has been disappointing to most Taiwanese, including her supporters. To be tough on China and brand herself as a leader to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty may help her win back some

votes. **Xi’s firm determination and Tsai’s strong resistance suggest that the Taiwan Strait will not be calm**


in the next couple of years. That has real implications for the United States. Tsai will strive to

strengthen relations with the United States while maintaining an anti-China stance. And there is reason to believe

Washington will be amenable to her overtures. **President Trump signed several pro-Taiwan bills into law in 2018, including**

the Taiwan Travel Act and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, moves that Beijing resents.

The U.S. government will likely continue to play the Taiwan card when dealing with China, but Taiwan’s people must be cautious and sober. It is not inconceivable that someday Trump may decide to sell out Taiwan in order to strike a deal with China. Taiwan’s future is inextricably linked to China’s. Instead of turning away from China, Taiwan may wish to work with Beijing and seek a mutually acceptable outcome for the island democracy



**China/Taiwan
BAUDL**

**JV Pack
2019/2020**

Case Arguments



1NC—Invasion Turn

US arms sales are key to deter Chinese aggression on Taiwan

Easton 3/28 (Ian Easton serves as a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, a Virginia-based think tank where he conducts research on defense and security issues involving the U.S., China, Japan, and Taiwan, March 28, 2019. "Asia's Nightmare Begins: This Is How China Would Try to Invade Taiwan", The National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/asias-nightmare-begins-how-china-would-try-invade-taiwan-49492>)

The Pentagon has a critical role to play in assisting Taiwan maximize its war fighting capabilities. With America's help, Taiwan can make sure its defense investments factor into Beijing's calculations and, hopefully, prevent a future invasion from occurring in the first place. The RAND report suggests the establishment of a joint working group, led on the U.S. side by an assistant secretary of defense. Indeed, Taiwanese forces would benefit from new types of professional military education and technical training in the United States. American mentors could support Taiwan's continued transit to a potent all-volunteer force and help create a more strategically focused reserve force. **Taiwanese troops also need regular and dependable arms sales,** something that unfortunately was denied them by the Bush and Obama administrations. **For Taiwan, the positive operational and tactical effects of American weapons systems are indisputable.** **The Trump administration should offer Taiwan the same capabilities it is offering Japan and South Korea, including new stealth fighter jets, missile defense batteries, and destroyers.** In addition, American companies should be unchained by Washington, allowing them to compete for access to Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine program. Even more important than firepower would be the huge morale boosting effects such material support would have on recruitment and retention on the island—and the powerful signal of purpose and resolve it would send to China. **Taiwan's military has developed a solid defense plan and is cultivating a force of professional warriors. But the grave invasion threat facing the island is growing over time.** Keeping pace with China's offensive power will be extremely difficult unless big changes are made to the way America does business in Asia. Going forward, the Trump White House would do well to develop a new strategy for advancing U.S.-Taiwan relations. **Making sure Taiwan has the strong self-defense capabilities it needs will help keep the globe's greatest powder keg from ever igniting. Ignoring the China problem would only make it worse.**

Ian Easton is a research fellow at the Project 2049 (where this first appeared) Institute and author of the forthcoming book, *The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia*.



2NC – Invasion Turn

Taiwan is dependent on the United States for Security measures

Bush 18 (Richard C. Bush works at CEAP, a center for research, analysis, and debate to enhance policy development on the pressing political, economic, and security issues facing East Asia and U.S. interests in the region.) , “Why Assurances Matter In U.S.-Taiwan Relations”, Brookings.edu, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/08/29/why-assurances-matter-in-u-s-taiwan-relations/>

In 1982, the Reagan administration made “Six Assurances” to Taiwan’s leaders as it was concluding negotiations with Beijing regarding arms sales to Taiwan. These commitments have become an important part of U.S. declaratory policy towards Taiwan, along with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the three U.S.-People’s Republic of China (PRC) Joint Communiqués (in 1972, 1979, and 1982).

Author Richard C. Bush The Michael H. Armacost Chair Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center richardbushiii As important as the Six Assurances of 1982 remain for U.S.-Taiwan relations, however, it is worth noting that governments make commitments to each other all the time. They are the daily stuff of international relations, both when they are observed and ignored. Assurances with a capital “A” are certainly significant, but so are assurances with a lower-

case “a.” Indeed, the Six Assurances of 1982 (capital “A”) was only one effort by Washington to convey assurance, with a lower-case “a,” to Taipei. **Many countries around**

the world depend on the commitments of other countries for their survival. Small countries, in particular, depend on the commitments of larger countries, as Taiwan has depended on the United States since the early 1950s. For a commitment to be effective as an instrument of policy, the party making the commitment must be credible and the party receiving the commitment must have confidence that the pledge means something.

Credibility and confidence are reciprocal and reinforcing for good or ill, and determine whether the underlying commitment is a valuable instrument of policy. Now, it is a fact of life that even in the best of international relationships, no commitment is perfect. There are always cobwebs of doubt. Misunderstandings occur. Communication breaks down. Circumstances change. Consequently, credibility and confidence—the linked, reciprocal elements of commitment—weaken. Sustaining the credibility of commitments and confidence in them requires regular assurance—with a lower-case “a”—by the party extending the commitment. Regular assurances are particularly common and necessary when the relationship between the party extending the commitment and the one receiving it is asymmetric. But, even in more balanced relationships, assurance with a lower-case “a” happens all the time. We, in the public, just do not hear about it. RELATED CONTENT Reading the political winds: The case for Taiwanese discretion Ryan Hass

Monday, August 13, 2018 ORDER FROM CHAOS Why a new office building in Taiwan is heightening U.S.-China tensions Richard C. Bush Tuesday, May 29, 2018 **We all**

understand that Taiwan is significantly dependent on the United States for its security. For sure, it should rely as much as possible on its own efforts, but it is still dependent on America. That being the case, the credibility of the U.S. commitment and the confidence that the leaders and people of Taiwan place in that commitment is extremely important.

So is the need for regular assurance (lower-case “a”). We know from history why Taiwan over the long-term may have less-than-full confidence in American commitments. **The fundamental change in U.S.-China policy begun**

by Richard Nixon in 1971, completed by Jimmy Carter in 1979, and elaborated by Ronald Reagan in 1982, is the key case in point. Conversely, American administrations have often preferred to state their commitments unambiguously.

They wished to reduce the blank-check problem and had to take the China factor into account. The result: U.S. statements of commitment were not always fully credible in Taiwan’s eyes. Regular, mutual assurance was all the more required. **This situation began to change as**

Taiwan became a democracy. Washington sincerely welcomed this transformation, even though U.S. officials had gotten used to the relative predictability of the late authoritarian period, when Taiwan’s decisionmaking circle was very small and its perceived choices very few. Simultaneous with

democratization, through the 1990s the PRC’s military threat to Taiwan and the importance for the United States to maintain the island’s security increased.



2NC – Invasion Turn

U.S. arms sales are urgently key to halt Chinese invasions

Episkopos 6/1 (Mark Episkopos is a Research Assistant and has a PHD in History and International Affairs), “Could Taiwan Halt and Invasion by China?”, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/could-taiwan-halt-invasion-china-60617>

The Taiwan question has long been in a thorn in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) side. In the decades following the Shanghai communiqué, the CCP’s core strategic approach to Taiwan was to bide their time while building up national strength. As Deng Xiaoping famously proclaimed, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can wait 100 years to reunify with Taiwan (also known as Republic of China, or ROC) if necessary. **Today’s CCP appears to be operating**

within a much shorter time frame, however. With China’s rise to great power status, Beijing wields unprecedented economic leverage over Taiwan and is increasingly comfortable with flexing its military muscle overseas. XI Jinping is “losing patience” with the defiant island off his southeastern coast, which continues to rebuff Chinese reunification schemes premised on what Xi calls a “one country, two systems” approach.

It is unlikely that the CCP would seek an outright invasion and occupation of Taiwan, given the drastic geopolitical risks that would entail. But as East Asia scholars have frequently cautioned, the China-Taiwan relationship is fraught with potential escalatory spirals that can easily set the two sides on a path to unavoidable military conflict. 0 SECONDS Do You Know What Happened On This Day? Jun 29 1881In Sudan, Muhammad Ahmad declares himself to be the Mahdi, the messianic redeemer of Islam. A derecho sweeps across the eastern United States, leaving at least 22 people dead and millions without power. Sponsored Advertisement Sponsored Advertisement What are Taiwan’s military capabilities, and how would it defend itself against a Chinese offensive? Here is what we found. Taiwan’s capacity to defend its airspace against the might of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is one of the foremost deciding factors in a prospective military conflict. For most of the 20th century, Taiwan’s security establishment was confident that the superior training and equipment of the ROC air force was enough to offset the PLAAF’s vast numerical advantage. In 2019, those calculations no longer apply. The PLAAF has emerged from its 1980’s modernization program with one of the most technically advanced air force rosters in the world, supplementing a growing domestic jet fighter industry with a total sum of just under one hundred modernized Russian Su-30MKK and Su-35 fighters. Report Advertisement Meanwhile, the core of Taiwan’s fleet is still composed of US-made F-16A/B fighters that were procured in the 1990’s. Since then, Taipei attempted several times to purchase upgraded F-16 C/D Block fighters. The Pentagon demurred until 2011, when it instead offered a minor retrofit package for Taiwan’s fleet of aging F-16A/B jets. Even this watered-down contract sputtered and eventually ground to a halt amid cost concerns. Taipei then briefly turned its sights on procuring the F-35B, before concluding that the US fighter was cost-inefficient and ill-suited for Taiwan’s defense needs. **It is only in the past year that Taipei**

found a glimmer of hope on their decades-long quest to modernize the Taiwanese air force. As per a 330 million dollar contract signed in late 2018 and reconfirmed last month, the preponderance of Taiwan’s F-16A/B fleet will be retrofitted to become generation 4.5 F-16 Vipers. As opposed to the ill-fated F-16 C/D deal, the F-16V upgrade promises to be a serious technical leap forward for Taiwan’s air force. The Viper boasts the best avionics package ever seen on an F-16, while incorporating the expanded armament suites of more recent F-16 Block revisions. Report Advertisement **For the first time in well over a decade, Taiwan’s air force would be in a military position to at least contest Taiwanese airspace against the PLAAF’s J-10 and Su-30 fighters. There is, however, a large caveat: the F-16V deal is not set in stone. Just as rapidly as Taiwan’s military fortunes are rising on the heels of a deteriorating US-China relationship, so too can they suddenly collapse with a change in Washington’s geopolitical priorities.**



1NC—Appeasement Turn

Even SMALL changes in Taiwan increase Chinese Aggression and show U.S. weakness

Tucker and Glaser 11 (Nancy Bernkopf Tucker is Professor of History at Georgetown University and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She also is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the author of Strait Talk. Bonnie Glaser is a Senior Fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and also a Senior Associate with the CSIS Pacific Forum. Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?, 1 Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 34:4 pp. 2337, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/19262/uploads>)

A decision to **jettison Taiwan**, or **even cut back significantly on U.S. support**, would prove to **an increasingly confident China** that Washington has become **weak, vacillating, and unreliable**.⁴ The 2009 U.S.—China Joint Statement reflected Beijing's estimate that Washington could be intimidated or misled, as it juxtaposed a reference to Taiwan as a Chinese core interest with concurrence that "the two sides agreed that respecting each other's core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.S.—China relations."⁴ **Analysts who argue that Washington can safely appease Beijing** because "territorial concessions are not always bound to fail" **are, without evidence, assuming improbably modest Chinese objectives** (emphasis added).⁵ **Relying on the sacrifice of Taiwan to fulfill Chinese ambitions ignores more than intentions, it also overlooks internal dynamics in China.** Beijing confronts constant domestic turmoil. **Corruption, income inequality, and environmental degradation have tarnished the accomplishments of the government and party. Fears among the leadership concerning mounting social unrest, spurred by the Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East, produced harsh restrictions of the media and the Internet along with the imprisonment of artists, underground church members, protesting peasants, lawyers, and human rights activists. Regaining Taiwan is unlikely to provide a broad and enduring balance to internal unhappiness.** Beijing also confronts militant nationalism which, though fostered by the government, **is still difficult to control.** Any suspicion that authorities are not adequately safeguarding Chinese interests and securing international respect could **threaten regime stability**. Accordingly, a U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan, while gratifying, **could not thoroughly slake a continuing need for Beijing to demonstrate its power**.⁶ Indeed, **the sacrifice might promote new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts to satisfy that need.** Accommodating China's demands on Taiwan, moreover, **would not necessarily cause Beijing to be more pliable on other matters of importance to the United States.** Beijing's positions on issues such as Korea and Iran are shaped by China's national interests and are not taken as favors to Washington. **Beijing's determination to preserve stability in its close neighbor and ally North Korea would continue to prevent China from increasing pressure on Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons. Resolving China's Taiwan problem would, also, not mean greater cooperation** in preventing Iran from going nuclear given Beijing's almost universal opposition to muscular sanctions, its growing energy needs, and desire to promote Chinese influence in the Middle East.



2NC – Appeasement Turn

Keeping military commitments and arms sales to Taiwan is key to effective containment and preventing miscalc

Office of Defense Studies 15 (Office of Defense Studies at the Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China, December 2015, "Challenges and Opportunities in the South China Sea," p. 7)

Given the structural stress in the US-China power transition and the uncertainty about China's foreign policy goals, how does Taiwan fit into this? As noted above, US security objective in Asia is to maintain a balance of power and to prevent any country from dominating the region. In this strategic context, **Taiwan's geographical location is of particular importance to the US. The island controls the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) extending from Japan to Southeast Asia and serves as a check on China's maritime expansions into the East and the South China Seas. As China rises, Taiwan's strategic value to the US will rise** as well. The imperatives of the balance of power will prompt Washington to give more thought to Taiwan's defense needs. **Taiwan has substantial economic and military resources to contribute to America's balancing efforts.** For their own strategic interests, "[US policy makers] will be inclined to back Taiwan no matter what."¹⁶ Far from being a strategic liability, as advocates of abandoning Taiwan believe, Taiwan is a strategic asset for the US and its allies. During Cold War, Gen. Douglas MacArthur famously referred to Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." Today, China's strategic planners see Taiwan as an integral part of its future naval power, as a way to break out of the encirclement of the First Island Chain. **Beijing's acquisition of Taiwan would enhance China's naval capabilities and give the PLA Navy greater strategic depth. It would adversely affect Japan's maritime security,** making it more difficult for the US to defend its ally. **Taiwan's close location to the Philippine Sea and the Luzon Strait would also provide the PLA Navy easy access to the South China Sea,** an area fraught with territorial disputes. The changing international structure will push Washington and Taipei into closer defense cooperation. The security interests of both countries are compatible. **It makes good strategic sense for the US to help strengthen Taiwan's defense capabilities to deter a Chinese attack. US arms sales to Taiwan,** rather than being an unnecessary provocation to China, as those in favor of abandoning Taiwan believe, actually **strengthen regional stability.** **A basic requirement for effective deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is that Taiwan should at least have the capabilities to withstand an initial Chinese attack until the US has sufficient time to respond.** The arms sales not only fulfill a legal obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act but also serve US strategic interests. **A robust defense makes Taiwan less vulnerable to China's military coercion and helps preserve regional peace. China is opposed to US arms sales for the simple reason that a militarily weak Taiwan will be more compliant to Beijing's demands. But a weakly defended Taiwan could tempt Chinese leadership to use the implied threat of force to coerce the island into negotiations for unification. Once this process is started,** it would be difficult for the US to stay on the sideline and watch a democracy being forced to accommodate an authoritarian state under duress. For their part, the Chinese leaders would find it difficult to back down without losing domestic legitimacy. **A spiral of escalation would generate perilous dynamics and threaten regional peace. Conversely, a well-defended Taiwan would reduce this source of dangerous miscalculation,** which counterintuitively is also in China's interest.¹⁷



2NC – Appeasement Turn

Disengaging from Taiwan causes China to pocket concessions and continue to pursue even more aggressive foreign policy

Iskander Rehman 14 (Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments where he focuses on U.S. grand strategy, defense policy, and emerging security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Prior to joining CSBA, Dr. Rehman was a Stanton Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2/28/2014, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “Why Taiwan Matters”, <http://csbaonline.org/2014/02/28/why-taiwan-matters/>)

There are certain **core issues** troubling the Sino-U.S. relationship that **extend far beyond** the **Taiwan Strait**. Whether it is Beijing’s assertiveness towards its neighbors [9], some of whom, like Japan and the Philippines, are treaty allies of the United States, or issues related to cyber-espionage and human rights, the **challenges currently testing the bilateral relationship are profound and numerous. China is a revisionist power** [10]—and its claims on the international system do not end with Taiwan. **One should not surmise**, therefore, **that Sino-U.S. strategic competition would abate were the Taiwan issue to be resolved**. Indeed, a growing body of work in the strategic studies community has suggested that **Sino-U.S. tensions are more structural than conjunctural, and are the natural result of** the [11] **friction** [11] **that traditionally occurs between rising and established powers**. Furthermore, **while some may assume that China’s absorption of Taiwan might provide at least a symbolic first step** towards a more stable and peaceful relationship between Washington and Beijing, **this hypothesis also appears somewhat untenable**. To the contrary, an **American abandonment** of Taiwan might only succeed in **emboldening**, and **strengthening hardline elements** within Beijing’s leadership, by providing a **material confirmation** of their **long-held desire to see America progressively retreat from the Indo-Pacific theater**. Bonnie Glaser and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker have expressed their concerns [12] over such a development, cautioning that **A decision to jettison Taiwan, or even cut back significantly on U.S. support, would prove to an increasingly confident China** that Washington has become **weak, vacillating and unreliable**...Accordingly, **a U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan, while gratifying, could not thoroughly slake a continuing need for Beijing to demonstrate its power. Indeed, the sacrifice might promote new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts to satisfy that need.**



1NC—Taiwan Not Key

No Taiwan Tensions — U.S. support *doesn't* undermine U.S.-China relations.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Myth #1: Taiwan Is an Obstacle to Better U.S.-China Relations **Glaser and others** who espouse the benefits of a U.S.-China grand bargain **allege that the unresolved question of Taiwanese independence has impeded healthy U.S.-China relations. To test this assertion, it is important to consider the reality of recent China-Taiwan interactions.** The issues of **Taiwan's disputed status and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan** remain perhaps the most outstanding problems between the United States and China. Still, even these issues **no longer impede U.S.-China relations**. The question of Taiwanese independence emerged in the 1990s with the nation's transition to democracy. As the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gained control over Taiwan in subsequent elections, then-President Chen Shui-bian amplified Taiwan's calls for independence. The 2005 passage of the Anti-Secession Law* in China served as a sharp response to Taiwan's ambitions for independence. Meanwhile, former President George W. **Bush clarified the U.S. position of “strategic ambiguity” over the Taiwan** issue with a powerful proclamation: The United States would not want to see Taiwan provoke China, but the United States would help defend Taiwan if China were to lose its patience with Taiwan and use force to achieve unification with the island. This statement made it clear that the United States did not support either formal Taiwanese independence or forceful unification. This policy position effectively stabilized the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. **Since then, no further attempts have been made to upend the balance between China and Taiwan.** Nor should U.S. arms sales to Taiwan be regarded as a serious barrier to U.S.-China relations. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 stipulates that the United States will provide Taiwan with arms of a defense nature. Although China often uses the United States' periodic decision to sell arms to Taiwan as a political ploy to suspend the Chinese military's contact with the United States and stir up nationalistic sentiments, the issue needs to be put into perspective. While all arms are technically offensive in nature, **the quantity and quality of the weapons Taiwan receives from the United States do little Taiwan's offensive capabilities.** For example, Taiwan purchases short-range fighter jets, air defense systems, and older-generation weapons. In addition, **U.S. authorization to sell arms to Taiwan differs from the actual delivery of weapon systems. The United States has declined to provide the quality of weapons that Taiwan has requested from time to time.** Moreover, Taiwan's legislature has often failed to appropriate the funds necessary to purchase the quantity of weapons requested. Finally, **China's periodic suspensions of its military contacts with the United States have failed to inflict significant damage on U.S.-China relations and relations are regularly quietly restored once the political storm subsides. Beijing understands that Taiwan's weaponry does not pose a serious threat to mainland China's military.** Bearing this in mind, it seems evident that **U.S. arms sales to Taiwan act as mere political pretense for China's antagonistic behavior and are not serious obstacles.** In fact, **the past several decades have produced a relatively stable economic and political equilibrium between China and Taiwan.** Most recently, **the 2008 election of President Ma Ying-jeou has ushered in an era of unprecedented China-Taiwan cooperation.** Economic integration, highlighted by a 2010 bilateral trade agreement, has inextricably linked Beijing and Taipei. In fact, **the health of Taiwan's economy relies on revenue from Chinese trade.** According to 2014 Chinese statistics, trade volume between the two nations totaled more than 200 billion dollars. Taiwan also exports most of its goods to China and enjoys a huge trade surplus. **Yearly trends indicate that the economic bonds between the two nations are getting even stronger.** From 2014 to 2015, trade between the two nations increased 16.7 per cent.



1NC—Taiwan Not Key

The plan doesn't solve US-China relations AND independently sparks massive political backlash that turns the advantage

Rigger 11 (Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor and chair of political science at Davidson College, November 29, 2011. "Why giving up Taiwan will not help us with China." <http://www.aei.org/publication/why-giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-china/>)

No Silver Bullet for US-China Woes Even if it were true that Sino-American tensions **could be melted away with a single policy change in Washington**, the United States should still continue to support Taiwan to maintain the credibility of its alliances and uphold its commitment to democracy as a desirable and feasible goal for developing nations. But, **in reality, ending US defense assistance to Taipei is unlikely to produce the salutary effects** the critics of current US policy anticipate. **Such a change** would indeed delight Beijing; however, it **would create new problems just as intractable as the old ones but less familiar and potentially even more challenging. The point of departure for critics of America's existing Taiwan policy is their shared belief that ending security assistance to Taiwan would improve US-China relations.** As Freeman puts it, "**The kind of long-term relationship of friendship and cooperation China and America want with each other is incompatible** with our emotionally fraught differences over the Taiwan issue. These differences propel mutual hostility and the sort of ruinous military rivalry between the two countries that has already begun. We are coming to a point at which we can no longer finesse our differences over Taiwan. We must either resolve them or live with the increasingly adverse consequences of our failure to do so." [10] As a syllogism, this argument makes sense: Beijing believes Taiwan should be unified with the mainland, and it views US security assistance to Taiwan as the primary reason it is not. Because unification is a core issue for the PRC, leaders in Beijing cannot ignore or overlook US intervention; they must constantly challenge it. **Thus, if the United States ended its security assistance to Taiwan, the biggest irritant in US-China relations would disappear.** In practice, unfortunately, **there is no guarantee that a change in US policy toward Taiwan would instantly or automatically end, or even significantly reduce, the tensions** the Taiwan issue creates in **Sino-American relations.** Ending security assistance to Taiwan would raise expectations in China without removing the existing obstacles to peaceful unification. It likely would provoke panic in Taiwan, but it would not make the Taiwanese people any more enthusiastic about unification. On the contrary, the more vulnerable and threatened the Taiwanese people felt, the harder it would be for them to consider China's overtures rationally. For decades, the United States has justified arms sales to Taiwan on the grounds that Taipei can negotiate with Beijing more effectively from a position of strength than of weakness. It is easy to dismiss this logic as a rationalization, but as Randall Schriver said, "In what other instance involving a negotiation is the weaker party better off? . . . Historically, what you find is where there is equal power—or, at least, credible deterrent power—you get better outcomes." Neither Beijing nor Taipei is well served by a negotiating process that leads to a bad deal, including one Taiwanese citizens cannot accept. Successfully pressuring Taiwan's negotiators into accepting a deal might seem like a victory for Beijing, but if Taiwan's domestic politics make it impossible to implement the deal, the long-term result might be worse than no deal at all. **Ending US defense assistance to Taiwan**—whether by repealing the Taiwan Relations Act or by simply declining to provide defensive equipment to Taiwan's armed forces—would not "ripen" Taiwan for peaceful unification or obviate the rationale the United States has historically followed regarding Taiwan. It **would, however, intensify the debate over Taiwan policy within the United States. Taiwan still has many US friends and supporters, and many foreign policy experts would question a decision to change course.** The policy changes Gilley, Glaser, Freeman, and Owens recommend would stimulate a debate over China policy at a time when negative attitudes toward the PRC already are on the rise. **The last thing Sino-American relations need is an acrimonious, politically charged debate in Washington over policy toward China and Taiwan.** In sum, **changing America's Taiwan policy could easily induce a poisonous turn in the domestic politics of US China policy** without making peaceful unification easier.



2NC—Taiwan Not Key

Empirically proven — U.S.-China ties have been strong despite U.S. support for Taiwan.

Liao and Lin 15 — Nien-chung Chang Liao, Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica—the national academy of Taiwan, holds a Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at the National Chengchi University (Taiwan), and Dalton Kuen-da Lin, Research Associate at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Executive Editor of the Taiwan Security Research website, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2015 (“Rebalancing Taiwan–US Relations,” *Survival*, Volume 57, Issue 6, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor and Francis Online)

It would be wise, moreover, for observers in Washington to acknowledge that continued US support of Taiwan has so far not affected the core substance of Sino-American relations. At both official and grassroots levels, China–US ties have flourished over the past few decades: bilateral trade and investment are booming, Chinese visitors flock to the US in record numbers, and political and military dialogues continue unabated. US public diplomacy should therefore focus on identifying and interpreting the shared interests that underpin Washington's relations with both sides of the Strait.



1NC—Alt Cause (Laundry List)

No Solvency — tensions are *numerous* and *structural*.

Rehman 14 — Iskander Rehman, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former Visiting Fellow in Security Studies at the Observer Research Foundation, former Research Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Government from Sciences Po—The Paris Institute of Political Studies, 2014 (“Why Taiwan Matters,” *The National Interest*, February 28th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971?page=show>, Accessed 07-10-2016)

Abandoning Taiwan would likely fail to ameliorate the Sino-U.S. Relationship.

There are certain core issues troubling the Sino-U.S. relationship that extend far beyond the Taiwan Strait. Whether it is Beijing’s assertiveness towards its neighbors, some of whom, like Japan and the Philippines, are treaty allies of the United States, or issues related to cyber-espionage and human rights, the challenges currently testing the bilateral relationship are profound and numerous. China is a revisionist power—and its claims on the international system do not end with Taiwan. One should not surmise, therefore, that Sino-U.S. strategic competition would abate were the Taiwan issue to be resolved. Indeed, a growing body of work in the strategic studies community has suggested that Sino-U.S. tensions are more structural than conjectural, and are the natural result of the friction that traditionally occurs between rising and established powers.



2NC—Alt Cause (Laundry List)

Many other issues will continue to undermine relations.

Easley 16 — Leif-Eric Easley, Assistant Professor in the Division of International Studies at Ewha University, Research Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, former Northeast Asian History Fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, holds a Ph.D. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” *International Security*, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)

Points of friction in U.S.-China relations abound—from cyber espionage and human rights to trade disputes and financial governance. Abandoning Taiwan will not stop Chinese military modernization, antiaccess/area denial development, or the targeting of U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea with Chinese missiles.¹¹ The United States has numerous reasons for conducting surveillance and freedom of navigation operations, so those activities Glaser identifies as irritants to China would not end, even if Taiwan were no longer a subject of disagreement. Foreign policy ambition in Beijing has outgrown the 1950s and 1990s cross-strait crises; Chinese internal debates tend to paint the United States as a global competitor, benchmark U.S. global capabilities, and derive legitimacy from contrasting Chinese political values with “Western” or “universal” values.¹² Glaser does not mention Chinese efforts at building up alternative institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, Boao Forum for Asia, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, or China using issues of historical animosity to drive a wedge between Japan and South Korea. He thus underestimates the apparent Chinese strategy of not directly confronting the United States globally, while attempting to dilute U.S. alliances in Asia, pursuing a Chinese-centered regional architecture, and changing the status quo in maritime areas without going so far as to trigger conflict or a coherent balancing coalition.¹³



1NC—AT: Defensive Realism

This only makes sense if Taiwan is China's only regional aspiration.

Roy 15 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, June 24th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Glaser's case has other weaknesses.

He **assumes that the US abandonment of Taiwan would “dramatically improve” U.S.-China relations, and that “China can be very secure with the United States maintaining its alliances and forward deployment” as long as Taiwan is no longer in play. This is believable only if we posit that Beijing has no aspirations for regional leadership or revisions of the current order beyond gaining control over Taiwan, both now and in the future.**

It's not — China's goal is to end American hegemony.

Jackson 15 — Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Strategist and Policy Adviser focused on the Asia-Pacific at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds a Ph.D. in World Politics from The Catholic University of America, 2015 (“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” *The Diplomat*, August 6th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

China's concerns will only be assuaged when the United States divests of the military force structure that makes it possible to project power globally, uphold its commitments, and bolster the regional order. The U.S. military will be unable to pursue such a course as long as China maintains openly expansionist geopolitical ambitions and a force structure designed to achieve it. Competition, it seems, is the logic of the situation. We ignore that at our own peril.



1NC—No US-China War

No U.S.-China war — economic ties and deterrence.

Gelb 13 — Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and columnist for the *New York Times*, served as Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration and was the recipient of the Distinguished Honor Award—the State Department’s highest honor, served as Director of Policy Planning and Arms Control for International Security Affairs at the Department of Defense where he was the recipient of the Distinguished Service Award—the Defense Department’s highest honor, holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University, 2013 (“Is a military conflict between China and the United States possible in the future?,” *Ask CFR Experts*—a Council on Foreign Relations blog, Question submitted by Josh Wartel from Lake Braddock Secondary School, September 9th, Available Online at http://www.cfr.org/china/military-conflict-between-china-united-states-possible-future/p31361?cid=rss-fullfeed-is_a_military_conflict_between-090913, Accessed 09-12-2013)

Is a military conflict between China and the United States possible in the future?

There is almost never a time when people do not worry about war between major powers. The history here is not a happy one. But there are good reasons to expect a better outcome in the 21st century—as long as both sides are alert and careful.

The stakes are much too high for either Beijing or Washington to expect direct military confrontations. Two-way trade and investment are quite high. China holds almost \$1.2 trillion in American debt. **By contrast, during the Cold War, the United States had virtually no economic ties with the Soviet Union—and both sides still went out of their way to avoid war because of the dangers of escalation into nuclear war. The nightmare of nuclear war hangs over the Chinese-American relationship today. It is clear neither side wants to come anywhere near this ultimate danger.**

None of this is to say that both sides will not continue to build up their military capability. No country is adding to its military punch faster than China. But it is still far behind the United States in usable military capability, that is, force that can be applied effectively and decidedly in various situations. Chinese military strength is limited almost entirely to lands and seas bordering its own territory. The United States is still the only global military power.

And **it is difficult to see what Beijing might calculate is worth a war or even the risk of war.** It has boundary disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and others in the South China Sea, and with Japan up north. Troubles should be expected there, and China will certainly be testing Washington's will in both places. **Chinese leaders, however, continue to focus on their nation's economic development, and war would certainly set that back.**



2NC—No US-China War

The U.S. can respond to Chinese aggression with non-military policies.

Turton 15 — Michael Turton, writer, blogger, and teacher based in Taichung, Taiwan, author of *The View from Taiwan*—a popular scholarly blog about Taiwanese politics, 2015 (“Hugh White in Straits Times issues primer on how not to write about the Taiwan Issue,” *The View from Taiwan*—a blog, April 17th, Available Online at <https://michaelturton.blogspot.com/2015/04/hugh-white-in-straits-times-issues.html>, Accessed 07-10-2016)

Note that White says that there is little the US could do. LOL. **There are many things the US can do short of the military intervention he actually presents** (which was not toe-to-toe in any case, the carriers loitered far from the island, just a gentle reminder). **It's not only a choice between military intervention and not intervening in support of Taiwan, except in the case of a hot war.**

If "serious pressure" -- whatever that is -- is put on Taiwan, the US can respond by upgrading weapons sales and military contacts. By arranging the sale of Japanese subs to Taiwan. By upgrading its treaty and legal situation with respect to Taiwan. By moving military assets closer to the island. By sending cabinet officials to visit. By making loans and other commercial engagements. By organizing support from and for other regional actors. By a wide range of gestures both symbolic and real. Even by landing two F-18s in Tainan...

The US may or may not choose to do such things. But it always has the ability to.



1NC—No Nuke Escalation

No Nuclear Escalation — deterrence and strategic restraint.

Thim 12 — Michal Thim, Research Fellow at the Association for International Affairs (Prague), Member of CIMSEC—The Center for International Maritime Security, Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, Postgraduate Student in Taiwan Studies at the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham, previously a Graduate Student in Asia-Pacific Studies and Taiwan Studies at National Chengchi University, holds an M.A. in Political Science from Charles University in Prague, 2012 (“Of Peace and Appeasement: Comments on Charles Glaser’s Article, ‘Will China’s Rise Lead To War?’,” *Taiwan In Perspective*—a blog, August 21st, Available Online at <https://taiwan-in-perspective.com/2012/08/21/of-peace-and-appeasement-comments-on-charles-glasers-article-will-chinas-rise-lead-to-war/>, Accessed 07-10-2016)

The author of this essay **strongly opposes the idea** that current U.S. commitments may easily lead to full-scale nuclear war. A combination of **nuclear and conventional deterrence** (developing Taiwan’s A2/AD and missile defense capabilities with U.S. technological assistance), and **strategic restraint** in the case of a breakout of war (i.e. limiting U.S. response purely to Taiwan’s defense) may keep a potential conflict **limited to conventional warfare**. Moreover, **enhancing Taiwan’s defensive advantages and limiting disadvantages should be enough to make Chinese leaders think twice** about choosing a military solution.



2NC—No Nuke Escalation

War won't go nuclear — stakes aren't high enough for either side.

Thim 15 — Michal Thim, Research Fellow at the Association for International Affairs (Prague), Member of CIMSEC—The Center for International Maritime Security, Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, Postgraduate Student in Taiwan Studies at the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham, previously a Graduate Student in Asia-Pacific Studies and Taiwan Studies at National Chengchi University, holds an M.A. in Political Science from Charles University in Prague, 2015 (“On Taiwan, Hard Choices, and Determinism,” *Taiwan In Perspective*—a blog, April 19th, Available Online at <https://taiwan-in-perspective.com/2015/04/19/on-taiwan-hard-choices-and-determinism/>, Accessed 07-10-2016)

Firstly, White inevitably addresses the issue of potential U.S. military assistance to Taiwan in the case of Chinese attack:

Even more worryingly, this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in Washington, where leaders still talk boldly about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without seriously considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and quite possibly a nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster for everyone, including, of course, the people of Taiwan itself – far worse than reunification, in fact.

The last sentence is just horrible. It could very well read like this: “Please, everyone who just happen to be subject of territorial desire of a stronger state, do us good and surrender already, obviously it is better for you anyway. Sincerely yours, concerned third party.” Now somehow I can't understand why White's compatriots were so stubbornly rejecting to become part of the glorious Japanese empire more than 60 years ago. It must be some exception from the rule, I suppose.

That is not what puzzles me though. Instead it is the other claim. **Why so many people assume that potential conflict between China and the U.S. has nuclear potential?** For one, **I do not think it does.** **Neither territory of the two nuclear weapon-armed actors would be subject to an invasion from the other side, nor would either of them face total defeat threatening the very existence of one's statehood. Granted, losing would be hard hit for either of the two (and Taiwan), but it would not be as nearly as bad as mutual nuclear holocaust. Live to fight another day is in this scenario always better option, Taiwan's importance notwithstanding.**



2NC—No Nuke Escalation

If China really *is* willing to wage nuclear war to annex Taiwan, the counterplan is better than the plan.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master's in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 ("If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan," *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

If, however, Beijing were committed to a nuclear policy and willing to cause and suffer millions of deaths to annex Taiwan, a country that is 1/267th the size of China, then I would say that we have all the reasons in the world to oppose it, as giving in to its blackmail would unleash upon the world a beast of unmitigated evil.



1NC – No Environmental Cooperation

They say China and the US are able to cooperate on Green Tech, but alternative sources of tension ensure that environmental cooperation will fail, regardless of the plan.

Pike 18 [Lili Pike, December 13, 2018, Competition fears threaten Chinese investment in US clean tech, <https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10972-Competition-fears-threaten-Chinese-investment-in-US-clean-tech>]

A new investment fund is looking to strengthen this relationship. The California-China Cleantech Partnership Fund was launched at the Global Climate Action Summit in San Francisco in the autumn. It aims to **help investors and companies operate across borders to rapidly scale up their clean energy technologies. But a new US law scrutinising Chinese investments poses a threat to the fledgling initiative. Clean technology trade has been snagged by similar policies in the past. Now this law is testing, once again, whether clean energy cooperation can overcome economic nationalism** Chinese investment in the US has fallen dramatically since 2017, but not in clean tech. However, **the sector is not immune to geopolitical tensions. The new US law will target foreign investment in “critical technologies”, a category that spans industries,** including some related to clean energy such as battery manufacturing. Research from the Rhodium Group found that almost 40% of China’s US investments last year could be subject to review depending on how the rules are applied. Meanwhile in China, the trade war has spurred rising nationalism in the technology sector. President Xi has called for “self-reliance”, echoing the country’s goal to build its own advanced technologies, as articulated in the Made in China 2025 plan. Clean technologies, including power technologies and new energy vehicles, feature in this strategy. **As the US closes its borders, China-US clean tech cooperation and the new partnership fund may be at odds with the protectionist era. If the new US investment rules make it prohibitively difficult to access the Californian market, the fund may have to invest in other countries rather than the US. “If we do not have collaboration between China and the US, everyone is going to lose out,”** warned Mialaret.



1NC – No Environmental Cooperation

We have a president that does not believe in climate change, or the scientists that argue for it. There is 0 chance that the United States will be able to effectively cooperate to invest and create green technology.

Wolff 18 [Eric Wolff, Reporter, Politico, “Trump’s failing war on green power”, <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/24/trumps-failing-war-green-power-307281>]

President Donald Trump and Republicans have tried again and again during the past year to turn back the clock on energy — pushing policies that would help fossil fuels stave off advances by solar and wind. But they have repeatedly come up short. Energy Secretary Rick Perry’s proposal to force electricity customers to subsidize ailing coal plants ran aground early this year. The Senate rebuffed efforts to water down tax credits for solar and wind power. And **Trump’s move this week to impose a tariff on imported solar panels should put only a crimp in the growth of sun-powered energy**, analysts have said, **despite the outcry it’s generated from most of the U.S. solar industry. Trump spent his campaign promoting an "America First" energy policy that translated to more oil, gas and especially coal** — even as he slammed solar as expensive and hammered wind turbines as ugly. But after growing rapidly during the Obama years, wind and solar energy may have come too far for even a pro-fossil-fuel administration to stuff back into the barrel — especially after creating tens of thousands of jobs in red and blue states alike. **The administration's most ambitious effort so far to tilt the scale in the direction of traditional fuels came from the Energy Department last fall, when Perry invoked a rarely used authority to press federal energy regulators to create a subsidy for a group of coal-fired and nuclear power plants in markets stretching from the Midwest to the East Coast.** The move would have propped up plants that are struggling to survive in the face of rising natural gas and wind power.



1NC—Warming Inevitable

Inevitable—developing countries and continued fossil fuel usage

Porter 2013 - writes the Economic Scene column for the Wednesday Business section (March 19, Eduardo, “A Model for Reducing Emissions” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/business/us-example-offers-hope-for-cutting-carbon-emissions.html?_r=1&)

Even if every American coal-fired power plant were to close, that would not make up for the coal-based generators being built in developing countries like India and China. **“Since 2000, the growth in coal has been 10 times that of renewables,”** said Daniel Yergin, chairman of IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates. ¶ Fatih Birol, chief economist of the International Energy Agency in Paris, points out that **if civilization is to avoid catastrophic climate change, only about one third of the** 3,000 gigatons of **CO₂** contained **in** the world’s **known reserves** of oil, gas and coal can be released into the atmosphere. ¶ But **the world economy does not work as if this were the case** — not governments, nor businesses, nor consumers. ¶ **“In all my experience as an oil company manager, not a single oil company took into the picture the problem of CO₂,”** said Leonardo Maugeri, an energy expert at **Harvard** who until 2010 was head of strategy and development for Italy’s state-owned oil company, Eni. **“They are all totally devoted to replacing the reserves they consume every year.”**



2NC—Warming Inevitable

Already passed the tipping point

Michael **McCarthy**, Environment Editor of The Independent, Global warming: passing the 'tipping point', **2006** <http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/global-warming-passing-the-tipping-point-466187.html>

A crucial global warming "tipping point" for the Earth, highlighted only last week by the British Government, **has already been passed, with devastating consequences.** Research commissioned by The Independent reveals that **the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has now crossed a threshold, set down by scientists from around the world at a conference in Britain** last year, **beyond which really dangerous climate change is** likely to be **unstoppable.** The implication is that **some of global warming's worst predicted effects, from destruction of ecosystems to increased hunger and water shortages** for billions of people, **cannot now be avoided, whatever we do.** It gives considerable force to the contention by the green guru Professor James Lovelock, put forward last month in The Independent, that **climate change is now past the point of no return.**

The danger point we are now firmly on course for is a rise in global mean temperatures to 2 degrees above the level before the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century. At the moment, global mean temperatures have risen to about 0.6 degrees above the pre-industrial era - and worrying signs of climate change, such as the rapid melting of the Arctic ice in summer, are already increasingly evident. But a rise to 2 degrees would be far more serious. By that point it is likely that **the Greenland ice sheet will already have begun irreversible melting, threatening the world with a sea-level rise of several metres. Agricultural yields will have started to fall**, not only in Africa but also in Europe, the US and Russia, putting up to 200 million more people at risk from hunger, and up to 2.8 billion additional people at risk of water shortages for both drinking and irrigation. **The Government's conference** on Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, held at the UK Met Office in Exeter a year ago, **highlighted a clear threshold in the accumulation** of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO₂) in the atmosphere, **which should not be surpassed if the 2 degree point was to be avoided with "relatively high certainty". This was for the concentration of CO₂** and other gases such as methane and nitrous oxide, taken together in their global warming effect, **to stay below 400ppm** (parts per million) in CO₂ terms - or in the jargon, the "equivalent concentration" of CO₂ should remain below that level. The warning was highlighted in the official report of the Exeter conference, published last week. However, an investigation by The Independent has established that **the CO₂ equivalent concentration**, largely unnoticed by the scientific and political communities, **has now risen beyond this threshold.** This number is not a familiar one even among climate researchers, and is not readily available. For example, when we put the question to a very senior climate scientist, he said: "I would think it's definitely over 400 - probably about 420." So we asked one of the world's leading experts on the effects of greenhouse gases on climate, Professor Keith Shine, head of the meteorology department at the University of Reading, to calculate it precisely. Using the latest available figures (for 2004), his calculations show the equivalent concentration of CO₂, taking in the effects of methane and nitrous oxide at 2004 levels, is now 425ppm. This is made up of CO₂ itself, at 379ppm; the global warming effect of the methane in the atmosphere, equivalent to another 40ppm of CO₂; and the effect of nitrous oxide, equivalent to another 6ppm of CO₂. **The tipping point** warned about last week by the Government **is already behind us.**



1NC—No Warming Extinction

Extinction claims inaccurately deviate from predictive modelling—adaptation checks worst case scenarios

Willis, et. al, '10 [Kathy J. Willis, Keith D. Bennett, Shonil A. Bhagwat & H. John B. Birks (2010): 4 °C and beyond: what did this mean for biodiversity in the past?, Systematics and Biodiversity, 8:1, 3-9, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14772000903495833>,]

Given that this temperature increase was greater in magnitude and rate to anything predicted for the next century, it is an extremely useful time interval to examine possible biotic responses to 4 ° C and beyond

In order to assess biotic responses, however, it is also important to have records with a good temporal resolution, ideally annual resolution. **A review of the vegetational responses recorded in 11 sedimentary sequences with a suitably high temporal resolution from around the North Atlantic region** (Williams et al., 2002), **indicates that in North America and Europe, in less than 100 years, vegetation responded to the rapid climate change 11 600 years ago. For tree populations, this change often occurred in less than two or three generations.** The nature of the response depended upon the former vegetation; in central Europe (e.g. Willis et al., 1997; Feurdean et al., 2007) and parts of eastern North America, for example, there is evidence in many regions for a change from needle-leaved dominated to broad-leaved dominated forest, often in less than 100 years. In comparison, closer to the ice-sheets, in western Norway, there was a rapid expansion in the herbaceous and shrub flora and a later arrival of trees, probably due to a time lag for migration from refugial areas (Birks & Birks, 2008). The increase in tree populations, however, even in these northerly regions was still rapid (Birks & Ammann, 2000). A recent study from the East Baltic region, for example, indicates that those trees that survived in northerly refugial populations (Betula, Pinus, Picea) established within a century, suggesting climate-driven ecosystem changes rather than gradual plant succession on new deglaciated land (Heikkilä et al., 2009). Thus **some species expanded very fast in response to late-glacial warming**. There is also evidence, however, for species that expanded slowly or largely failed to expand from their refugia in response to this interval of rapid climate warming (Svenning & Skov, 2007) suggesting that persistence and expansion is also dependent on being in a location that was continuously suitable during the glacial–interglacial 'cycle' (Bennett et al., 1991). Biotic responses to this interval of rapid climate warming throughout Europe and North America therefore include evidence for (i) rapid expansion of in situ populations, (ii) large-scale species range shifts (Birks & Willis, 2008), (iii) community turnover (Birks & Birks, 2008) and (iv) the formation of novel community assemblages (Williams & Jackson, 2007). However, **at no site yet studied,**

anywhere in the world, is there evidence in the fossil record for largescale climate-driven extinction

during this interval of rapid climate change (Botkin et al., 2007). **In some regions there was local or regional extinction, as is apparent throughout the cold-stages of the Quaternary when increasing numbers of tropical species went locally or regionally extinct in**

Europe (Tallis, 1991; Svenning, 2003; Willis & Niklas, 2004). There is evidence in the fossil record for the total extinction of only one species, the east North American spruce *Picea critchfieldii* (Jackson & Weng, 1999), but **evidence for widespread global extinction of plants in this interval of very rapid climate warming has yet to be demonstrated. It had been argued previously that the large-scale megafaunal extinction that occurred at the end of the Pleistocene was climatically driven, but a large number of studies now suggests that this was a predominantly human-driven extinction event that spanned thousands of years** (Koch & Barnosky, 2006; Johnson, 2009) **rather than a rapid response to the large temperature increase at the late-glacial/post-glacial transition.**



2NC—No Warming Extinction

History disproves

Willis, et. al, '10 [Kathy J. Willis, Keith D. Bennett, Shonil A. Bhagwat & H. John B. Birks (2010): 4 °C and beyond: what did this mean for biodiversity in the past?, Systematics and Biodiversity, 8:1, 3-9, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14772000903495833>,]

So **why is there this discrepancy between what the fossil and historical records are telling us about extinctions driven by climate change and those predicted through models? Many biota, using evidence from fossil plant records, likely have much wider ecological tolerances than are usually assigned in models. Also, the present-day distribution of species, especially in mid to high latitudes, often has a strong historical/pre-historical cultural imprint (e.g. Bradshaw & Lindbladh, 2005) which again is often not taken into account in the models. However, the discrepancy is also in part due to the coarse scale of the models used to estimate climate change-induced habitat loss. For example, a recent study to assess whether climate change-induced habitat losses predicted at the European scale (16 km × 16 km grid cells) are also predicted from local-scale data and modelling (25 m × 25 m grid cells) in two regions of the Swiss Alps indicated that whereas the European-scale model predict loss of all suitable habitats, local-scale models predict persistence of suitable habitats in up to 100% of species (Randin et al., 2009). A similar conclusion was also reached in a study to assess the predictive accuracy of bioclimatic envelope models for the future distribution of European butterflies (Luoto & Heikkinen, 2008). Here, of the 100 species studied, a model that included topography predicted only half of the species losses for the period 2051–2080 compared with those predicted by a climate-only model. In contrast, the number of species predicted to disappear from flatlands doubled. It would appear from both these studies that habitat heterogeneity resulting from topographic diversity may be an essential factor for persistence of biota in a future changing climate (Willis & Bhagwat, 2009). Based on these studies, and many others using fossil and historical records, we argue that evidence for the widely cited view that future climate change poses an equal or greater threat to global biodiversity than anthropogenic land-use change and habitat loss (Thomas et al., 2004) is equivocal: extinctions driven by the latter processes of habitat loss pose a far greater threat to global biodiversity. It is also questionable, however, whether it is even possible to now separate the two processes, given that over 80% of the Earth's terrestrial biomes now have evidence of an anthropogenic impact upon them (Ellis & Ramankutty, 2008). What we probably need to be considering is the synergistic effect of these two factors on biodiversity (Travis, 2003)**