

CON CASE	2
Tourism	7
Automobiles	12
AMS's don't work	14
China and North Korea will spend more money on missiles to overwhelm any anti-missile system that exists.	14
North Korea sees the deployment of THAAD as an act of aggression.	15
North Korea sees the deployment of THAAD as an act of aggression.	16
THAAD can't stop nukes	16
THAAD no work	17
Prolif Good 1NC/1AC – Solves War	19
Prolif Good 1NC/1AC – Bioweapons	20
Prolif Good 1NC/1AC – Impact Calculus	22
***Extensions	23
Prolif Solves War 2NC/2AC	23
Solves War	25
South Korea has a better Economy and Military	29
Moon/South korea wants to reunite and how	29
South korea will try easing tensions to reunite	30
North and South Korea have come to agreement	30
China is going to actually implement negotiations	31
North Korea and South Korea have come to an agreement	32

CON CASE

We negate the resolved: Anti-missile systems are in the best interest of the South Korea Judge because of the dependent nature of economics and national security upon each other we advocate a cost-benefit analysis framework for which we will evaluate the round

Contention One: Economy

Subpoint A: Chinese Relations

According to Kristian McGuire in 2017,

Kristian McGuire, *Kristian McGuire is an independent, Washington-based research analyst. He is the founder and executive editor of Pac100.com and associate editor of [Taiwan Security Research](#). Kristian earned his M.A. in international affairs from George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs and his B.A. in international relations from University of the Pacific's School of International Studies.*, "Dealing With Chinese Sanctions: South Korea and Taiwan,"

<http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/dealing-with-chinese-sanctions-south-korea-and-taiwan/> *The Diplomat*, 12 May 2017, JF

"After South Korea agreed to host the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system last July, reports surfaced that China had begun sanctioning South Korea to pressure Seoul into reversing its decision. Chinese officials have repeatedly denied that there is any validity to such reports. However, evidence that Beijing has [restricted Korean pop culture imports](#), [ordered Chinese travel agencies to halt sales](#) of travel packages to South Korea, [blocked importation](#) of Korean cosmetics, and leveled a number of other unofficial economic sanctions on South Korea has led the U.S. and South Korea to call China out for its coercive measures. Beijing, though, has shown no intention of lifting its sanctions, causing many inside and outside South Korea to wonder how much longer the country will be subjected to Beijing's pressure. A look at Taiwan's similar experience as a victim of China's coercive tactics indicates that the sanctions might be lifted soon after the new South Korean president settles into office, but could also linger in one form or another for years, depending on the new South Korean administration's strategic orientation."

Overall, T.H.A.A.D. is a key blocker of commercial trade between South Korea and China and it may be the key to strengthening Chinese South Korean relations. In fact McGuire furthers that,

Kristian McGuire, Kristian McGuire is an independent, Washington-based research analyst. He is the founder and executive editor of Pac100.com and associate editor of [Taiwan Security Research](#). Kristian earned his M.A. in international affairs from George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs and his B.A. in international relations from University of the Pacific's School of International Studies., “Dealing With Chinese Sanctions: South Korea and Taiwan,”

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China would almost certainly remove its sanctions on South Korea immediately were the new administration in Seoul to remove THAAD. Yet, such a move might not be necessary to get the sanctions lifted.”

Sub-Point B: Sanctions

AUTOMOBILES

Kenichi Yamada quantifies the detriment to the automobile industry when he writes,

Kenichi Yamada, “Hyundai's Chinese sales skidded 60% for June amid THAAD backlash,” 11 July 2017.

<http://asia.nikkei.com/Business/AC/Hyundai-s-Chinese-sales-skidded-60-for-June-amid-THAAD-backlash>, JF

“SEOUL -- [Hyundai Motor](#)'s sales plunged about 60% on the year in China last month, the victim of public ire following the deployment of an American missile defense system in South Korea.

Hyundai moved around 35,000 vehicles in June, and group unit [Kia Motors](#) some 17,000.

China is Hyundai's most important market, with last year's sales of about 1.8 million units accounting for more than a fifth of group sales worldwide. The company set a 2017 sales target of 1.95 million early this year.

But when South Korea's Ministry of National Defense decided in February to offer the U.S. a site to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, a chill wind blew through the market.

The step stirred up China's concerns about national security and so fueled anti-South Korea sentiment among its people. Hyundai's monthly sales fell 40-50% on the year -- a drop that looks to have sharpened in June.

South Korean media report a pessimistic estimate that the THAAD issue will cost Hyundai 1.2 million units in annual sales -- two-thirds the 2016 volume”

Furthermore the magnitude of this loss is detrimental. According to WTTC,

World Travel and Tourism Council, “How does Travel & Tourism compare to other sectors?” *WTTC*,

<https://www.wttc.org/->

[/media/files/reports/benchmark%20reports/country%20reports%202015/south%20korea%20%20benchmarking%20report%202015.pdf](https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/benchmark%20reports/country%20reports%202015/south%20korea%20%20benchmarking%20report%202015.pdf), 2014. JF

Automotive Manufacturing is responsible for 9.9% of the GDP as of 2014 and 11.6% of South Korea's workforce.

TOURISM

World Travel and Tourism Council, “How does Travel & Tourism compare to other sectors?” *WTTC*,

<https://www.wttc.org/->

[/media/files/reports/benchmark%20reports/country%20reports%202015/south%20korea%20%20benchmarking%20report%202015.pdf](https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/benchmark%20reports/country%20reports%202015/south%20korea%20%20benchmarking%20report%202015.pdf), 2014. JF

According to a study by the World Travel & Tourism Council, tourism accounts for 5.8% of South Korea's GDP. It also employs about 6.3% of their workforce.

According to the Korea Herald,

Shim Woo-hyun, 'Tourism industry to continue to suffer as THAAD issue remains unresolved,' *Korea Herald*, 9 July 2017., <http://m.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170709000210#cb>, JF

“The tourism industry here is expected to continue to suffer from plunging revenues and a record-breaking cross-border deficit due to a lack of progress made between the leaders of South Korea and China over the THAAD dispute.

Between March and May, the number of Chinese tourists in Korea plunged to 841,952, down 57.7 percent from the last year's 1.98 million, according to the Korea Tourism Organization's data Sunday.

Of the total number of tourists that visited Korea in 2016, 46.8 percent or 8 million people were Chinese.

The already-dramatic downturn is expected to continue as Seoul and Beijing failed to come to an agreement on the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system issue during the Group of 20 summit held in Berlin last week.”

Contention 2: No War

The chances that the world enter a nuclear war are low due to the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) theory, thus removing any security impacts that anti-missile systems have.

MAD Theory suggests that opposing countries that strike with nuclear weapons would both be destroyed because of the retaliating attack. MAD Theory has led to deterrence among countries with nuclear weapons, and it is the reason why the world has not seen nuclear war to this point.

The United States military currently has a
By being deterred under the status quo, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has proved that he is rational.

According to Professors Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in Seoul and John Delury of Yonsei University in Seoul, Kim Jong-un's practices may be excessive, but they are not necessarily irrational.

Since Kim Jong-un is rational, he understands the risks of MAD Theory. In fact, experts believe the only reason that North Korea has nuclear weapons at all has been to deter their opponents in the geopolitical arena.

According to David C. Kang of the New York Times in July 2017, "Does anyone actually think that with another round of sanctions the country's leader, Kim Jong Un, will suddenly give up power and North Koreans will all become liberal democrats? In short, deterrence works, and neither North Korea nor the rest of the world is in danger of forgetting that."

Kang continues, "The good news is that deterrence is effective both ways. North Korea poses almost no threat to South Korea."

As long as natural deterrence remains in place, anti-missile systems are not needed to deter.

Tourism

Woo-hyun 2017 (Shim Woo-hyun, Korea Herald, "Tourism industry to continue to suffer as THAAD issue remains unresolved", July 9, 2017)

<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170709000210>

The tourism industry here is expected to continue to suffer from plunging revenues and a record-breaking cross-border deficit due to a lack of progress made between the leaders of South Korea and China over the THAAD dispute. Between March and May, the number of Chinese tourists in Korea plunged to 841,952, down 57.7 percent from the last year's 1.98 million, according to the Korea Tourism Organization's data Sunday. Of the total number of tourists that visited Korea in 2016, 46.8 percent or 8 million people were Chinese. The already-dramatic downturn is expected to continue as Seoul and Beijing failed to come to an agreement on the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system issue during the Group of 20 summit held in Berlin last week. During the summit, China's President Xi told both Korea and the US that China will not back down on the dispute over Korea hosting the US anti-missile system, alluding that China would not end the alleged economic retaliation imposed on Korean firms until the issue was resolved. If the number of Chinese tourists decreases by half to reach 4 million this year, their spending in Korea is also estimated to plunge by almost 11 trillion won. The average spending of a Chinese tourist was 2.74 million won (\$2,373) in 2015, but this might too decline, industry sources anticipated. On the back of continued declines of Chinese tourism

in Korea, the sales of the duty-free industry saw the most dramatic financial loss. Lotte Duty Free, Korea's largest duty-free operator, expected its sales to decrease by 20 percent, 350 billion won down from the same period last year. The overall duty-free industry also expects its sales to decrease 15 to 20 percent accounting for some 600 billion won. Lotte Mart also had to shut down 87 of its 99 outlets in China, due to the THAAD controversy. Of the 87 closed outlets, only 13 were voluntarily closed by the company, while the other 74 were closed by Chinese authorities citing safety violations. Korea's tourism deficit also expanded to hit a record high in May due mainly to a drop in incoming travelers, according to the Bank of Korea.

The tourism balance of payment, or net costs spent by Koreans on short-term overseas tours, reached \$1.18 billion in May. The number of outbound tourists also jumped 21 percent to 2 million in May from a year ago. The number of foreign visitors overall fell 34.5 percent to 978,000.

Flavio 2017 (Amando Flavio, ANONHQ.com, "China's Economic Pressure on S. Korea over THAAD to Cause \$261 Billion Loss", March 26, 2017)

<http://anonhq.com/chinas-economic-pressure-impact-south-korea-thaad-bigger-think-country-lose-261-billion/>

The big news now in the Northeast Asian regions is the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployed to South Korea by the US. The US claims it is alarmed by North Korea's increasingly provocative behavior in the Korean Peninsula, hence the deployment of the weapon to protect South Korean and US interests. THAAD is an advanced anti-ballistic missile system designed to shoot down short, medium, and intermediate ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. The method, naturally, unnerves any nation situated within its range.

The US and South Korean actions [have angered the regional powers, China and Russia](#). These two countries are not only regional powers but also major world players. South Korea allowing the US to deploy a volatile weapon like THAAD at their doorsteps, is the equivalent to a national security threat to their countries. There is no doubt that if the deployment of THAAD occurred in Mexico by China or Russia, the US would construe it as military aggression. Both countries have issued a joint statement demanding that South Korea back down from installing the weapon. Nonetheless, the South Korean government isn't ready to listen to the concerns expressed by the two regional heavyweights. South Korean officials have said they expect the missile system to start operating this year. One unidentified official even said he believes the weapon, in its entirety, could be deployed by the end of August. Although Russia is worried about the installation of the weapon in the region, it is only moderately expressing its concerns.

China, on the other hand, is taking a more radical approach. China argues that THAAD could be used to track its military operations. As a result, China [has launched a special economic pressure](#) against South Korea, aiming to deter it from installing the weapon. The world's most populous country has called on its citizens to boycott all things from South Korea. The South Korean government has already signed a land swap deal with the multinational retail conglomerate, Lotte. The deal will see Lotte exchanging its golf course for another location. The golf course will then become the future home to THAAD. Lotte has business interests in China. The company was due to take a multibillion dollar real estate project in China, but Chinese officials have canceled the deal. Citizens too are responding to the call to boycott South Korean products or services. This is taking a heavy toll on South Korean companies doing business in China. "No one wants to shop here when our government is having some sort of dispute with South Korea. Luckily we don't have angry protestors around so we can still operate," a Chinese saleswoman at Lotte Supermarket in Beijing's Chongwenmen district told Forbes in an interview.

The state-run newspaper, China Youth Daily wrote a full editorial supporting the boycott of Lotte. The paper said: "Lotte turned over its land to the South Korean government out of so-called national security concerns. Such reckless behavior will be boycotted by Chinese consumers, who have every right to say no to this company." The extensive economic losses have resulted in mass [closures of Lotte stores across China](#). Apart from the Lotte boycott, China has also denied visas to South Korean pop stars who were due to perform in the country. China has also removed South Korean television dramas and broadcasts, and has ordered all online travel agencies to stop selling South Korea-related tour packages. Particularly on tourism, the new measure will hit South Korea hard. According to statistics by the Korea Tourism Organization, Chinese travelers accounted for half of all visitors to the country in 2016. A popular Chinese travel agency, Tuniu, said the company took down South Korea-related products because customers' demand has sharply reduced, following the arrival of the THAAD missile defense system. The Swiss bank, Credit Suisse reports that if the travel ban is left in place by China, it could lead to a 20% (equivalent to \$261 billion) decline in South Korea's Gross Domestic Product growth this year. The bank currently forecasts the South Korean economy to grow at 2.5%. Many analysts believe this economic pressure will compel South Korea to think twice before installing the weapon. "They [Chinese officials] believe it is feasible to get a reversal of the THAAD decision by putting an economic impact on the big [South Korean] companies. But the deployment might already be partly completed and hard to reverse", said Andrew Gilholm, director of Greater China & North Asia analysis at consultancy Control Risks.

Harrison 2017 (Bruce Harrison, voanews.com, "China Means Business in Economic Challenge Over Thaad", March 16, 2017)

<https://www.voanews.com/a/china-means-business-in-economic-challenge-over-thaad/3768596.html>

As anti-Korean sentiment in China grows stronger, Seoul appears to have few options at the moment to try and limit the impact on trade relations. Tension flared early this month after South Korea began deploying components of a U.S. anti-missile system to the Korean Peninsula. China is strongly opposed to the missile battery and has been trying to block its deployment, seemingly through economic retaliation. FILE - South Koreans hold signs and a national flag during a rally to support a plan to deploy an advanced U.S. missile defense system called Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, in Seoul, South Korea, July 18, 2016. Park Sung-hoon, a professor of economics at Korea University, said he's concerned about the future of economic relations, which have been solid for decades. "The backlash [from China] is kind of dismantling what we have achieved so far," he said. "We have no reliable sources on how long China will continue these measures." It's unclear if Beijing is acting deliberately, which makes it much harder for South Korea to counter the growing economic unease. Chang Do-hwan, a director with South Korea's Ministry of Strategy and Finance, told VOA South Korea is prepared to deal with unfair trade measures. But for now, Seoul is unable to take "legal or official" action because Beijing has yet to acknowledge it's taken any official action to pressure South Korea. THAAD backlash South Korea and the U.S. maintain the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is solely to protect against North Korea's growing nuclear weapons threat. But China believes THAAD's powerful radar will be used to spy on its military. Park said he hopes China comes around. "We hope China sees the necessity and inevitability of Korea's alliance with the U.S., in defending the nation against the possible invasion from North Korea," he said. The South Korean corporation Lotte Group has become a main target of angry Chinese sentiment. The company, which declined an interview, sold the Korean government a golf course where the defense battery is expected to be stationed, possibly in the next few months. FILE - People come out from Lotte Group office in Seoul, South Korea, Aug. 26, 2016. Shoppers in China are boycotting some Lotte stores, and other have been shut down after failing safety inspections. "We don't know if it was provoked by the [Chinese] government or not, but a lot of people have been taking voluntarily action against Korean products," said Ahn Duk-geun, a professor of international trade law and policy at Seoul National University. Korea's tourism sector is taking a hit as well. This week, an estimated 3,000 Chinese tourists took a stand against THAAD by staying on board a cruise ship that docked at South Korea's Jeju Island, a popular tourist destination for Chinese. Chang with the Finance Ministry said the government is closely monitoring Korean companies facing financial risks

because of the pressure from China. He said a relief fund would be available for small and medium-sized firms. Sending a message Beijing has a history of punching back economically when angered. There was the so-called garlic war in 2000. Seoul jacked up import tariffs on Chinese garlic to protect local farmers, and China responded by banning South Korean exports of cellphones and polyethylene. Whether or not Seoul's policy was flawed, China's response was viewed widely as excessive. However, the current retaliation against South Korea appears to be non-tariff related. China has experience there, too. In 2012, Japan felt China's wrath over a sovereignty dispute involving a group of islands in the East China Sea. The Chinese public responded to Tokyo's actions to further assert control over the islands by smashing Japanese cars and boycotting Japanese products. Limited options South Korea sold goods and services were worth roughly \$124 billion to China last year, about 25 percent of the country's total exports. Some local analysts have suggested businesses begin scouting new markets, as THAAD poses a formidable barrier to resolving the trade dispute. In the meantime, Ahn suggested Seoul use a mediation provision in its FTA with China. It's essentially a channel, he said, to discuss non-tariff issues when it's unclear if the problem is intentional. But Ahn is not hopeful about resolution. "I think the situation will become worse," he said. He said it's likely THAAD will be fully deployed and China will eventually formalize its economic sanctions against South Korea. But even if China backs off its pressure, Ahn said, it's inevitable that South Korean companies will expand into other markets because of growing competition in China, as well as increased labor costs and standards. "That's an unavoidable direction."

World Travel and Tourism Council, "How does Travel & Tourism compare to other sectors?" *WTTC*, <https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/benchmark%20reports/country%20reports%202015/south%20korea%20%20benchmarking%20report%202015.pdf>, 2014. JF

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Kenichi Yamada, "Hyundai's Chinese sales skidded 60% for June amid THAAD backlash," 11 July 2017.

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Automotive Manufacturing is responsible for 9.9% of the GDP as of 2014 and 11.6% of South Korea’s workforce.

AMS's don't work

China and North Korea will spend more money on missiles to overwhelm any anti-missile system that exists.

Warrant: Feffer 2015 [John. "The Madness of THAAD." May 24, 2015. *Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/the-madness-of-thaad_b_7431472.html] DF

“Right now, South Korea is divided on the issue, with the ruling party supporting THAAD and the opposition expressing skepticism. The debate may well come down to money, since THAAD is not cheap. In this case, the opposition’s resistance will inadvertently help Park Geun Hye by providing her with a stronger argument that the United States should provide the system for free instead of pressuring South Korea into giving roughly \$1 billion to military contractor Lockheed Martin for each THAAD battery.

But THAAD is a waste of money, whoever is footing the bill. It has not been demonstrated to work effectively. It pushes China and North Korea to spend more money on more missiles to overwhelm THAAD (just as the United States is moved to spend more money on missile upgrades to counteract the missile defense of other countries). And it is a poor substitute for arms-control negotiations. Instead of letting Lockheed Martin determine the security politics of Northeast Asia, it’s crucial

to bring the diplomats back to the negotiating table to address the causes of insecurity and not just the symptoms.

North Korea sees the deployment of THAAD as an act of aggression.

Warrant: Institute for Security and Development Policy 2016 [“THAAD in the Korean Peninsula,” Nov. 2016. *Institute for Security and Development Policy*.

<http://isdpeu/publication/korea-thaad/>] DF

“North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy THAAD as both a provocation and an act of aggression. Their response has been to continue missile development and invest in technologies that could bypass systems like THAAD. Correspondingly, one day after the announcement of THAAD deployment, North Korea tested a Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11) SLBM. This was followed by three short-range missiles that were fired six days after the announcement and another two intermediate-range missiles in early August 2016. North Korea has also stated that they will retaliate with a “physical response.”

The continuous missile development by North Korea could be seen as tests for bypassing THAAD’s abilities, as it is possible to launch more missiles than a missile defense can intercept. So far, only one THAAD battery is planned to be deployed which could be a critical weakness. THAAD’s difficulty in intercepting missiles with irregular trajectories could also be used; in theory, North Korea’s medium-range Rodong missiles would be able to bypass THAAD as they have an irregular trajectory. Recent analysis suggests that North Korea is developing a new submarine that would be larger than the previous GORAE-class experimental ballistic missile submarine. The improvement of SLBMs, could be considered another weakness of THAAD and would give a

critical advantage to North Korea. In any case, North Korea have continued their nuclear development, conducting a fifth nuclear test in September 2016.”

North Korea sees the deployment of THAAD as an act of aggression.

Warrant: O’Connor 2017 [Tom. “North Korea Warns Of ‘Miserable’ Consequences To U.S. Missile Defense In South”. May 3, 2017. *Newsweek*. <http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-miserable-consequences-us-missile-defense-594019>] DF

“North Korea deeply criticized the U.S.'s installation of a missile defense system in South Korea on Wednesday and called on citizens to reject Washington's military ambitions in the region.

In the latest commentary by Pyongyang's official [Korean Central News Agency](#) (KCNA), the state-run media outlet blasts the U.S.'s deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, which was designed to defend South Korea against North Korea's nuclear and ballistic arsenal and became operational in recent days. The article, called "Consequences of THAAD Deployment Will be Miserable," claimed recent South Korean protests against the U.S. anti-missile apparatus's presence on South Korean soil were indicative of "the persistent struggle of the South Koreans against THAAD."

"South Korea can suffer great disaster any moment." the commentary read. "It is exactly for this reason that the South Koreans are raising voices denouncing the conservative group."

THAAD can't stop nukes

2016 [“THAAD not effective in countering N.K. nuclear attack haystacked in barrage of warheads” *YONHAP News Agency*.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/06/14/0401000000AEN20160614000300315.html>

Garth McLennan, who has closely followed American foreign and security policy, made the point in an article contributed to the website 38 North, forecasting that THAAD's deployment to South Korea would lead to the North stepping up its production of ballistic missiles.

"THAAD would not, however, serve as an effective tool in countering a North Korean nuclear strike if such an attack were haystacked among a barrage of conventional warheads," he said. "The THAAD system is a powerful anti-missile tool ... but in this case, it would not serve as a bulletproof measure against a North Korean nuclear attack."

The nuclear warheads would be the proverbial needles in the haystack of conventional munitions. Currently, such a defensive system does not exist, he said THAAD cannot stop missiles at low altitudes and entirely useless against artillery.

THAAD no work

Emanuel Pasterich-HuffPost-The Unable Sadness Of THAAD-2016 // To start with, THAAD is an outdated technology whose ability to stop missiles is doubtful. **To the degree that THAAD might work, it does so for missiles flying at high altitudes. North Korea does not need to send missiles at high altitudes to attack South Korea, if such an unlikely scenario unfolded.** After all, if North Korea wanted to kill tens of thousands or more South Korean civilians, it does not need to use any missiles at all, but rather can use its substantial artillery units for which Seoul is fully within range. **THAAD is entirely useless against artillery.** Moreover, there are any number of strategies that render the missile defense system ineffective. As THAAD is aimed at missiles flying at a high altitude, most likely it will simply encourage the Chinese, who perceive the system as intended primarily to deter them, to build many more missiles. That will only bring on an arms race and greater insecurity.

Robert E Kelly-The National Interest-Can THAAD Save South Korea?-2016 // Next, THAAD has never been battle-tested. No one really knows how effective it will be. **But even if all ten THAAD anti-missile rockets were to destroy Northern inbound missiles, the North almost certainly has, or will soon have, many more, including dummies.** Finally, THAAD is only a mild quantitative expansion of what South Korea already has. It is not a qualitative shift in regional air battle scenarios. In reality, THAAD just thickens South Korea's "roof" a little. **It buys South Korea a few more years at best – a bit more time before North Korea builds so many missile, drones, dummies, and so on that it can overwhelm Southern air defense.** THAAD does not obviate the North's nuclear weapons, much less China's. It just gives Seoul a little more breathing room to figure out what to do about Pyongyang's spiraling missile program.

AMS can't respond to decoys, unreliable until tested in battle, can't stop low flying missiles and promotes false sense of security

Dr. Clemens 2016 [Walter C, associate professor at the Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Boston University, North Korea and The World, University of Kentucky Press, 2016, d3]

Championing national missile defense and withdrawing from the ABM treaty with Moscow, the Bush administration ignored the widely shared views of scientists and engineers that no defense could respond effectively to rockets equipped with multiple warheads or decoys, that no system of advanced warning sensors, radars, and defense missiles could be regarded as reliable until tested in battle, that the proposed system would do nothing against low flying cruise missiles launched close to U.S. shores, and that the real WMD threat to the United States could come from containers smuggled on trucks or ships. Not only was the administration investing in a system that could never work, but it was also misleading the public by promoting a false sense of security.

US Defense Department concluded systems as of 2014 were inadequate- means AEGIS is incapable of solving

Dr. Clemens 2016 [Walter C, associate professor at the Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Boston University, North Korea and The World, University of Kentucky Press, 2016, d3]

The United States proceeded to throw good money after bad. A dozen years after the Bush team embraced missile defense, the US Defense Department conceded that the defense systems deployed in Alaska and California would not work. The Pentagon announced in February 2014 that its next budget would include funds to overhaul Boeing Company's ground-based missile defense system and develop a replacement for an interceptor built by Raytheon after several recent test failures. "We've got to get more reliable systems," Frank Kendall, under-secretary of defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, told a conference sponsored by McAleese and Associates and Credit Suisse. Did the problems arise from a shortage of funding in recent years? No, Kendall said. They resulted more from decisions to rush deployment of technologies that had not been completely and thoroughly tested. "Just updating the things we've got is probably not going to be adequate. So we're going to have to go beyond that," he said-offering no details.

Dr. Clemens 2016 [Walter C, associate professor at the Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Boston University, North Korea and The World, University of Kentucky Press, 2016, d3]

As noted later, in chapter 20, President Barack Obama's Pentagon pushed Seoul in 2015 to buy and deploy its "THAAD" defense system to shield South Korea from short- and medium-range missile attack. Washington pointed vaunted successes of Israel's "Iron Dome," heavily subsidized by the United States. Serious analysis showed, however, the dome to be quite leaky. It stopped at most 5 percent of missiles fired from Gaza- not the 85 to 95 percent claimed by Israel and the Pentagon.

If defense against the short-range missile is problematic, how much more difficult to intercept an ICBM- especially if outfitted with multiple warheads? *The Economist* reported in 2014 that "not even the American military can distinguish sophisticated decoys from a warhead (though it might manage to do so if confronted with relatively crude weapons designed by Iran or North Korea)." Some analysts hoped that antimissiles fired from drones could intercept enemy missiles during launch phase, but the problems in deploying such a system close to North Korea or Iran, not to speak of China or Russia, might well be insurmountable. A survey of expert opinion conducted by *The Economist* concluded: "Even with new technology, America's multi-billion-dollar effort to build a shield against long range ballistic missiles looked doomed."

Proliferation

Prolif Good INC/1AC – Solves War

Nuclear weapons prevent war by making costs unacceptable and de-escalating conflict

Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Poly Sci at Berkley, 2003. ["The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed"]

First, **war can be fought in the face of deterrent threats, but the higher the stakes** and the closer a country moves toward winning them, **the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains.** War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. **Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but de-escalation becomes likely.** War remains possible, but **victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. If states can score only small gains, because large ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight.** Second, **states act with less care if the expected costs of war are low** and with more care if they are high. In 1853 and 1854 Britain and France expected to win an easy victory if they went to war against Russia. Prestige abroad and political popularity at home would be gained, if not much else. The vagueness of their expectations was matched by the carelessness of their actions. In blundering into the Crimean War, they acted hastily on scant information, pandered to their people's frenzy for war, showed more concern for an ally's whim than for the adversary's situation, failed to specify the changes in behavior that threats were supposed to bring, and inclined toward testing strength first and bargaining second.² In sharp contrast, **the presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious.** Think of Kennedy and Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis. Why fight if you can't win much and might lose everything?

Deterrence prevents large scale war - Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir prove

Alagappa '8 [Muthiah – Distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center. *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia*. Ed. Muthiah Alagappa. p.]

Nuclear weapons have a low profile in the conflicts across the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula. Conventional military capability dominates deployment, perception of immediate threat, and response to them. However, **the danger of escalation to nuclear war determines the role and deployment of conventional military force. That danger also shapes the range and choice of military options in a crisis and the risks that states are willing to take in pursuit of their objectives.** The risk of nuclear war not only tempers the means but also influences short- and medium-range goals. Although the nuclear threat is implicit in the Taiwan conflict, **the danger of nuclear escalation and retaliation induces caution, deters large-scale conventional attack by China, restrains American military intervention, and limits the military options available to both countries. The nuclear consideration,** along with others, also tempers the urgency of Beijing's unification goal and induces Washington to restrain Taiwanese leaders advocating the independence option. Similarly on the Korean Peninsula, nuclear weapons provide an important backdrop. North Korea views nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of its security; this in turn has increased the relevance of the American nuclear umbrella for South Korea. Nuclear weapons figure more prominently in the India-Pakistan conflict. **Pakistan attempted to exploit the danger of escalation to nuclear war to alter the status quo. However, that risk also conditioned how it used force and the Indian response to the Pakistani military action.** In all three conflicts, **the shadow of nuclear escalation circumscribes military action.** Though small in number and appearing relatively stable, **these conflicts are the most likely sources of major war** in the region. **Nuclear weapons condition their management in significant ways and in essence take large-scale war off the table.**

Prolif Good 1NC/1AC – Bioweapons

Regional nuclear proliferation prevents CBW warfare

Dr. Keith B. Payne, President, National Institute for Public Policy Faculty, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service National Security Studies Program, April 1998. ["Why We Must Sustain Nuclear Deterrence," http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Op%20Ed%203_20_98.pdf]

A single illustration of the lethality of biological weapons will clarify why the U.S. capability to deter regional challengers is of paramount importance: a single undeterred attacker employing as little as 20 kilograms of dispersed anthrax drifting downwind

could, under the proper conditions, cause the deaths of 50 percent of the unprotected population in an area of more than 150 square miles. Such a biological attack against the unprotected populations of ten large U.S. urban areas could kill on the order of 20 million Americans. To risk understatement, deterrence is not less important in this post-Cold War period. In the absence of a revived great power competition, the most taxing likely role for U.S. deterrence policy will be deterring the use of WMD by hostile regional powers. What is the future role for nuclear weapons in regional deterrence? There are numerous recent confident assertions by prominent persons that U.S. conventional forces can reliably replace nuclear forces for deterrence of all but nuclear threats. Consequently, they conclude that nuclear weapons are largely unnecessary for regional deterrence. Such assertions ring hollow; they are speculative and unsupported by actual evidence. The evidence that does exist, including recent history, suggests strongly that when a challenger is highly motivated, and cost- and risk- tolerant, nuclear weapons can be essential to deterring WMD attacks. What, for example, was the value of nuclear weapons for deterrence in the Gulf War? By Iraqi accounts, nuclear deterrence prevented Iraq's use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) that could have inflicted horrendous civilian and military casualties on us and our allies. Senior Iraqi wartime leaders have explained that while U.S. conventional threats were insufficient to deter, implicit U.S. nuclear threats did deter Saddam Hussein's use of chemical and biological weapons. As the then-head of Iraqi military intelligence, Gen. Waffic al Sammarai, has stated, Saddam Hussein did not use chemical or biological weapons during the war, "because the warning was quite severe, and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be too dear and too high." Immediately following the Gulf War many prominent U.S. military commentators, such as former Secretary of Defense McNamara, claimed that nuclear weapons were "incredible" and therefore "irrelevant" to the war.¹ This assessment-that U.S. nuclear weapons are irrelevant to regional challengers-is at the heart of the various nuclear disarmament proposals; it also is gravely mistaken. The continuing proliferation of CBW can only increase our need for nuclear deterrence. The United States has given up chemical and biological weapons, and has thus given up the option of deterring chemical and biological threats with like capabilities. In some tough cases conventional forces alone are likely to be inadequate to deter CBW threats. Consequently, as CBW proliferates our nuclear capabilities become more, not less important for regional deterrence.

Biological weapons cause mutated and uncontrolled pathogens, culminating in extinction

John Steinbruner, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, chair of the committee on international security and arms control of the National Academy of Sciences, Foreign Policy, December 22, 1997

That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

Prolif Good 1NC/1AC – Arms Race

Nuclear proliferation solves arms races-makes force comparisons irrelevant

Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Poly Sci at Berkley, 2003.[“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed”]

One may believe that old American and Soviet military doctrines set the pattern that new nuclear states will follow. One may also believe that they will suffer the fate of the United States and the former Soviet Union, that they will compete in building larger and larger nuclear arsenals, while continuing to accumulate conventional weapons. These are doubtful beliefs. One can infer the future from the past only insofar as future situations may be like past ones. For three main reasons, new nuclear states are likely to decrease, rather than to increase, their military spending. First, nuclear weapons alter the dynamics of arms races. In a competition of two or more parties, it may be hard to say who is pushing and who is being pushed, who is leading and who is following. If one party seeks to increase its capabilities, it may seem that others must too. The dynamic may be built into the competition and may unfold despite a mutual wish to resist it. But need this be the case in a strategic competition among nuclear countries? It need not be if the conditions of competition make deterrent logic dominant. Deterrent logic dominates if the conditions of competition make it nearly impossible for any of the competing parties to achieve a first- strike capability. Early in the nuclear age, the implications of deterrent strategy were clearly seen. "When dealing with the absolute weapon," as William T. R. Fox put it, "arguments based on relative

advantage lose their point."²⁹ The United States has sometimes designed its forces according to that logic. Donald A. Quarles, when he was President Eisenhower's secretary of the Air Force, argued that "sufficiency of air power" is determined by "the force required to accomplish the mission assigned." Avoidance of total war then does not depend on the "relative strength of the two opposed forces." Instead, it depends on the "absolute power in the hands of each, and in the substantial invulnerability of this power to interdiction."³⁰ In other words, if no state can launch a disarming attack with high confidence, force comparisons are irrelevant. Strategic arms races are then pointless. Deterrent strategies offer this great advantage: Within wide ranges neither side need respond to increases in the other side's military capabilities. Those who foresee nuclear arms racing among new nuclear states fail to make the distinction between war-fighting and war-detering capabilities. War-fighting forces, because they threaten the forces of others, have to be compared. Superior forces may bring victory to one country; inferior forces may bring defeat to another. Force requirements vary with strategies and not just with the characteristics of weapons. With war-fighting strategies, arms races become hard to avoid. Forces designed for deterrence need not be compared. As Harold Brown said when he was secretary of defense, purely deterrent forces "can be relatively modest, and their size can perhaps be made substantially, though not completely, insensitive to changes in the posture of an opponent."³¹ With deterrent strategies, arms races make sense only if a first-strike capability is within reach. Because thwarting a first strike is easy, deterrent forces are quite cheap to build and maintain. Second, deterrent balances are inherently stable. This is another reason for new nuclear states to decrease, rather than increase, their military spending. As Secretary Brown saw, within wide limits one state can be insensitive to changes in another state's forces. French leaders thought this way. France, as President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing said, "fixes its security at the level required to maintain, regardless of the way the strategic situation develops in the world, the credibility—in other words, the effectiveness—of its deterrent force."³² With deterrent forces securely established, no military requirement presses one side to try to surpass the other. Human error and folly may lead some parties involved in deterrent balances to spend more on armaments than is needed, but other parties need not increase their armaments in response, because such excess spending does not threaten them. The logic of deterrence eliminates incentives for strategic-arms racing. This should be easier for lesser nuclear states to understand than it was for the United States and the Soviet Union. Because most of them are economically hard-pressed, they will not want to have more than enough. Allowing for their particular situations, the policies of nuclear states confirm these statements. Britain and France are relatively rich countries, and they have tended to overspend. Their strategic forces were nevertheless modest enough when one considers that they thought that deterring the Soviet Union would be more difficult than deterring states with capabilities comparable to their own. China, of course, faced the same task. These three countries, however, have shown no inclination to engage in nuclear arms races. From 1974, when India tested its peaceful bomb, until 1998, when it resumed testing, India was content to have a nuclear military capability that may or may not have produced deliverable warheads, and Israel long maintained its own ambiguous status. New nuclear states are likely to conform to these patterns and aim for a modest sufficiency rather than vie with one another for a meaningless superiority. Third, because strategic nuclear arms races among lesser powers are unlikely, the interesting question is not whether they will be run but whether countries having strategic nuclear weapons can avoid running conventional races. No more than the United States will new nuclear states want to rely on executing the deterrent threat that risks all. Will not their vulnerability to conventional attack induce them at least to maintain their conventional forces? American policy since the early 1960s again teaches lessons that mislead. From President John F. Kennedy and Secretary Robert S. McNamara onward, the United States followed a policy of flexible response, emphasizing the importance of having a continuum of forces that would enable the United States to fight at any level from irregular to strategic nuclear warfare. A policy that decreases reliance on deterrence by placing more emphasis on conventional forces would seem to increase the chances that wars will be fought. Americans wanted to avoid nuclear war in Europe. Europeans wanted to avoid any war in Europe. Flexible response weakened Europeans' confidence in America's deterrent forces. Their worries were well expressed by a senior British general: "McNamara is practically telling the Soviets that the worst they need expect from an attack on West Germany is a conventional counterattack."³³ Why risk one's own destruction if one is able to fight on the ground and forego the use of strategic weapons? The policy of flexible response seemed to lessen reliance on deterrence and to increase the chances of fighting a war, although not nearly as much as the unnamed British general thought. Large conventional forces neither add to nor subtract from the credibility of second-strike nuclear forces. Smaller nuclear states are likely to understand this more easily than the United States and the Soviet Union did, if only because few of them can afford to combine deterrent with large war-fighting forces.

Prolif Good INC/1AC – Impact Calculus

Nuclear weapons reduce both the probability and magnitude of interstate conflict and cause de-escalation; we outweigh on all accounts

Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Poly Sci at Berkley, 2003, ["The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed"]

The presence of nuclear weapons makes war less likely. One may nevertheless oppose the spread of nuclear weapons on the ground that they would make war, however unlikely, unbearably intense, should it occur. Nuclear weapons have not been fired in anger in a world in which more than one country has them. We have enjoyed half a century of nuclear peace, but we can never have a guarantee. We may be grateful for decades of nuclear peace and for the discouragement of conventional war among those who have nuclear weapons. Yet the fear is widespread that if they ever go off, we may all be dead. People as varied as the scholar Richard Smoke, the arms controller Paul Warnke, and the former defense secretary Harold Brown have all believed that if any nuclear weapons go off, many will. Although this seems the least likely of all the unlikely possibilities, it is not impossible. What makes it so unlikely is that, if a few warheads are fired, all of the countries involved will want to get out of the mess they are in. McNamara asked himself what fractions of the Soviet Union's population and industry the United States should be able to destroy to deter it. This was the wrong question. States are not deterred because

they expect to suffer a certain amount of damage but because they cannot know how much damage they will suffer. Near the dawn of the nuclear age, Bernard Brodie put the matter simply, "The prediction is more important than the fact." 35 Potential attacks are deterred by the knowledge that attacking the vital interests of a country having nuclear weapons may bring the attacker untold losses. As Patrick Morgan put it later, "To attempt to compute the cost of a nuclear war is to miss the point." 36 States are deterred by the prospect of suffering severe damage and by their inability to do much to limit it. Deterrence works because nuclear weapons enable one state to punish another state severely without first defeating it. "Victory" in Thomas Schelling's words, "is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy." 37 Countries armed only with conventional weapons can hope that their military forces will be able to limit the damage an attacker can do. Among countries armed with strategic nuclear forces, the hope of avoiding heavy damage depends mainly on the attacker's restraint and little on one's own efforts. Those who compared expected deaths through strategic exchanges of nuclear warheads with casualties suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II overlooked the fundamental difference between conventional and nuclear worlds. 35 Deterrence rests on what countries can do to each other with strategic nuclear weapons. From this statement, one can easily leap to the wrong conclusion: that deterrent strategies, if they have to be carried through, will produce a catastrophe. That countries are able to annihilate each other means neither that deterrence depends on their threatening to do so nor that they will necessarily do so if deterrence fails. Because countries heavily armed with strategic nuclear weapons can carry war to its ultimate intensity, the control of force becomes the primary objective.

If deterrence fails, leaders will have the strongest incentives to keep force under control and limit damage rather than **launching genocidal attacks.**

If the Soviet Union had attacked Western Europe, NATO's objectives would have been to halt the attack and end the war. The United States had the ability to place thousands of warheads precisely on targets in the Soviet Union. Surely we would have struck military targets before striking industrial targets and industrial targets before striking cities. The intent to hit military targets first was sometimes confused with a war-fighting strategy, but it was not one. It would not have significantly reduced the Soviet Union's ability to hurt us. Whatever American military leaders thought, our strategy rested on the threat to punish. The threat, if it failed to deter, would have been followed not by spasms of violence but by punishment administered in ways that conveyed threats of more to come. A war between the United States and the Soviet Union that got out of control would have been catastrophic. If they had set out to destroy each other, they would have greatly reduced the world's store of developed resources while killing millions outside of their own borders through fallout. **Even while destroying themselves, states with few weapons would do less damage to others.** As ever, the biggest international

dangers come from the strongest states. Fearing the world's destruction, one may prefer a world of conventional great powers having a higher probability of fighting less-destructive wars to a world of nuclear great powers having a lower probability of fighting more-destructive wars. But that choice effectively disappeared with the production of atomic bombs by the United States during World War II. Does the spread of nuclear weapons threaten to make wars more intense at regional levels, where wars of high intensity have been possible for many years? If weaker countries are unable to defend at lesser levels of violence, might they destroy themselves through resorting to nuclear weapons? Lesser nuclear states live in fear of this possibility. But this is not different from the fear under which the United States and the Soviet Union lived for years. Small nuclear states may experience a keen sense of desperation because of vulnerability to conventional as well as to nuclear attack, but, again, in desperate situations what all parties become most desperate to avoid is the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Still, however improbable the event, lesser states may one day fire some of their weapons. Are minor nuclear states more or less likely to do so than major ones? The answer to this question is vitally important because the existence of some states would be at stake even if the damage done were regionally confined. **For a number of reasons, deterrent strategies promise**

less damage than war-fighting strategies. First, **deterrent strategies induce caution all around and thus reduce the incidence of war.** Second, **wars fought in the face of strategic nuclear weapons must be carefully limited** because a country having them may retaliate if its vital interests are threatened. Third, prospective punishment need only be proportionate to an adversary's expected gains in war after those gains are discounted for the many uncertainties of war. Fourth, **should deterrence fail, a few judiciously delivered warheads** are likely to **produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and thus bring rapid deescalation.** Finally, war-fighting strategies offer no clear place to stop short of victory for some and defeat for others. Deterrent strategies do, and that place is where one country threatens another's vital interests. Deterrent strategies lower the probability that wars will begin. If wars start nevertheless, deterrent strategies lower the probability that they will be carried very far. In a conventional world, to deter an attacker a status quo country must threaten a lot of force. It must do so to overcome doubts about the credibility of conventional threats and uncertainty about the effectiveness of conventional blows. In a nuclear world to deter one need threaten only a little force because so much more can easily be added. Limiting wars in a conventional world has proved difficult. In a nuclear world, only limited wars can be fought. In a conventional world, states are tempted to strike first to gain an initial advantage and set the course of the war. In a nuclear world, to strike first is pointless because no advantage can be gained against invulnerable forces. In a conventional world, combatants use their best, i.e. their most destructive, weapons. Although overlooked, this explains our use of atomic bombs in the Second World War. From Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima to Okinawa to the fire-bombing of Tokyo, America applied force on an ever-increasing scale. In the context of a conventional war, A-bombs looked simply like bigger and better weapons. The aim in a conventional war is to escalate to a higher level of force than your opponent can reach. In a nuclear world, no one can escalate to a level of force anywhere near the top without risking its own destruction. Deterrence in World War II worked only where combatants shared the ability to use a horrible weapon, poison gas. All of the major combatants were capable

of using it. None did. On all of the above counts, nuclear weapons reverse the logic of war that operates in conventional worlds. **Nuclear weapons lessen the intensity as well as the frequency of war among their possessors.** For fear of escalation, nuclear states do not want to fight long and hard over important interests—indeed, they do not want to fight at all. Minor nuclear states have even better reasons than major ones to accommodate one another and to avoid fighting. **Worries about the intensity of war among nuclear states have to be viewed** in this context and **against a world in which conventional weapons have become ever costlier and more destructive.**

*****Extensions**

Prolif Solves War 2NC/2AC

Extend Waltz – Nuclear weapons make the costs of war unbearable and reduce the benefits of conflict; states can only fight over minor interests, because threats to central interests risk nuclear retaliation – lowers the GAINS from war and prevents crises

AND, more reasons prolif solves war:

1. Removes need for territorial conquest for security

Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Poly Sci at Berkley, 2003. ["The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed"] Third, the deterrent deployment of nuclear weapons contributes more to a country's security than does conquest of territory. A country with a deterrent strategy does not need territory as much as a country relying on conventional defense. A deterrent strategy makes it unnecessary for a country to fight for the sake of increasing its security, and thus removes a major cause of war. 3

1. Guarantees moderation in foreign policy

Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Poly Sci at Berkley, 2003. ["The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed"] Second, many fear that states that are radical at home will recklessly use their nuclear weapons in pursuit of revolutionary ends abroad. States that are radical at home, however, may not be radical abroad. Few states have been radical in the conduct of their foreign policy, and fewer have remained so for long. Think of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. States coexist in a competitive arena. The pressures of competition cause them to behave in ways that make the threats they face manageable, in ways that enable them to get along. States can remain radical in foreign policy only if they are overwhelmingly strong—as none of the new nuclear states will be—or if their acts fall short of damaging vital interests of other nuclear powers. States that acquire nuclear weapons will not be regarded with indifference. States that want to be freewheelers have to stay out of the nuclear business. A nuclear Libya, for example, would have to show caution, even in rhetoric, lest it suffer retaliation in response to someone else's anonymous attack on a third state. That state, ignorant of who attacked, might claim that its intelligence agents had identified Libya as the culprit and take the opportunity to silence it by striking a heavy conventional blow. Nuclear weapons induce caution in any state, especially in weaker ones.

1. Solves arms race and prevents miscalculated war

Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Poly Sci at Berkley, 2003. ["The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed"] Fifth, certainty about the relative strength of adversaries also makes war less likely. From the late nineteenth century onward, the speed of technological innovation increased the difficulty of estimating relative strengths and predicting the course of campaigns. Since World War II, technological advance has been even faster, but short of a ballistic missile defense breakthrough, this has not mattered. It did not disturb the American-Soviet military equilibrium, because one side's missiles were not made obsolete by improvements in the other side's missiles. In 1906, the British Dreadnought, with the greater range and fire power of its guns, made older battleships obsolete. This does not happen to missiles. As Bernard Brodie put it, "Weapons that do not have to fight their like do not become useless because of the advent of newer and superior types." 5 They may have to survive their like, but that is a much simpler problem to solve. Many wars might have been avoided had their outcomes been foreseen. "To be sure," Georg Simmel wrote, "the most effective presupposition for preventing struggle, the exact knowledge of the comparative strength of the two parties, is very often only to be obtained by the actual fighting out of the conflict." 6 Miscalculation causes wars. One side expects victory at an affordable price, while the other side hopes to avoid defeat. Here the differences between conventional and nuclear worlds are fundamental. In the former, states are too often tempted to act on advantages that are wishfully discerned and narrowly calculated. In 1914, neither Germany nor France tried very hard to avoid a general war. Both hoped for victory even though they believed the opposing coalitions to be quite evenly matched. In 1941, Japan, in attacking the United States, could hope for victory only if a series of events that were possible but unlikely took place. Japan hoped to grab resources sufficient for continuing its war against China and then to dig in to defend a limited perimeter. Meanwhile, the United States and Britain would have to deal with Germany, supposedly having defeated the Soviet Union and therefore reigning supreme in Europe. Japan could then hope to fight a defensive war until America, her purpose weakened, became willing to make a compromise peace in Asia. 7 Countries more readily run the risks of war when defeat, if it comes, is distant and is expected to bring only limited damage. Given such expectations, leaders do not have to be crazy to sound the trumpet and urge their people to be bold and courageous in the pursuit of victory. The outcome of battles and the course of campaigns are hard to foresee because so many things affect them. Predicting the result of conventional wars has proved difficult. Uncertainty about outcomes does not work decisively against the fighting of wars in

conventional worlds. Countries armed with conventional weapons go to war knowing that even in defeat their suffering will be limited. Calculations about nuclear war are made differently. A nuclear world calls for a different kind of reasoning. If countries armed with nuclear weapons go to war with each other, they do so knowing that their suffering may be unlimited. Of course, it also may not be, but that is not the kind of uncertainty that encourages anyone to use force. In a conventional world, one is uncertain about winning or losing. In a nuclear world, one is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated. If force is used, and not kept within limits, catastrophe will result. That prediction is easy to make because it does not require close estimates of opposing forces. The number of one's cities that can be severely damaged is equal to the number of strategic warheads an adversary can deliver. Variations of number mean little within wide ranges. The expected effect of the deterrent achieves an easy clarity because wide margins of error in estimates of the damage one may suffer do not matter. Do we expect to lose one city or two, two cities or ten? When these are the pertinent questions, we stop thinking about running risks and start worrying about how to avoid them. In a conventional world, deterrent threats are ineffective because the damage threatened is distant, limited, and problematic. Nuclear weapons make military miscalculation difficult and politically pertinent prediction easy.

Solves War

Empiricism proves our argument

Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Poly Sci at Berkley, 2003. ["The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed"]

How can we perpetuate peace without solving the problem of war? This is the question that states with nuclear weapons must constantly answer. Nuclear states continue to compete militarily. With each state tending to its interests as best it can, war is constantly possible. Although the possibility of war remains, nuclear weapons have drastically reduced the probability of its being fought by states having them. Wars that might bring nuclear weapons into play have become extraordinarily hard to start. Over the centuries, great powers have fought more wars and lesser states have fought fewer. The frequency of war has correlated less closely with the attributes of states than with their international standing. Yet, because of a profound change in military technology, waging war has more and more become the privilege of poor and weak states. Nuclear weapons have reversed the fates of strong and weak states. Never in modern history have great powers enjoyed a longer period of peace than we have known since the Second World War. One can scarcely believe that the presence of nuclear weapons does not greatly help to explain this happy condition.

Prolif is stabilizing – induces caution and encourages peaceful dispute settlement – prevents large scale war

Alagappa '8 [Muthiah – Distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center. *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia.* Ed. Muthiah Alagappa. p. 484]

The fear of escalation to nuclear war conditions the role of force in major power relations and circumscribes strategic interaction among them. By restraining measures and actions that could lead to conflict escalation, nuclear weapons limit the competitive strategic interaction of major powers to internal and external balancing for deterrence purposes; constrain their resort to coercive diplomacy and compellence; and shift the burden of international competition and adjustment in status and influence to the economic, political, and diplomatic arenas. They also render remote the possibility of a hegemonic war should a power transition occur in the region. More immediately, nuclear weapons enable Russia and China to deter the much stronger United States and mitigate the negative consequences of the imbalance in conventional military capability. Nuclear weapons reinforce India's confidence in dealing with China. By reducing military vulnerabilities and providing insurance against unexpected contingencies, nuclear weapons enable major powers to take a long view and engage in competition as well as cooperation with potential adversaries. Differences and disputes among them are frozen or settled through negotiations. Though they are not the only or even primary factor driving strategic visions and policies,

nuclear weapons are an important consideration, especially in the role of force in major power strategic interaction. They prevent the outbreak of large-scale war. Military clashes when they occur tend to be limited.

Proliferation deters large-scale regional war

David Karl, Ph.D. International Relations at the University of Southern California, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” *International Security*, Winter, 1996/1997, p. 90-91

Although this school bases its claims upon the U.S-Soviet Cold War nuclear relationship, it admits of no basic exception to the imperatives of nuclear deterrence. Nothing within the school’s thesis is intrinsic solely to the superpower experience. The nuclear “balance of terror” is seen as far from fragile. Nuclear-armed adversaries, regardless of context, should behave toward each other like the superpowers during the Cold War’s “nuclear peace.” The reason for this near-absolute claim is the supposedly immutable quality of nuclear weapons: their presence is the key variable in any deterrent situation, because fear of their devastating consequences simply overwhelms the operation of all other factors. Martin van Creveld alleges that “the leaders of medium and small powers alike tend to be extremely cautious with regard to the nuclear weapons they possess or with which they are faced—the proof being that, to date, in every region where these weapons have been introduced, large-scale interstate warfare has disappeared.” Shai Feldman submits that “it is no longer disputed that the undeclared nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have helped stabilize their relations in recent years. It is difficult to see how escalation of the conflict over Kashmir could have been avoided were it not for the two countries’ fear of nuclear escalation.” The spread of nuclear weapons technology is thus viewed by optimists as a positive development, so much so that some even advocate its selective abettance by current nuclear powers.’

Solves War

Nuclear acquisition catalyzes forced bargaining, replacing conflict with diplomacy in dispute settlements

Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo April 2009 (Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53 Issue 2, pp 209-233)

Possession of nuclear weapons increases the risks to opponents that choose to fight. In general, military advantages can be used to discourage an opponent from attempting to shift the status quo in the opponent’s favor (deterrence) or to encourage an opponent to accept a shift that favors the advantaged state (compellence). A trade-off thus exists between efforts to secure the status quo and seeking to procure new prerogatives or benefits. Pressing for concessions raises the risk of war. Failing to press an opponent reduces the benefits available to a state. If opponents are more inhibited by nuclear weapons than nuclear states are emboldened, then deterrence prevails, as optimists suggest. If, instead, opponents are less cowed by nuclear weapons than proliferators are encouraged, conflict will tend to spiral, as pessimists warn. Where ambition roughly equals inhibition, nuclear weapons will not appear to matter much for whether states fight. Even if only some of the substantial increase in lethality from “going nuclear” can be converted into political leverage, nuclear-capable nations are bound to increase their influence in international affairs. Greater influence amounts to getting what states want without having to use force. To the degree that nuclear capabilities lead to bargains that approximate the outcomes states expect from fighting, aggression becomes less appealing, and the anxieties of opponents are reduced. Diplomacy serves as a tool for smoothing the bumpy road of world politics.

Deterrence prevents large scale war - Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir prove

Alagappa ‘8 [Muthiah – Distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center. *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia*. Ed. Muthiah Alagappa. p.]

Nuclear weapons have a low profile in the conflicts across the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula. Conventional military capability dominates deployment, perception of immediate threat, and response to them. However, the danger of escalation to nuclear war determines the role and deployment of conventional military force. That danger also shapes the range and choice of military options in a crisis and the risks that states are willing to

take in pursuit of their objectives. The risk of nuclear war not only tempers the means but also influences short- and medium-range goals. Although the nuclear threat is implicit in the Taiwan conflict, the danger of nuclear escalation and retaliation induces caution, deters large-scale conventional attack by China, restrains American military intervention, and limits the military options available to both countries. The nuclear consideration, along with others, also tempers the urgency of Beijing's unification goal and induces Washington to restrain Taiwanese leaders advocating the independence option. Similarly on the Korean Peninsula, nuclear weapons provide an important backdrop. North Korea views nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of its security; this in turn has increased the relevance of the American nuclear umbrella for South Korea. Nuclear weapons figure more prominently in the India-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan attempted to exploit the danger of escalation to nuclear war to alter the status quo. However, that risk also conditioned how it used force and the Indian response to the Pakistani military action. In all three conflicts, the shadow of nuclear escalation circumscribes military action. Though small in number and appearing relatively stable, these conflicts are the most likely sources of major war in the region. Nuclear weapons condition their management in significant ways and in essence take large-scale war off the table.

Solves War

Nukes stabilize great power relations

Alagappa '8 [Muthiah – Distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center. *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia*. Ed. Muthiah Alagappa. p. 516]

The caution induced by nuclear weapons, their leveling effect, the strategic insurance they provide to cope with unanticipated contingencies, and general deterrence postures inform and circumscribe interaction among the major powers, reduce their anxieties, and constrain the role of force in their interaction. This enables major powers to take a long view and focus on other national priorities. Nuclear weapons feature primarily in deterrence and insurance roles. These roles are not necessarily threatening to other parties. Modernization of nuclear arsenals and the development of additional capabilities have proceeded at a moderate pace; they have produced responses but not intense strategic competition. The net effect has been stabilizing. The stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons in the Sino-American, Russo-American, and Sino-Indian dyads were discussed in Chapter 17. Here I will limit myself to making some additional points. Continuing deterrence dominance underlies China's measured response to the U.S. emphasis on offensive strategies and its development of strategic missile defense. Perceiving these as undermining the robustness of its strategic deterrent force, China seeks to strengthen the survivability of its retaliatory force and is attempting to develop capabilities that would threaten American space-based surveillance and communications facilities in the event of hostilities. However, these efforts are not presented as a direct challenge to or competition with the United States. Beijing has deliberately sought to downplay the modernization of its nuclear force. This is not simply deception, but a serious effort to develop a strong deterrent force without entering into a strategic competition with the United States, which it cannot win due to the huge imbalance in military capabilities and technological limitations. Strategic competition will also divert attention and resources away from the more urgent modernization goals. A strong Chinese strategic deterrent force blunts the military advantage of the United States, induces caution in that country, and constrains its military option in the event of hostilities. Although Russia's response to the U.S. development of offensive and strategic defense capabilities has been more vocal, it lacks specifics. Moscow also does not appear to have allocated significantly more resources to its nuclear force. India's strategic deterrence force does not compare with China's, but its nuclear, missile, and conventional military capability give New Delhi a relatively high degree of self-confidence in managing relations with Beijing. The insurance provided by its small nuclear force and strong conventional capability, combined with technological and resource limitations, and improving bilateral relations, explain India's gradual development of a nuclear deterrent capability against China. India's minimum deterrence nuclear posture and its gradual nuclear buildup also reassure China, which sees the United States as its principal security concern. In recent times, Japan has been more sensitive than India to China's nuclear force modernization and the development of North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities. In part, this is due to the lack of its own nuclear weapon capability. However, Japan has not sought its own nuclear weapon capability to compete with China or North Korea, a move that could be destabilizing. Instead it has sought reaffirmation of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, increase in its own conventional military capability, and development of strategic defense, all of which can be stabilizing.

Reunification Under South Korea

Kim jong-un control crumbling

Sang-hun 17 [sang-hun, choe @ The New York Times, “North Korean Defector Says Kim Jong-Un’s Control Is Crumbling”, 1/25/17, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/world/asia/north-korea-defector.html>, A.G.]

The highest-ranking defector from North Korea in years said on Wednesday that the days of the country’s leadership were “numbered,” and that its attempts to control outside information were not working because of corruption and discontent.

“I am sure that more defections of my colleagues will take place, since North Korea is already on a slippery slope,” the defector, Thae Yong-ho, said during a news conference in Seoul, the capital of South Korea. “The traditional structures of the North Korean system are crumbling.” Mr. Thae had been the North’s No. 2 diplomat in London until he fled to the South last summer with his family. South Korea has hailed his defection as a sign of growing disillusionment among North Korean elites with the country’s leader, Kim Jong-un. Since December, Mr. Thae has given a series of interviews to share his dire view of today’s North Korea.

South Korea has a better Economy and Military

Stilwell 17 [Stilwell, Blake @ Business Insider, Here's who would win in a war between North and South Korea, 4/12/17, <http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-who-would-win-in-a-war-between-north-and-south-korea-2016-4>, A.G.]

The North also boasts 605 combat aircraft and 43 naval missile boats, but the (North) Korean People's Air Force's most numerous fighter is the subsonic MiG-21, which debuted in 1953. The latest model is the MiG-29, from the 1970s, and they're all armed with Vietnam War-era weapons. So in terms of military technology, North Korea pales in comparison to the South. South Korea is one of the most technologically advanced countries in the world.

The South's GDP is 50 times as great as the North's, and it spends almost five times as much as North Korea on defense. Since it can't keep up in traditional combat arms, the North is beefing up its unconventional warfare capabilities, including chemical and nuclear weapons, along with the ballistic missiles to deliver them. It can't deliver the weapons by air because their antiquated air forces would be easy pickings for the US F-22 Raptor squadron on the Peninsula.

Moon/South korea wants to reunite and how

Friedman 17 [Friedman, Uri @ The Atlantic, “Trump's North Korea Policy Just Got More Complicated”, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/trump-south-korea-election/525939/>,

A.G.]

Moon, by contrast, favors outreach right away, so long as North Korea doesn't carry out major acts of aggression. As the chief of staff to former President Roh Moo Hyun, Moon helped implement the "Sunshine Policy," an effort from 1998 to 2008 to woo North Korea with humanitarian assistance, diplomatic dialogue, cultural exchanges, and increased economic relations. Moon now wants to bring back the Sunshine Policy. He's proposed reopening an industrial park and tourist destination jointly run by North and South Korea, as a first step in the gradual economic and political "unification" of the peninsula. Moon has also criticized the U.S. military's hurried installation of a missile-defense system in South Korea in recent weeks, scoffing at Trump's suggestion that the South Korean government pay \$1 billion for the system and calling for a thorough review of the deployment. (One of Moon's motivations here might be his desire for better relations with China, which suspects that THAAD could be used to undermine the Chinese military's capabilities. South Korea is caught between China, its most important trading partner, and the United States, its most important military partner.)

South Korea will try easing tensions to reunite

Yong-Soo, Pog-Nee 17[Yong-Soo, Jeong, Pog-Nee, Kim, @ Korea JoongAng Daily, "Moon wants talks with Pyongyang but there's no channel",

<http://mengnews.joins.com/view.aspx?aId=3035693>, A.G.]

The source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Seoul was likely to focus first on Moon's suggestion to North Korea to ease military tensions. The president's four-point peace vision also included a reunion of families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War, resumption of inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea's participation in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics.

Negotiations/Diplo DO work

North and South Korea have come to agreement

2017, Associated Press, "THE LATEST: S. KOREAN PRESIDENT SEEKS TALKS WITH KIM JONG UN"

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_KOREAS_TENSIONS_THE_LATES

[T?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2015-08-24-12-59-54](https://www.ap.com/section/home?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2015-08-24-12-59-54)

South and North Korea have come to an agreement to defuse the stand-off at their

border. Under the settlement, South Korea has agreed to stop broadcasting

propaganda at the border, and North Korea has expressed regret over the wounding

of two South Korean soldiers by a North Korean land mine. The stand-off began

earlier in August after a landmine blast maimed two South Korean troops.

Following the blast, South Korea installed loud speakers broadcasting anti-North

Korean propaganda at the border. North Korea then positioned troops at the border,

and said they were prepared to attack if South Korea did not stop. Talks between

the two countries began shortly after the Saturday deadline. They were adjourned

for a bit Sunday morning, but resumed in the afternoon. Talks ended officially

early Tuesday morning in Korean time, with North Korea agreeing to a military

de-escalation. Both sides also agreed to hold talks in Seoul or Pyongyang in the

near future to improve their ties.

China is going to actually implement negotiations

Larry Diamond [senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University]. 2017, The Atlantic, "There Is a Peaceful Way Out of the North Korea Crisis" <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-trump-china/524349/>

Yet the Chinese leadership is clearly deeply frustrated with North Korea's erratic and menacing behavior, which increasingly endangers China's vital interests in regional peace and stability. **It is this incipient shift in China's thinking that presents the most promising opportunity for a breakthrough on the long-stalled diplomatic front.** Whether through a resumption of the six-party talks or initiation of direct three-party negotiations involving China, the U.S., and North Korea (with the U.S. closely coordinating with Japan and South Korea), a diplomatic breakthrough must be pursued. It is probably not realistic at this point to think that North Korea will give up its current stockpile of nuclear weapons. But at a minimum, resolution of the current crisis requires a version of what my Stanford colleague Siegfried Hecker first proposed—that the Kim regime [commit to “four no's”](#): *no more bombs* that would enlarge its current stockpile; *no better bombs*, and hence an end to nuclear weapons testing; *no missile testing* or production that would enhance their current range; and *no export* of bombs or other nuclear weapons or missile technology.

North Korea and South Korea have come to an agreement

Chuck Downs, 2015, Defense News, “Commentary: A New Standard for Negotiation With N. Korea”

<http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/09/21/new-standard-negotiation-korea/72577764/>

South Korean President Park Geun-hye achieved a landmark success in the simple six-point agreement reached on Aug. 25 between North Korea and South Korea. For over 60 years, North Korea has consistently followed a negotiating pattern that obtains benefits from manipulating crises that it creates, inspiring a demand for talks by instigating provocations, then delaying talks, ratcheting up provocations and rhetoric. Calculated acceleration of risk has been the cornerstone of North Korea's negotiating strategy. This method of kick-starting negotiations has included such provocations as a 1968 attack on South Korea's presidential residence in Seoul; ax murders in the DMZ in 1976; a bomb attack on the South Korean Cabinet in 1983; the downing of a South