

BAUDL Novice Pack

Trump: Global Gun Dealer





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Topic Introduction

Gun violence is a global reality. Over one thousand people are killed around the world every day by guns and many more lives are affected. Many of those guns come from the United States in the form of arms sales to other countries. The weapons that we sell to other countries then get distributed and resold, sometimes ending up back into United States communities including the bay area. Despite the prevalence of guns, President Trump wants the United States to increase the number of guns that we sell to other countries.

So what should be done about it? Should we stop selling guns to other countries?

The affirmative will propose a plan that we should reduce US arms sales, claiming that by reducing the number of guns we sell we can:

- Prevent President Trump from flooding the world with guns increasing conflict between states and violence between individuals
- Help develop global gun control which can stop the spread of guns and prevent gun violence

The negative will demonstrate problems with the affirmative's proposal to reduce arms sales by pointing out that:

- Guns aren't the real problem. The causes of violence and conflict in the countries we sell arms to are really US militarism and imperialism and if we focus on arms sales than we distract from the central issue
- Gun sales are an alternative to military action. If we stop selling arms to other countries we would feel the need to stop conflicts a different way by sending in US armed forces which would be more dangerous
- If we don't sell arms then other countries like Russia and China or countries will make their own guns which is even riskier than buying from the US



Welcome and Hot Tips

Welcome to Debate!

Debate is an opportunity for you to build your voice and be heard.

When you debate, you will have the chance to speak your mind on topics from events in Saudi Arabia to poverty in the inner city, and to prove your skills against young people from all over the bay. Debate is a sport: it calls on you to join a team, represent your school, and win trophies, championships, and prizes. If you commit yourself to this sport you will have much fun; most importantly, you will gain the tools to better yourself, to earn college scholarships, and to speak up for your entire community.

What is Debate?

Debate is a competition between two teams, each with two debaters. One team takes the Affirmative, proposing a plan to change the world and explaining why it is a good idea. The other team is the Negative, who attacks the plan and tries to prove that it will do more harm than good.

There are 8 speeches and 4 cross-examinations in a debate round. You and your partner will each take the lead on 2 speeches (1 Constructive and 1 Rebuttal) and 1 cross-examination.

Speech	Time	General purpose
First Affirmative Constructive (1AC)	8 minutes	Present affirmative case (harms, inherency, plan, solvency)
Cross-examination by Second Negative	3	Ask questions, clarify affirmative's arguments
First Negative Constructive (1NC)	8	Present negative off-case and attack affirmative case
Cross-examination by First Affirmative	3	Ask questions, clarify negative's arguments
Second Affirmative Constructive (2AC)	8	Attack negative off-case arguments, rebuild affirmative case
Cross-examination by First Negative	3	Ask questions, clarify affirmative's arguments
Second Negative Constructive (2NC)**	8	Respond to some of 2AC arguments, rebuild negative arguments
Cross-examination by Second Affirmative	3	Ask questions, clarify negative's arguments
First Negative Rebuttal (1NR)**	5	Respond to rest of 2AC arguments, rebuild negative arguments
First Affirmative Rebuttal (1AR)	5	Rebuild affirmative arguments, respond to both 2NC and 1NR
Second Negative Rebuttal (2NR)	5	Explain why the negative team should win
Second Affirmative Rebuttal (2AR)	5	Explain why the affirmative team should win



What's in this pack?

An important part of policy debate is using evidence to prove important facts that show your argument to be true and to get ideas and opinions from experts who agree with your position. In this pack we've provided evidence that both sides can use to form the foundation of their argument so that a debate can take place. However, a debate can't be won with just evidence alone! We've also provided opportunities for you to expand upon the evidence by explaining important concepts through your own words and personal experiences to make your arguments more interesting and engaging with the judge.

Cards have three different parts:

(1) The Tag – This is a short summary of the evidence that's read first so the judge can right down what the main idea and purpose of the card is. *The entire tag is read in the speech.*

(2) The Cite – This gives important information about who the author is to demonstrate if they are qualified to speak on that subject and to show where the evidence comes from so other people can find it. *Only the author's last name and the year it was published are read in the speech.*

(3) The Card – This is the actual text of the evidence that is directly copied and pasted from the publication where it was produced without any changes made. *Only the underlined and highlighted parts of the evidence are read in the speech.*

Example:

(1) **Debating in the BAUDL is the best**

(2) **Feldman 19**, Executive Director of the Bay Area Urban Debate League (Jonah, Arms Sales Novice Pack)

(3) **BAUDL is the best organization** not only in the Bay Area but in the whole entire world and indeed **in the Universe. BAUDL has the best evidence** that it gives to its students and it also has the best clothing, stickers, **and** other **SWAG. Students who didn't do debate will** look back at when they were in high school and **wish** that **they had because** all **of** the cool **travel, college, and fun opportunities** they missed out on.



What should I do with this pack?

Read it – To be an effective debater you need to do more than just have evidence and put it in your speech, you need to know what it says! Carefully read over what's written in the evidence and ask your coach any questions that you might have on the meaning or use of the evidence

Make notes explaining the evidence – In cross examination and in your rebuttal speeches you will need to talk about what the evidence says and if you are able to have notes handy on what the evidence means to you so that you are able to explain it in your own words, the better and more convincing you will sound

Highlight it – It may not be necessary to read every single word that's underlined in the evidence so you can use a highlighter to make the speech more efficient or remove unnecessary parts. It all depends on how time you have in your speech. If you find that you are not able to fill all the time in your speech than read more and if you find that you are running out of time before you say everything you want to say than you will need to highlight more and read less

Organize it – You will not be able to read all the evidence in every speech so make sure you pick and choose which ones you think are the best and most useful pieces of evidence. You can also use an accordion or file folders to sort and label the evidence so you know where to find the pieces of evidence that best respond to what your opponents are saying. If you are affirmative and your opponents spend most of their time on the 3D printed guns argument, and don't spend very much time on the Transfers argument, then you need to make sure you are reading more of the 2AC 3D printed guns evidence and not as much of the 2AC transfers evidence



Vocabulary

Here are some important words and phrases that you will see used in the evidence

Bolster (pg. 11) – To support something, or make something stronger. “The UN is sending more troops to bolster the peacekeepers.”

Circumvention (pg. 38) - To avoid something by finding a way around it. “Young people still want to circumvent their parents’ control.”

Conventional Weapons (pg. 10) – These are weapons like guns, tanks, and warships that are not weapons of mass destruction like nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons


Deterrence (pg. 23) - To discourage or restrain from acting or proceeding. “The large dog deterred trespassers.”

Imperialism (pg. 31) - The policy of extending the rule or authority of a nation over foreign countries, or of acquiring and holding colonies and dependencies.

Militarism (pg. 31) – Making military power the most important goal of a state and using military strength to force the actions of other countries

Root Cause (pg. 31) - The fundamental reason for the occurrence of a problem

Symptom (pg. 31) – The visible sign of a problem but not the cause of the problem
"dental problems may be a symptom of other illness"



Affirmative Evidence



1AC Advantage

Guns are one of the world's greatest threats – they kill 1,000 people every day and upend the lives of millions. There are enough bullets made every year to shoot each person in the world twice

Alpers 13, Associate Professor of Public Health at the University of Sydney (Philip, Global Impact of Gun Violence: Firearms, public health and safety, <https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region>)

“The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems — and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as ‘weapons of mass destruction’.” — Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, March 2000
Small arms, commonly known as firearms or **guns**, are used to **kill** as many as **1,000 people each day**. **Millions more are wounded, or their lives upended** when access to development aid, markets, health, education and human rights is disrupted **by people with guns**. **There are more than 875 million firearms in the world**, 75 per cent of them in the hands of civilians. Guns outnumber passenger vehicles by 253 million, or 29 per cent. **Each year** about eight million new small arms, plus 10 to **15 billion rounds of ammunition are manufactured — enough bullets to shoot every person in the world** not once, but **twice**. The authorised international trade in small arms and ammunition exceeds US\$7.1 billion each year



1AC Advantage

Nuclear weapons receive the most attention, but guns are actually a greater risk causing global death and destruction

Chim 18, Columnist for the Georgetown Security Studies Review (Will, Conventional Weapons Are a Serious Threat to International Security, georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2018/05/03/conventional-weapons-are-a-serious-threat-to-international-security/)

Nuclear weapons have been responsible for zero deaths since 1945, whereas conventional weapons have been responsible for nearly all conflict deaths of the rest of the 20th century and the entire 21st century. **Yet** in the field of security studies and defense policy, **discussion and scholarship focus** almost wholly **on nuclear weapons and** both **ignore and minimize the broad threat that conventional weapons pose to** both state and individual **security around the world**. In the post-Cold War era, **most wars have been internal conflicts** within sovereign states fought by both regular and irregular forces. Both insurgent groups and paramilitary **forces** in various conflict areas around the world **have used readily available, massive stocks of small arms** and light weapons **to devastate their countries and regions and cause significant harm to civilian populations**.^[i] The U.S. State Department's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) best describes the ongoing threat that conventional weapons, often described as small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) pose to the global community, "Around the world, stockpiles of excess, poorly-secured or otherwise at-risk conventional weapons remain a serious threat to peace and prosperity."^[ii]

Conventional weapons are inexpensive, readily available to any individual or group who wants them, and fuel political instability and violence the world over. Stockpiles of improperly managed weapons

can explode and **cause death and destruction**. Unexploded ordnance and landmines prevent the safe use of land for economic purposes and displace communities in areas of conflict and instability.^[iii] For example, Amnesty International noted that "decades of reckless arms trading" fueled the rise of the Islamic State.^[iv] Furthermore, illicit arms trafficking fuels internal conflicts, contributes to global crime, equips terror groups, all resulting in an estimate that SA/LW account for 60-90% of the 100,000+ conflict deaths each year.^[v] The US government, along with many international allies, non-profits, and non-governmental organizations, has pledged billions of dollars to countering the spread and threat of conventional weapons through programs securing and destroying weapons along with broad demining programs and efforts to disarm conflict zones.^[vi] However, topic is not widely discussed outside of the conventional weapons destruction community (CWD), and especially compared to the security studies community's obsession with nuclear weapons and missiles as tools of geopolitical politics. The Small Arms Survey (SAS), an independent research project in Geneva, Switzerland that monitors SA/LW, estimates that there are 875 million small arms in the world today, with 200 million held by state militaries and 25 million among law enforcement, leaving 600 million in the hands of private citizens.^[vii] This information, however, is based on only readily available, public data for weapons that have identification information. SAS estimates that for each soldier in all the world's militaries, there are 2-5 small arms.^[viii] As well, SAS estimates the legal global trade in SA/LW and ammunition to be at least \$7.1 billion per year.^[ix] Factoring in illegally held weapons and stockpiles would make the 875 million number much higher. It also estimates the value of illicit arms trafficking at a minimum of 10-20% of the total global legal trade, possibly several billion dollars per year.^[x] Simply put, **these numbers are**

staggering and represent an under-recognized threat to global security. Conventional weapons proliferation does not receive top-line attention from countries and the security studies community for a variety of reasons. The global small arms trade is incredibly profitable and intertwined with national governments and militaries, preventing any serious state-level action. For example, the United Nations' Arms Trade Treaty, which seeks to prevent weapons sales and transfers to countries under embargo or to non-state actors and requires verification that weapons will not be used in terrorism, genocide, or other crimes against humanity, only entered into force in 2014. Furthermore, major powers such as the U.S., China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia (the second largest weapons importer in the world)^[xi] have yet to ratify it, rendering it largely ineffective.^[xii] As well, the challenge of countering legal and illegal proliferation of conventional weapons is near-insurmountable, as small weapons are generally legal, have legitimate military and recreational uses, and are extremely easy to conceal and transport. While nuclear weapons are the exclusive domain of state governments, the small arms industry involves non-state individuals, corporations, and communities the world over. Conventional weapons proliferation poses a serious threat to security, prosperity, and development in both developed and developing areas the world over. It is understandable that national security analysts identify nuclear weapons as posing more of a global security threat than conventional weapons, though this would be a grave mistake. For those scholars and policymakers focused on nuclear weapons, they consider the apocalyptic possibility of a nuclear war and discount the likelihood of major wars fought with conventional weapons. However, the nuclear taboo has held fast since 1945 and it will continue to do so, even in the era of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un because of the immense and unendurable political and economic consequences, as well as an incalculable cost in human lives. The development of lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons is often used to challenge the taboo, but such devices entail a

very different discussion from wanton large-scale nuclear annihilation, which will remain taboo. Current **nuclear weapons have catastrophic but hypothetical consequences, while the carnage wrought by small arms and light weapons is a devastating, daily reality worldwide.** The world must view conventional weapons proliferation as a

grave security issue and one deeply connected to a human security perspective. The spread of small arms and light weapons is not merely a business or of less importance than other non-proliferation issues. Such **conflicts** primarily **fought with conventional weapons** are considered under the threshold of "low intensity" and "localized" conflict, but this does not capture the severity of most conflicts today, which **pose a much greater threat to regional and**

international security. Protracted conflict, even with conventional weapons, undermines all aspects of society, development, and stability. Use of landmines and other weapons have long-term economic and political effects on individuals, families, and communities long after the conflicts have ended. A human security perspective allows for the understanding that all aspects of such conflicts are connected, and that the global spread of light weapons is a core problem that requires more international attention.



1AC Advantage

Despite the danger of guns Trump wants the United States to sell EVEN MORE GUNS – he is doing all he can to increase US sales in order to flood the world with guns

Spetalnick 18, Foreign Policy Correspondent for Reuters (Matt, Arming the world: Inside Trump's "Buy American" drive to expand weapons exports, <https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-arms/insight-arming-the-world-inside-trumps-buy-american-drive-to-expand-weapons-exports-idUSL1N1RU008>)

With this Oval Office intervention, the details of which have not been previously reported, Trump did something unusual for a U.S. president – he personally helped to close a major arms deal. In private phone calls and public appearances with world leaders, **Trump has gone further than any of his predecessors to act as a salesman for the U.S. defense industry**, analysts said. **Trump's personal role underscores his determination to make the United States, already dominant in the global weapons trade, an even bigger arms merchant to the world.** U.S. officials say, despite concerns from human rights and arms control advocates. **Those efforts will be bolstered by the full weight of the U.S. government when Trump's administration rolls out a new "Buy American" initiative** as soon as this week aimed at **allowing more countries to buy more and even bigger weapons.** It will loosen U.S. export rules on equipment ranging from fighter jets and drones to warships and artillery, the officials said. Reuters has learned that **the initiative will provide guidelines that could allow more countries to be granted faster deal approvals**, possibly trimming back to months what has often taken years to finalize. **The strategy will call for members of Trump's cabinet to sometimes act as "closers" to help seal major arms deals**, according to people familiar with the matter. **More top government officials will also be sent to promote U.S. weapons at international air shows and arms bazaars.** Human rights and arms control advocates warn that **the proliferation of a broader range of advanced weaponry to more foreign governments could increase the risk of arms being diverted into the wrong hands** and **fueling violence in** regions such as **the Middle East and South Asia.** The Trump administration stresses that the main aims are to help American defense firms compete better against increasingly aggressive Russian and Chinese manufacturers and give greater weight than before to economic benefits of arms sales to create more jobs at home. One Trump aide, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the new initiative is also intended to ease human rights restrictions that have sometimes led to an effective "veto" over certain arms deals. "This policy seeks to mobilize the full resources of the United States government behind arms transfers that are in the U.S. national and economic security interest," a White House official said, responding to a request for comment on the story. "We recognize that arms transfers may have important human rights consequences," the official said. "Nothing in this policy changes existing legal or regulatory requirements in this regard." One of the main architects of the new policy has been economist Peter Navarro, a China trade skeptic ascendant in Trump's inner circle. His effort to boost arms exports has drawn little resistance within the White House, officials said. 'WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT' The initiative has been in the works for months and some of its expected components have already been reported. But with the rollout nearing, more than a dozen industry sources and current and former U.S. officials have provided Reuters with the most complete picture yet of Trump's policy, though they caution that last-minute changes are still possible. The policy will call for a "whole of government" approach – from the president and his cabinet on down to military attaches and diplomats – to help drum up billions of dollars more in arms business overseas, U.S. officials said. It will also call for cutting red tape to secure faster deal approval on a broader range of weaponry for NATO members, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf partners as well as treaty allies such as Japan and South Korea, among others, they said. Many details will remain classified. Companies that stand to benefit most include Boeing and the other top U.S. defense contractors, Lockheed Martin Corp., Raytheon Co., General Dynamics Corp and Northrop Grumman Corp. All of their shares have surged by double-digit percentages, led by the doubling of Boeing's stock price, since Trump took office in January 2017. Trump's aides also want more senior officials to attend major international arms shows, including cabinet members such as Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, to promote U.S.-made weapons the way countries such as France and Israel pitch their companies' wares. "If you go to the Paris air show, you see the French foreign minister standing in front of the Airbus pavilion," one U.S. official said. "We're getting outplayed so we have to change our culture." In addition to the broad arms export initiative, Trump is expected to sign a separate document easing exports of military drones, an item high on foreign governments' shopping lists, officials said. U.S. foreign military sales totaled \$42 billion last year, according to the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Experts say exports from Russia, the largest U.S. competitor, are typically half those of the United States. The Aerospace Industries Association trade group said it had first lobbied Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign on the need for "bolstering U.S. manufacturing" and encouraging allies to take more responsibility for their own security. SALESMAN-IN-CHIEF **While many presidents have helped promote the U.S. defense industry, none is known to have done so as unabashedly as Trump**, a former real estate developer who seems sometimes at his most comfortable when he is promoting U.S. goods. Trump regularly discusses specific arms sales with foreign leaders in meetings and on the phone, according to White House statements. And on a trip to Japan last November, he publicly urged Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to buy more American weapons. More recently, at an Oval Office meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman last month, Trump held up posters with pictures of U.S. jets, ships and helicopters and other armaments sold to Saudi Arabia. "We make the best military product in the world," he boasted to reporters as the prince sat smiling beside him. Other presidents, including Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush stressed the need to strengthen the defense industrial base, but they did it more subtly, said William Hartung, director of the arms and security project at the Center for International Policy, a non-partisan think tank. **"Nobody's been as blatant about it as Trump"** he added. **"Nobody has yelled it from the rooftops."**



1AC Advantage

The war in Yemen demonstrates the devastating consequences – arms merchants are growing rich while Saudi Arabia is using American bombs to create a humanitarian disaster

Kane 19, New York-based freelance journalist who writes on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East (Alex, Here's Exactly Who's Profiting from the War on Yemen, <https://inthesetimes.com/features/us-saudi-arabia-yemen-war-arms-sales.html>)

Saudi Arabia, one of the world's richest countries, has been bombing Yemen, the fifth-poorest nation in the world, since 2015—with support from the United States.

Their mission is to topple the Houthis, an armed political movement that overthrew Yemen's president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, a Saudi ally, in February 2015. Saudi Arabia (a Sunni monarchy with an oppressed Shiite minority) feared that the Houthis movement in Yemen (who are Zaydis, a Shiite sect) was acting as an arm of its regional foe, Iran, in an effort to take power right across its southern border. While the Houthis have never been controlled by Iran, Iran delivers arms to the movement. Under President Barack Obama's administration and, now, President Donald Trump's, the United States has put its military might behind the Saudi-led coalition, waging a war without congressional authorization.

That war has devastated Yemen's infrastructure, destroyed or damaged more than half of **Yemen's health**

facilities, killed more than 8,350 civilians, injured another 9,500 civilians, displaced 3.3 million people, **and created a humanitarian**

disaster that threatens the lives of millions as cholera and famine spread through the country. U.S.

arms merchants, however, have grown rich.

Fragments of the bombs were documented by journalists and HRW with help from Mastaba villagers. An HRW munitions expert determined the bombs were 2,000-pound MK-84s, manufactured by General Dynamics. Based in Falls Church, Va., General Dynamics is the world's sixth most profitable arms manufacturer. One of the bombs used a satellite guidance kit from Chicago-based Boeing, the world's second-most profitable weapons company. The other bomb had a Paveway guidance system, made by either Raytheon of Waltham, Mass., the third-largest arms company in the world, or Lockheed Martin of Bethesda, Md., the world's top weapons contractor. An In These Times analysis found that in the past decade, the State Department has approved at least \$30.1 billion in Saudi military contracts for these four companies. The war in Yemen has been particularly lucrative for General Dynamics, Boeing and Raytheon, which have received hundreds of millions of dollars in Saudi weapons deals. All three corporations have highlighted business with Saudi Arabia in their reports to shareholders. Since the war began in March 2015, General Dynamics' stock price has risen from about \$135 to \$169 per share, Raytheon's from about \$108 to more than \$180, and Boeing's from about \$150 to \$360. Lockheed Martin declined to comment for this story. A spokesman for Boeing said the company follows "guidance from the United States government," while Raytheon replied, "You will need to contact the U.S. government." General Dynamics did not respond to inquiries. The State Department declined to comment on the record. The weapons contractors are correct on one point: They're working hand-in-glove with the State Department. By law, the department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs must approve any arms sales by U.S. companies to foreign governments. U.S. law also prohibits sales to countries that indiscriminately kill civilians, as the Saudi-led military coalition bombing Yemen did in the Mastaba strike and many other documented cases. But **ending sales to Saudi Arabia would cost the U.S. arms industry its**

biggest global customer, and to do so, Congress must cross an industry that pours millions into the

campaigns of lawmakers of both parties. THE CIVILIAN DEATH TOLL Saudi coalition spokesperson Gen. Ahmed al-Assiri told the press that the Mastaba market bombing targeted a gathering of Houthi fighters. But because the attack was indiscriminate, in that it hit both civilians and a military target, and disproportionate, in that the 97 civilian deaths would outweigh any expected military advantage, HRW charged that the missile strikes violated international law. According to an In These Times analysis of reports by HRW and the Yemeni group Mwatana for Human Rights, the Saudi-led coalition (including the United Arab Emirates [UAE], a Saudi ally that is also bombing Yemen) has used U.S. weapons to kill at least 434 people and injure at least 1,004 in attacks that overwhelmingly include civilians and civilian targets. "Most

of **the weapons that we have found** and been able to identify **in strikes that appear unlawful have been U.S.**

weapons," Motaparthy says. **"Factories have been hit. Farmlands have been hit with cluster bombs. Not**

only have they killed civilians, but they have also destroyed livelihoods and contributed to a dire

humanitarian situation." "The [U.S. government is] now on notice that there's a high likelihood these

weapons could be used in strikes that violate the laws of war," Motaparthy says. **"They can no longer say**

the Saudis are targeting accurately, that they have done their utmost to avoid civilian casualties."



1AC Advantage

Trump's plan would turn Mexico and Central America into the next Yemen making it even worse in countries that we have already armed to the teeth

Hartung 18, director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy (William, How America Cashes In on Deadly Weapons, <https://www.truthdig.com/articles/the-nra-and-the-gun-industry-in-the-global-stratosphere/>)

President **Trump's plan would** even eliminate the requirement that Congress be notified in advance of major firearms deals, which would undoubtedly prove to be the arms loophole of all time. According to statistics gathered by the Security Assistance Monitor, which gathers comprehensive information on U.S. military and police aid programs, the State Department approved \$662 million worth of firearms exports to 15 countries in 2017. The elimination of Congressional notifications and the other proposed changes will **mean that countries like Mexico**, the Philippines, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, **as well as various Central American nations, will have far easier access to a far wider range of U.S. firearms** with far less Congressional oversight. And **that, in turn, means that U.S.-supplied weapons will play even more crucial roles in vicious civil wars like the one in Yemen and are far more likely to make their way into the hands of local thugs, death squads, and drug cartels. And mind you, it isn't as if U.S. gun export policies were enlightened before the Trump era. They were already wreaking havoc in neighboring countries.** According to a report from the Center for American Progress, an astonishing 50,000 U.S. guns were recovered in criminal investigations in 15 Western Hemisphere nations between 2014 and 2016. That report goes on to note that **70% of the guns recovered from crimes in Mexico are of U.S. origin**. The comparable figures for Central America are 49% for El Salvador, 46% for Honduras, and 29% for Guatemala. **While Donald Trump rails — falsely — against a flood of criminals washing across the U.S.-Mexico border, he conveniently ignores this country's export of violence in the other direction thanks to both legal and illegal transfers of guns to Mexico and Central America. The U.S. has**, in short, already **effectively weaponized both criminal networks and repressive security forces in those countries**. In other words, **it's played a key role in the killing of significant numbers of innocent civilians there, ratcheting up the pressure on individuals, families, and tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors who have then headed for the United States looking for a safer, better life. Trump's new proposal would** potentially **make this situation far worse** and his "big, fat, beautiful wall" would have to grow larger still. Congress could seek to blunt the most egregious aspects of the Trump administration's deregulation of firearms exports by, for instance, ensuring that oversight of the most dangerous guns — like sniper rifles and AR-15 semiautomatic weapons — not be shifted away from the State Department. It could also continue to force the administration to notify Congress of any major firearms deals before they happen and pass legislation making it illegal to post instructions for producing untraceable guns via 3-D printing technology. In a political climate dominated by an erratic president in the pocket of the NRA and a Congress with large numbers of members under the sway of the gun lobby, however, only a strong, persistent public outcry might make a difference. In the meantime, **welcome to the world of American gunrunning and start thinking of Donald Trump as our very own gunrunner-in-chief.**




1AC Advantage

[*Here is an opportunity to contribute your own voice to the speech and add some context for the judge and further emphasize why they should be concerned.**

Has gun violence effected your life, the lives of your family, or the lives of people in your community?

Do you have a family connection or just an interest in areas of the world effected by US gun sales either historically or currently? This could include countries in Latin America (Mexico, El Salvador, Chile), in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, UAE, Egypt, Israel, Iraq), in Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia), in Asia (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, China, Singapore) or in Europe (United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany, Greece).]



**Trump: Global Gun Dealer
BAUDL**

**Novice Pack
2019/2020**

1AC Plan

Therefore, we offer the following plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce international arms sales to support global gun control



1AC Solvency

Decreasing United States international arms sales is critical to the success of global gun control efforts which reduce gun violence

Thrall 18, Associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute (A. Trevor, Risky Business The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy, <https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-836.pdf>)

The second major benefit of reducing arms sales is that it would imbue the United States with greater moral authority. Today, **as the leading arms-dealing nation in the world, the United States lacks credibility in discussions of arms control** and nonproliferation, especially in light of its military interventionism since 2001. **By showing the world that it is ready to choose diplomacy over the arms trade, the United States would provide a huge boost to international efforts to curtail proliferation and its negative consequences.** This is important because the United States has pursued and will continue to pursue a wide range of arms control and nonproliferation objectives. **The United States is a signatory of treaties dealing with** weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, land mines, and cluster munitions, not to mention the flow of **conventional weapons of all kinds.** **The effectiveness of these treaties, and the ability to create more effective and enduring arms control** and nonproliferation frameworks, however, **depends on how the United States behaves** **This is not to say that unilateral American action will put an end to the problems of the global arms trade.** States would still seek to ensure their security and survival through deterrence and military strength. **Other weapons suppliers would,** in the short run, **certainly race to meet the demand. But history shows that** global nonproliferation treaties and **weapons bans** typically **require great-power support.** In 1969, for example, Richard Nixon decided to shutter the American offensive-biological-weapons program and seek an international ban on such weapons. By 1972 the Biological Weapons Convention passed and has since been signed by 178 nations. In 1991 President George H. W. Bush unilaterally renounced the use of chemical weapons. By 1993 the United States had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which now has 192 signatories.⁹⁹ Both of these efforts succeeded in part because the United States took decisive early action in the absence of any promises about how others would respond.¹⁰⁰ **Without U.S. leadership, any effort to limit proliferation of major conventional weapons and dangerous emerging technologies is likely to fail**



1AC Solvency

Global gun control is already being put in place by the UN through the Arms Trade Treaty – it just needs the US to stop selling so many guns to be successful

Olabuena 19, Legal Adviser of the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations (Pablo, Why the Arms Trade Treaty Matters – and Why It Matters That the US Is Walking Away, <https://www.justsecurity.org/63968/why-the-arms-trade-treaty-matters-and-why-it-matters-that-the-us-is-walking-away/>)

The adoption of the ATT was widely praised, and rightly so. Following the adoption of the ATT, the U.N. issued a press release stating: “To a burst of sustained applause, the General Assembly today voted overwhelmingly in favour of a **“historic”, first-ever treaty to regulate the astonishing number of conventional weapons traded each year, making it more difficult for them to be diverted into the hands of those intent on sowing the seeds of war and**

conflict.” The President of the Final UN Conference, Amb. Woolcott, wrote: “The UN had not seen success in negotiating a multilateral arms control agreement since the 1990s. The adoption of the Treaty by an overwhelming majority of States in the UN General Assembly is a major achievement for the United Nations and for multilateralism. When the Treaty’s regular Conference of States Parties takes hold, **it will underscore that the discussion and scrutiny of the international arms trade have firmly found a place**

on the multilateral agenda.” (Introduction to the book Weapons and international law: The Arms Trade Treaty, 2015) Finally, in the preface to the book Le Traite sur le Commerce des Armes by Loïc Simonet, Dr. Óscar Arias wrote: “...I am both proud and deeply relieved that as I write these words in October 2014, we have defied the odds. We have made history. The Arms Trade Treaty was adopted on 2nd April 2013 by a large majority of the UN General Assembly. (...) As we look back on our history of violence, we took a powerful step towards peace. For the first time in history, a legally binding instrument established a common regulatory framework for international transfers of conventional arms, and therefore set up universal legal standards for the arms trade, on one of the few areas of global commerce which had escaped any control until now. **The treaty has the power to reduce human suffering and contribute to international peace,**

security and stability. To be honest, it is an achievement I never expected to witness. I never thought that an idea that first took shape so many years ago would become a part of international law in my lifetime.” Given the great difficulties it encompassed as well as the great real impact it can have on the ground in reducing human suffering, the adoption of the ATT was indeed a historical achievement of the international community. It also reaffirmed the relevance of the United Nations and multilateral diplomacy, in particular in an area as controversial as the regulation of conventional arms, and in which no progress had been registered for so many years. According to Amnesty International, more than 500 people die every day from gun violence, 44 percent of all killings globally involve gun violence, and there were over 1 million firearm-related deaths globally between 2012 and 2016. In contrast, military expenditure is on the rise. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the U.S. continues to be the top global exporter of arms and the 13th global importer (with Saudi Arabia holding the first position), with a total military expenditure in 2018 of \$6.5 billion. This is more than 120 times the U.N. budget for the period 2018-2019. It is for these reasons that the recent announcement to “revoke” the U.S. signature of the ATT is so troubling. **The world is in dire need of an effective implementation of the only global legally binding instrument that regulates the international trade in arms. And for that to happen, it is key to have on board the largest exporter in the world, if not as a State Party, at least as a responsible actor committed not to undermine the object and purpose of the treaty,**

which has at its core international peace and security and, most importantly, the value of the human person. Unfortunately, this political decision, based on false premises, and coupled with a consistent pattern of attacks on multilateral diplomacy, seems anything but promising.



1AC Solvency

Reducing the number of guns matters – studies prove countries that have less guns have less violence

Kiger 13, Contributing Writer at HowStuffWorks (Patrick, Do countries with stricter gun laws really have less crime or fewer homicides?, <https://people.howstuffworks.com/strict-gun-laws-less-crime1.htm>)

The effect of gun laws on gun-related violence is fuzzier and far more controversial but, in general, **more guns mean more gun-related violence** [sources: Killias, van Kesteren and Rindlisbacher; Liptak; Luo]. We'll examine this further below. First, let's look at the relationship between gun laws and violence in general. It is possible to have a violent society without guns. Prime evidence of that is the former Soviet Union and its successor states such as Russia, which despite stringent gun control laws, posted murder rates from 1965-1999 that far outstripped the rest of the developed world [sources: Kates and Mauser; Kessler; Pridemore]. The killers in question did not obtain illegal firearms -- they simply employed other weapons [source: Kleck]. On the other hand, Norway, Finland, Germany, France and Denmark, all countries with heavy gun ownership, have a history of low murder rates. According to a 2014 United Nations report, Germany's murder rate of 0.8 killings per 100,000 inhabitants was identical to Luxembourg, where the law prohibits civilian ownership of handguns and gun ownership is rare [source: UNODOC, Kates and Mauser]. The U.S., though, in many ways is a special case. Not only does it have more guns than any other nation on the planet, but it also has far more gun deaths than any other developed nation — six times the homicide rate of neighboring Canada, more than seven times as many as Sweden, and 16 times as many as Germany [source: Lopez]. Within the U.S. picture isn't as uniform, because in addition to federal regulation, states across the U.S. have their own varying laws on firearms. Opponents of gun control often point to the city of Chicago, which had 781 homicides and 3,000 shooting incidents in 2016, despite Illinois' relatively tough gun laws, as proof that gun control doesn't work [source: Lewis]. But one recent study suggests that **stricter state gun laws do make a difference. In a study published in** the May 13, 2013 issue of **JAMA Internal Medicine**, researchers concluded that **states with the most firearm legislation have the lowest rates of firearm-associated deaths, as well as the lowest rates of both murders and suicides with guns**. The quarter of states with the strictest laws had 6.64 fewer deaths per 100,000 inhabitants than the quarter with the least regulation [source: Fleegler, et al.] **A 2013 UN study came to a similar finding. "While the specific relationship between firearm availability and homicide is complex, it appears that a vicious circle connects firearm availability and higher homicide levels,"** it concluded.



2AC Root Cause

Focusing on root causes is misleading – prefer specific causes like an abundance of guns

Swanson 05 Jacinda Swanson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University – Theory, Culture & Society August 2005 vol. 22 no. 4 87-118 – DOI: 10.1177/0263276405054992 –The online version of this article can be found – <http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/22/4/87>

It is thus misleading to suggest that social relations are ever solely economic, political or cultural, or that the causes of and remedies for unjust social arrangements are singular (see also Butler, 1997c: 273, 276; Young, 1997: 154–6; Sayer, 1999). Although Fraser insists on the thorough imbrication of culture and economics, her **emphasis on** the two categories of redistribution and recognition and on **root causes undermines** the **more complex understanding** she articulates elsewhere.⁶ Moreover, despite her commitment to perspectival dualism – and thus her rejection of substantive dualism and economism – in several instances Fraser describes the economy and capitalism in economically reductionist and determinist terms (2003: 53, 58, 214–18). **For instance**, although she correctly insists that capitalism and culture interact, **she often appears to conceptualize capitalism** and other economic activities **as** in themselves fundamentally economic **practices that function independently of political and cultural processes** and, related, appears to conceive economic behavior/phenomena as devoid of values. To cite just a few examples, Fraser provides the following conceptualizations: ‘In this marketized zone, interaction is not directly regulated by patterns of cultural value. It is governed, rather by the functional interlacing of strategic imperatives, as individuals act to maximize self-interest’ (2003: 58); ‘system integration, in which interaction is coordinated by the functional interlacing of the unintended consequences of a myriad of individual strategies’; and ‘a quasi-objective, anonymous, impersonal market order that follows a logic of its own. This market order is culturally embedded, to be sure. But it is not directly governed by cultural schemas of evaluation’ (2003: 214). **As the concept of overdetermination shows, ‘economic’ practices themselves depend on specific (cultural) knowledges**, values and discourses, as well as specific (political) rules and regulations (and vice versa). Values are therefore not confined to the cultural status order.⁷ In addition to discourses and knowledges, values, for example, constitute ideas and behavior related to business enterprise success and purposes, rational considerations and calculations, individual self-interest, appropriate and desirable objects of economic production and exchange, etc. (Amariglio and Ruccio, 1994; Watkins, 1998). The theoretical perspective I am advocating here thus urges both the multiplication of analytical categories and concrete empirical investigations of the numerous conditions of existence (located throughout society) of any unjust practice (see also Smith, 2001: 121). It consequently suggests that overcoming any given form of oppression most likely will require transforming a wide range of cultural, economic and political practices.

A focus on root causes prevents us from solving the issue

Toffler & Toffler 93 (Alvin-, Heidi-, Members of the U.S. Committee for U.S. China Relations, War and Anti-War, P. 226)

Making peace cannot depend on the priori solution of all the world’s moral, social, and economic ills. Those who tell us that war is a result of poverty, injustice, corruption, overpopulation, and misery may be right though the formula seems oversimple. But **if these must be eliminated before peace is possible, then war prevention or limitation becomes a utopian exercise.** **The problem is not how to promote peace in a perfect world but in the world that we actually have and the new one we are creating. In today’s real world we have a new global system in the making and a brand-new way of making war, yet so far few corresponding innovations in the way we try to make peace.**



2AC Root Cause

Even if guns alone don't kill people the number of guns made available by US arms sales makes it much more likely that mass violence occurs

Hartung 01, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy (William, Prophets of War: Lockheed Martin and the Making of the Military-Industrial Complex, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/new-business-of-war-small-arms-and-the-proliferation-of-conflict/5C3C2360898788C9E021B6CF2CAC81DC#>)

Guns alone don't kill people, but societies awash in guns are far more likely to resolve their differences violently, in ways that can quickly spiral out of control. Once this happens, the international community can neither stop the killing nor heal the

societal wounds inflicted by militias, war-lords, criminal gangs, or repressive governments. **The current massive quantities of small arms** in circulation **have been primary contributors to** what analyst Klare has described as **a worldwide "epidemic of** ethnic, sectarian, and criminal **violence.**"¹⁵ What is to be done? Is the arms trade just an unfortunate, necessary evil of our interconnected world, or can effective steps be taken to rein it in and diminish the levels of violence associated with the spread of small arms and light weapons? Like any public health epidemic, the current outbreak of local and regional violence must be addressed in a comprehensive fashion, involving both preventive measures such as arms control and conflict resolution, and "treatment" in the form of diplomacy, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. So far, the international community has invested far more in ad hoc, emergency treatment measures after violence has erupted in a given nation or region than it has in preventive approaches such as controlling access to small arms on the part of potential combatants. Because they are cheap, plentiful, portable, and easy to maintain, small arms facilitate violations of human rights and humanitarian law by a much wider range of state and nonstate actors than major conventional systems such as fighter planes or attack helicopters, which can generally only be purchased and maintained by governmental forces that, in theory, are more amenable to appeals to national and international law. This is not to suggest that major conventional systems should be "skipped over" in discussions of reining in the international arms trade. Turkey's use of U.S.-supplied helicopters and fighter planes to bomb and burn Kurdish villages in southeastern Turkey or Ethiopia's purchase of MiG fighter jets for use in its recent border war with Eritrea are just two recent examples that suggest the wisdom of seeking comprehensive controls on the arms trade, including everything from Kalashnikovs and M-16 rifles to MiGs and F-16 fighter planes. In a recent critique of U.S. arms-transfer policy, former Costa Rican president and Nobel Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias noted that in the modern era, **"the true weapons of mass destruction are** the jet fighters, tanks, machine guns, and other **military exports the United States ships to** nondemocratic **countries.**"¹⁶ While an across-the-board focus on **limiting arms transfers makes the most sense**, an argument can nonetheless be made for giving priority in terms of resources and public attention to small arms, **for the simple reason that they are the primary instruments of violence in the vast majority of the world's** most intractable **conflicts.** According to an assessment by Klare, light weapons were the only armaments used in forty-six of forty-nine major conflicts that were fought worldwide during the decade of the 1990s. **Small arms have also been linked to the vast increase in the proportion of civilian deaths generated by today's wars.** Civilian noncombatants account for an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the parties killed in current conflicts, compared with the roughly 5 percent rate of civilian deaths that prevailed during World War I.¹⁷ And, noting the substantial increases in the numbers of internal refugees generated by today's wars compared with those of a generation ago, many analysts have suggested that the single most important factor explaining the upsurge in refugee populations is the ready availability of small arms. In short, **a multifaceted case can be made for the urgent need to restrict the availability of small arms, in the interests of preventing conflict and promoting stability in war-torn regions,** reducing the human and economic costs of local and regional conflicts, and protecting the fragile fabric of global ethics and international humanitarian law from being overrun by an epidemic of lawlessness and violence. Toward that end, in May 1999 a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with human rights, humanitarian aid, arms control, law enforcement, and public health formed the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), with the goal of stemming the excessive accumulation, rapid proliferation, and rampant misuse of small arms.¹⁸ In the past two years, IANSA has made significant strides in placing the small arms problem on the agenda of governments, international institutions, and global civil society. The question now is how to move from compassionate rhetoric to effective action.



2AC Root cause

Guns are a cause not a symptom – people act more aggressively when they have guns

Bushman 13, Professor of communication and psychology at The Ohio State University (Brad, The "weapons effect", <https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/get-psyched/201301/the-weapons-effect>)

Research shows that the mere presence of weapons increases aggression. “Guns not only permit violence, they can stimulate it as well. The finger pulls the trigger, but the trigger may also be pulling the finger.”—Leonard

Berkowitz, Emeritus Professor of Psychology, University of Wisconsin In 1967, Leonard **Berkowitz and** Anthony **LePage conducted**

a fascinating study. [1] **First, participants were angered by a person pretending to be another**

participant (called a confederate). **Next, participants were seated at a table that had a shotgun and a revolver on it—or, in the control condition, badminton racquets and shuttlecocks. The items on the table were described as part of another experiment that the researcher had supposedly forgotten to put away. The participant was supposed to decide what level of electric shock to deliver to the confederate who had angered them, and the electric shocks were used to measure aggression. The experimenter told participants to ignore the items on the table, but apparently they could not.**

Participants who saw the guns were more aggressive than were participants who saw the sports items. This effect was dubbed the “weapons effect.” Research also shows that drivers with guns in their

cars more likely to drive aggressively. [2] A nationally representative sample of over 2,000 American drivers found that those who had a gun in the car were significantly more likely to make obscene gestures at other motorists (23% vs. 16%), aggressively follow another vehicle too closely (14% vs. 8%), or both (6.3% vs. 2.8%), even after controlling for many other factors related to aggressive driving (e.g., gender, age, urbanization, census region, driving frequency). Recent research replicated this finding in a driving simulation experiment. [3] Human beings can identify potentially dangerous, threatening stimuli such as spiders and snakes very quickly. This makes sense from an evolutionary perspective because some spiders and snakes are poisonous, and our ancient ancestors who could identify them quickly were more likely to avoid them and live to pass on their genes. Recent research shows that people can identify guns as quickly as they can identify spiders and snakes. [4], [5], [6] These findings are very interesting because guns are modern threats and cannot be explained using evolutionary principles. Yet guns are a far more dangerous to people today than spiders or snakes. Poisonous spiders (e.g., Black Widows, Brown Recluses) kill about 6 Americans each year. [7] Poisonous snakes (e.g., rattlesnakes) kill about 5 Americans each year. [8] In comparison, guns kill about 31,000 Americans each year. [9] **Several studies have replicated the weapons effect. A review of 56 published**

studies confirmed that the mere sight of weapons increases aggression in both angry and nonangry individuals A more recent meta-analysis of a larger sample of 151 effect-size estimates from 78 independent studies involving 7,668

participants found strong support for the idea that **weapons increase the accessibility of aggressive thoughts and**

hostile appraisals. However, more research is needed on the link between exposure to weapons and aggression in provoked participants, especially in field settings. A recent field study found that the presence of a TASER significantly increased the use of force in police officers. Perhaps **the weapons effect occurs because weapons are closely linked to aggression in our brains.**



2AC Invasion

No risk of invasion - Trump won't start a war because he knows it will be unpopular and hurt the economy

Prokop 19, Senior Politics Correspondent for Vox (Andrew, Does Trump want a war with Iran?, <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/21/18700696/trump-iran-war-bolton>)

We don't need to rely entirely on taking the president's words in good faith. **Trump has some very good, self-interested reasons to try to stay out of a major military conflict. It would infuriate some of his most fervent supporters, risk economic turmoil, and violate a campaign promise shortly before he's up for reelection in 2020.** The problem? Trump also appears to believe that both his foreign policy strategy and personal brand hinge on being seen as "tough." With longtime supporters of regime change in Iran holding Trump's ear, Iran responding aggressively to his "maximum pressure" campaign, and a risk of miscalculation or further escalations from each side spiraling ever higher, he may decide that he doesn't want to be seen as weak. So the ideal outcome for Trump appears to be that he presents himself as extremely "tough" without actually having to deal with a prolonged war. But if he decides he's failed to achieve that, it's unclear what his next move would be — and there are some incentives that could spur him toward military retaliation. The factors pushing Trump against war His assessment of the Bush administration: Though Trump's claim that he always opposed the war in Iraq is false, in recent years he has repeatedly opined that Bush's war was a terrible blunder. In 2016, he said on a Republican debate stage that it "may have been the worst decision" in presidential history. He reiterated that assessment after winning the presidency, saying in 2018 that it was "the single worst decision ever made" and comparing it to "throwing a big fat brick into a hornet's nest." So naturally, it would seem, he would not want to replicate this decision by getting bogged down in a forever war with Iraq's larger neighbor. The economy: **As his reelection campaign kicks off, Trump likely knows that the best thing he has going for him is the state of the economy — and that a major new war would imperil that.** For instance, oil prices surged after Trump seemingly threatened Iran in a tweet Thursday morning, saying Tehran "made a very big mistake!" by shooting down an unmanned US drone. Trump has certainly been willing to risk market turmoil on some fronts — like for his trade war — but a large-scale war could mean yet more instability and risk. (My colleague Alex Ward reports that, per one official, one factor in Trump's calling off the planned strike Thursday night was concern over potential damage to the US economy.) The "America First-ers": Though for decades the dominant faction in Republican Party has supported a vigorous US role abroad, there's also been a strain of "America First" conservative thought that has rebelled against these ideas. They've argued that the US should not deepen its involvement in faraway conflicts and are weary from the American lives lost after nearly two decades of post-9/11 wars. Trump explicitly championed this worldview during his campaign, and has continuously reaffirmed that mantra since being elected — during his inauguration speech, at global foreign policy conferences, and in his meetings with other world leaders. Some prominent figures now associated with this line of thinking have been among Trump's biggest fans, such as Tucker Carlson, Laura Ingraham, and Ann Coulter. Many of them are urging Trump not to let the GOP establishment spur him into a war with Iran. "We must be wary of doing anything that will draw us into another long-term conflict in the region," Ingraham said on her Fox show this week. Reelection is coming: Finally, and related to all of the above, **the 2020 election is less than a year and a half away. And whatever the current situation may be, Trump ran last time on a promise to avoid new foreign entanglements — and he will most likely want to argue that he kept that promise. If he's too aggressive now, he could start a conflict that would spiral out of control and not be resolved by November 2020.** Some have wondered if a war could actually help Trump's reelection, pointing to the "rally 'round the flag" effect (basically, that a president's approval rating often improves in times of national crisis). But that's questionable, considering how calcified Trump's own approval rating has been. A Reuters/Ipsos poll showed that American support for attacking Iran largely depends on which side is viewed as the aggressor — so **Trump would face a challenge convincing the majority of the public who disapproves of him that a war is justified.**



2AC Deterrence

Guns don't prevent violence – newest studies prove

Pappas 15, Live Science Contributor (Stephanie, Guns Don't Deter Crime, Study Finds, <https://www.livescience.com/51446-guns-do-not-deter-crime.html>)

A new study, however, throws cold water on the idea that a well-armed populace deters criminals or prevents murders. Instead, higher ownership of guns in a state is linked to more firearm robberies,

more firearm assaults and more homicide in general. We found no support for the hypothesis that **owning more guns leads to a drop or a reduction in violent crime,**" said study researcher Michael

Monuteaux, an epidemiologist and professor of pediatrics at Harvard Medical School. "**Instead, we found the opposite.**" More guns, more gun crime Numerous studies have found that gun ownership

correlates with gun homicide, and homicide by gun is the most common type of homicide in the United States. In 2013, for example, there were 16,121 total homicides in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and 11,208 of those were carried out with a firearm.

(Gun suicides outpace gun homicides by far; in 2013, the CDC recorded 21,175 suicides by firearm, about half of all suicides that year. Contrary to popular belief, suicide is typically an impulsive act, psychiatrists say. Ninety percent of people who attempt suicide once will not go on to complete a suicide later, but a suicide attempt using a gun is far more lethal than other methods.) Monuteaux and

his colleagues wanted to test whether increased gun ownership had any effect on gun homicides, overall homicides and violent gun crimes. They chose firearm robbery and assault, because those crimes are likely to be reported and recorded in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime

Report. Along with that FBI data, the researchers gathered gun ownership rates from surveys in the CDC's Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, an ongoing, nationally representative survey in which participants answered questions about gun ownership in 2001, 2002 and 2004. Using those years and

controlling for a slate of demographic factors, from median household income, population density, to age, race and more, the researchers compared crime rates and gun ownership levels state by state. **They found no evidence that** states with **more households with guns led to timid criminals. In fact, firearm**

assaults were 6.8 times more common in states with the most guns versus states with the least.

Firearm robbery increased with every increase in gun ownership except in the very highest quintile of gun-owning states (the difference in that cluster was not statistically significant). Firearm homicide was 2.8 times more common in states with the most guns versus states with the least. [Private Gun Ownership in the US (Infographic)]



2AC Fill in

By reducing US arms sales the plan makes global gun control efforts successful so after the plan the UN would be better able to stop other countries from selling weapons – that’s the 1AC Thrall and Olabuenaga evidence

China proves that other countries can’t fill in – they don’t have the capability and wouldn’t want to create tension with the US

Zheng 18, China Foreign Policy Reporter for the South China Morning Post (Sarah, China may seek to boost ties with Saudi Arabia but it ‘can’t fill US arms sales gap’, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2168849/china-may-seek-boost-ties-saudi-arabia-it-cant-fill-us-arms>)

China may continue to engage more with Saudi Arabia if Washington imposes sanctions over the disappearance and presumed murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, but it **cannot supplant US arms sales as** President Donald **Trump believes**, analysts say. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo arrived in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday as Washington weighs actions against Riyadh over the fate of Khashoggi, a US resident and vocal critic of the Saudi regime who vanished two weeks ago. But Trump has been reluctant to support sanctions, citing the impact to a US\$110 billion arms deal he helped broker last year. “I don’t like the concept of stopping an investment of US\$110 billion into the United States because you know what they’re going to do?” Trump told reporters last week. “They’re going to take that money and spend it in Russia or China or someplace else.” Saudi Arabia has long sought to diversify away from its reliance on the US and has increasingly stepped up its engagement with China, its largest trading partner with US\$42.36 billion in bilateral trade in 2017. Last March, the two countries also signed US\$65 billion worth of deals in areas ranging from energy to space technology. The Arab nation could turn to countries such as China and Russia to help fulfil its military needs if US sanctions were imposed, a step that would “create an economic disaster that would rock the entire world”, according to a widely cited opinion piece by the general manager of the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya news channel. In the editorial, Turki Aldakhil said Saudi Arabia – the world’s largest oil exporter – was considering more than 30 countermeasures to be taken against the US, including trading oil in yuan instead of the US dollar. But **in the military realm, China’s arms** exports to Saudi Arabia **lag far behind** those of **the US** and its European allies. Beijing exported only around US\$20 million in arms last year compared to US\$3.4 billion from Washington, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a Swedish think tank. Jonathan Fulton, assistant professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, said China had grown more serious in its regional arms relationships with Gulf states in recent years, with the potential to serve as a “wedge” as US-Saudi relations frayed. Along with Riyadh’s previous indications that it was willing to consider funding in yuan, increased arms sales would be a “natural progression” of their relationship, he said. “Part of the reason why [Saudi Arabia] is diversifying is there’s been so many kinds of structural changes in the relationship with the US,” Fulton said. “Another important part is just obviously the commercial relationship and economic relationship between these Gulf states and China, with these energy exports. We’re seeing a lot more engagement both ways.” But as evidence piles up that Saudi Arabia ordered Khashoggi’s assassination, which the government denies, the backlash is getting louder. A bipartisan group of US senators have pressured Trump to enact sanctions and key corporate sponsors have pulled out of the high-profile “Davos in the Desert” investment forum to be held in Riyadh this month. “I would expect to see some kind of ... Saudi-led way to ease the tensions between the US and Riyadh because I don’t think they can afford to let the US relationship deteriorate,” Fulton said. Simone van Nieuwenhuizen, an Australia-based researcher of China-Middle East relations at the University of Technology Sydney, said **China** would be “extremely unlikely” to follow US sanctions if they were levelled against Saudi Arabia, but **may not** necessarily **increase trade** with the country either. “I think **China is likely to keep a low profile** on this issue and see how it plays out before directly addressing it,” she said. “While its technology is developing, **China still lags behind the US in the sophistication and capability of its military equipment. It simply can’t fill the gap.**” Robert Mason, director of the Middle East Studies Centre at the American University in Cairo, said **China would not want to get involved** at this stage **to avoid further tensions with the Trump administration.**



2AC Fill in

Saudi Arabia already tried to replace us and found that other countries didn't want to or weren't able to fill in

Dewan 18. Digital News Producer with CNN International (Angela, These are the countries still selling arms to Saudi Arabia, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabia-intl/index.html>)

A number of countries have restricted arms sales to Saudi Arabia since the kingdom began airstrikes on Yemen in 2015, in a war that the UN describes as the world's worst man-made humanitarian disaster. **Calls for more restrictions on arms exports have been growing, particularly in Europe, since the killing of journalist**

Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Turkey last month. US President Donald Trump, however, has repeatedly pointed to the US' lucrative arms deals with the Saudis as a reason to stand by the kingdom. Denmark and Finland on Thursday became the latest countries to suspend new arms deals with Saudi Arabia. Denmark's Foreign Ministry said it was freezing new deals over both Khashoggi and Yemen, while the Finnish Foreign Ministry mentioned only Yemen. Finland also banned new arms sales to the United Arab Emirates, which is part of the Saudi-led coalition in the conflict. Their announcements came just two days after Germany said it was stopping all arms transfers to the kingdom. Denmark and Finland are not major suppliers of weapons to Saudi Arabia, but Germany certainly is. It had already suspended new arms deals to Saudi Arabia, but on Monday it widened that ban to include the transfers of weapons on existing orders as well. So where is Saudi Arabia getting its weapons from? Arms deals are often done in secret or with little publicity. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) tries to track deals involving major weapons, and a database of Saudi imports from the last decade shows the United States as the biggest supplier, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Spain and then Germany. But a **lot of exporters still selling to the**

Saudis have dramatically decreased their supply in recent years. The United Kingdom, for example, transferred arms worth an estimated \$843 million in 2016 but almost halved that value to \$436 million last year, according to SIPRI. (The database uses values constant with 1990 prices to eliminate currency fluctuations and inflation.) French exports of major weapons to Saudi Arabia were worth \$174 million in 2015 but dropped to \$91 million in 2016 and \$27 million last year. The value of Spanish exports also dramatically decreased in that time period, but the Spanish government confirmed this year it would go ahead with arms deals it had previously suggested it would freeze, bowing to pressure from Spanish manufacturers, according to reports. US dwarfs other exporters **Despite these decreases, the**

overall value of Saudi weapons imports actually increased by 38% between 2016 and 2017. That was almost **entirely because of a huge uptick in transfers from the United States**, which almost doubled its exports in terms of value from \$1.8 billion to \$3.4 billion in that time. Germany also multiplied its exports from \$14 million to \$105 million, although it is expected to be much lower this year following its suspension. Overall, **no country comes close to the United States in major weapons**

supply. Over the past five years, for example, the US accounted for 61% of major arms sales to the Saudis. The UK was a distant second, with a 23% share, while France, in third place, was a mere 4%. In a statement on Tuesday, Trump said that canceling major arms contracts with the Saudis would be foolish, and that "Russia and China would be the enormous beneficiaries" if the US halted its sales. **China supplies a negligible amount of major weaponry to Saudi Arabia**, SIPRI data shows, but it is on the increase. **Russia supplies so little it is not included in the organization's database. "Russia has tried hard** in the past 10 to 15 years **to get into the large Saudi arms market, but it has not been very successful.** Saudi Arabia has acquired Russian rifles and may have bought some other items, but such deals have been very small," said Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher with SIPRI's arms transfers and military expenditure program. "China has made some more substantial inroads into the Saudi arms market, in particular selling armed drones," Wezeman said. "The details are shady and we may very well have underestimated China's role as an arms exporter to Saudi Arabia. But China doesn't come anywhere near the USA, UK or even France as arms suppliers. Still, the important point here is that **Saudi Arabia has explored the possibility of diversifying its supplier base.**"



2AC Fill in

US arms sales are responsible for a huge percentage of firearms in the global black market – no one else can replace us

Shepp 18, International Editor at NY Magazine (Jonah, [The American Gun Glut Is a Problem for the Entire World](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/02/the-american-gun-glut-is-a-problem-for-the-entire-world.html), nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/02/the-american-gun-glut-is-a-problem-for-the-entire-world.html)

The point here is not that the AR-15 is a uniquely evil gun (it isn't), but that **while President Donald Trump demagogues about Mexican immigrants bringing drugs and crime across the border into the U.S., tens of thousands of American guns are making that journey in the opposite direction**, often illegally and often destined for the people operating and profiting from the Mexican drug trade. Mexico's gun laws are extremely restrictive, but the proximity of the U.S. and the lack of regulation here make them relatively easy to smuggle into the country. As arms trafficking experts Sarah Kinosian and Eugenio Weigend wrote in a Los Angeles Times op-ed last year, **Mexican criminals tend to get their hands on U.S. weapons the same way American criminals do: through straw purchases, in which one person buys a gun legally and sells it or hands it off illegally**. Gun trafficking, they add, is "a high-profit, low-risk activity," as trafficking within the U.S. is not illegal under federal law and straw purchasers rarely face harsh penalties when caught. **In this manner, the U.S. is arming both sides of the drug war in Mexico**, between the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and other equipment **our arms manufacturers ship to the Mexican military and police; and the lucrative business of illegal trafficking**, from which one study calculated that half of all U.S. gun dealers earned \$127 million in 2012. Without the Mexican market, many of these dealers would go out of business. **Mexico is by no means the only destination for black-market American firearms**. An investigation last year by RAND Europe and the University of Manchester found that **nearly 60 percent of firearms listed for sale on the dark web were of U.S. origin**, though Europe was the largest market for the unregulated online trade in firearms, generating revenues about five times higher than the U.S. Nor is illicit trafficking the only way American guns get into the hands of people in other countries who probably shouldn't have them. **In places like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, they start out as military assistance** given or **sold to allied governments and non-state actors**. **They then make their way into the black market** and often, the hands of our enemies. CNN recently found numerous U.S. military-issue small arms, including M16 and M4 assault rifles as well as "grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, thermal sniper scopes and body armor," being sold via jihadist channels on the encrypted messaging app Telegram in a part of Syria controlled by Al Qaeda-affiliated militants. **U.S. weaponry** (both light and heavy) also **still** occasionally **falls into the hands of ISIS, often diverted from legitimate buyers in the Middle East and Eastern Europe**. In Iraq and Afghanistan, where the U.S. has been at war since before some of the victims of the Parkland school shooting were born, the Pentagon has over the years supplied various security partners with more than 1.45 million guns, including nearly 1 million assault rifles, an investigation found in 2016 (with the author noting that it could be a vast underestimate). Of those weapons, the Defense Department had records of only 700,000, or 48 percent, meaning, at the very least **hundreds of thousands of weapons sent to these war zones by our government have gone missing**. Not all of these weapons were American-made — some were cheaper, older Russian machine guns and Kalashnikov assault rifles — but many M16s, M4s, and other American guns far deadlier than the AR-15 have been dumped into some of the most violent and unstable countries on Earth.



2AC 3D Printed Guns

The technology for 3D printing guns isn't advanced enough yet – it's not possible to make enough to replace US arms sales

Reichental 18, Founder, Chairman and CEO of XponentialWorks, and General Partner at OurCrowd's Cognitiv Ventures fund (Avi, 3D-Printed Guns Aren't as Threatening as You Think, <http://fortune.com/2018/10/17/3d-printed-guns-defense-distributed/>)

First off, although the availability issue is highly relevant, **the technology itself does not yet scale. There is no economically or technically viable way to equip an army with 3D-printed guns now, nor in the foreseeable future.** Moreover, **there is still a significant knowledge and craftsmanship barrier to creating your own guns. Despite online forums and DIY instructions, making a gun that doesn't blow your own hand off is still challenging enough that not everyone will try it.** Market economics still rule our actions. And the fact is that if you really want a gun, there's one significantly easier, cheaper, and completely legal way to obtain one without 3D printing: Buy it. And if you're looking for an untraceable gun, look no further than Defense Distributed's open-source CNC milling machines, which can make machine-grade, unmarked metal assault rifles and handguns. And what about the government's attempts to regulate 3D-printed guns more strictly? Let's be real: There are countless ways to disseminate information in our always-connected cloud computing universe, including through the dark web and distributed or decentralized file sharing. With all due respect to the judicial system, a judge's order is not going to shut down these kinds of activities. Applying linear law enforcement thinking to govern exponential tech-enabled behaviors like 3D gun printing is like applying a Band-Aid to a gushing wound. **The dangers of 3D-printed guns make for good headlines**, and regulators and politicians like headlines. **But let's face it: 3D-printed guns are** only as dangerous as the individuals—currently **not many in number**—who make them with ill intent.



2AC Circumvention

Trump wants to be a gun salesman and talk about how much money he's making – he wouldn't give guns away

Hartung 18, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy [William D. Hartung, 4-19-2018, "Trump's arms sales policy puts contractors above common sense," TheHill, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/384014-trumps-arms-sales-policy-puts-contractors-above-common-sense>]

In a move that poses grave risks to U.S. security, **the Trump administration's newly released conventional arms transfer policy will put jobs and the interests of arms manufacturers ahead of safety, security, and human rights** in its decisions on who the United States should arm. **This bias should come as no surprise given President Trump's penchant for promoting U.S. weapons sales and touting the jobs that they create**. From calling foreign leaders to urge them to speed up purchases of U.S. combat aircraft to using a White House meeting with the Saudi crown prince to brag about which states would gain jobs from specific sales to Riyadh, President **Trump seems to be obsessed with the alleged economic benefits of the weapons trade**. **Given its numerous mentions of creating jobs, making life easier for weapons contractors, and bolstering the U.S. defense industrial base, one might think the Trump administration's new directive is a statement of economic policy rather than a carefully crafted expression of national security concerns.**

Congress will make sure that Trump follows gun sale restrictions

ABA 13, Voluntary bar association of lawyers and law students (Proposals to Relax Export Controls for Significant Military Equipment" <https://bit.ly/2X2o4J6>)

While the Administration has authority to determine what constitutes a defense article, the Congress clearly intended for "significant military equipment" that has "substantial military utility" to be subject to the special controls of the AECA. 12 Semi-automatic rifles that can fire up to 60 rounds per minute clearly have substantial military utility. **It is therefore inconsistent with the AECA to transfer such items from the USML where they will no longer be subject to the special controls of that statute.** Contrary to the Administration's assertion in these proposed rulemakings, **Congress has established constraints on the Executive Branch** that go beyond AECA's notice requirements. Indeed, **Congress did not intend to give the President unfettered discretion** in determining which items should be placed on the USML, **but rather made clear that** certain defense articles considered to be "significant **military equipment**" **must be more closely controlled**. ITAR has long identified SME as those defense articles "for which special export controls are warranted because of their capacity for substantial military utility or capability," 22 C.F.R. § 120.19(a) (1984), 22 C.F.R. § 120.7(a) (1997), and has clearly distinguished those items on the USML. Congress, in its 1996 revisions to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq., and AECA, amended AECA to include a definition for SME, which had previously only been defined in ITAR. See Pub. L. No. 104-164, § 144, 110 Stat. 1421, 1434 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2794(9)). Congress's definition, however, merely copied the definition of SME from ITAR—SME are defense articles "for which special export controls are warranted because of the capacity of such articles for substantial military utility or capability" and "identified on the [USML]." 22 U.S.C. § 2794(9)(A)–(B) (see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-519, pt. 1, at 10 (1996)) (stating that "Section 144 amends the Arms Export Control Act to provide a definition of significant military equipment as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)").




2AC Circumvention

The courts and public pressure will prevent Trump from getting around the plan

Goldsmith 17, Professor at Harvard Law School and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution (Jack, Will Donald Trump Destroy the Presidency?,

<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-presidency/537921/>)

Thus far, however, **Trump has been** almost entirely **blocked from violating laws** or the Constitution. **The courts, the press**, the bureaucracy, civil society, **and** even **Congress have together robustly enforced the rule of law.** Trump's initial executive order on immigration—a temporary ban on entry for people from seven Muslim-majority countries that were not obvious sources of terrorist activity inside the United States—was widely seen as his first step toward authoritarianism. Issued seven days into his presidency, the ban was sloppily written, barely vetted inside the executive branch, legally overbroad, and incompetently rolled out. The administration gave the people subject to the ban's edicts no notice, which led to bedlam at airports. Many observers believed the immigration order indulged the "symbolic politics of bashing Islam over any actual security interest," as Benjamin Wittes of the Brookings Institution put it at the time. A crucial moment occurred during the week after Trump issued the order. Civil-society groups such as the ACLU quickly filed habeas corpus petitions asking federal courts to enjoin the order in various ways, which they did. For several days, it was unclear whether border agents were complying with the injunctions, and rumors that Trump or his Department of Homeland Security had ordered them not to filled the news. When a federal district-court judge in Seattle named James Robart halted the entire immigration order nationwide in the middle of the afternoon on Friday, February 3, Twitter and the cable shows were aquiver for several hours with the possibility that Trump would defy the court. "What would happen if the administration were to simply ignore this court order and continue to deny people entry?," MSNBC national correspondent Joy Reid asked her guests on All In. Washington State Attorney General Bob Ferguson, who had brought the case against Trump, treated the question as a live possibility. "I don't want to be overly dramatic, Joy," he said, "but you would have a constitutional crisis." **The hardest question in American constitutional law** was suddenly raised: **Why does a president, who controls what Alexander Hamilton described as "the sword of the community," abide by a judicial decision he abhors?** Trump wouldn't have been the first president to flout a court order. Six weeks into the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln defied a ruling by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney that the president lacked the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and Franklin Roosevelt threatened to ignore the Supreme Court in a World War II case involving Nazi saboteurs. But during the next few decades, judicial authority solidified. Though many worried that Nixon would disobey the Supreme Court in 1974 when it ordered him to turn over his incriminating tapes to a special prosecutor, Nixon famously acquiesced. Would Trump? We can imagine that he didn't want to. We can imagine him ranting deliriously after Robart issued his decision. But at 10:05 p.m., the White House put out a statement declaring that the Justice Department would seek to stay the "outrageous order," which meant that the executive branch would pursue review in higher courts. And 10 hours later, at 8:12 a.m., the incensed chief executive tweeted the first of many attacks against Robart. "The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!," Trump wrote. He would appeal, rather than defy, Robart's injunction. **We don't know why Trump acquiesced. Perhaps his staff convinced him that ignoring the ruling would spark resignations** in the White House and the Justice Department, **as well as congressional reprisal, which would jeopardize his** two-week-old **presidency.** Whatever the reason, **the most powerful man in the world complied with** the edict of **a little-known federal trial judge on an issue at the top of his agenda. The Constitution held.**



Negative Evidence



1NC Root cause

The affirmative focuses on symptoms and not causes – international gun violence is the result of US militarism and imperialism which glorifies violence. Reducing gun sales is an insufficient solution which distracts from the real problem

Ramsey 18, Professor of English and American studies at UMass Boston (Joseph, Does America Have a “Gun Problem” ...Or a White Supremacy Capitalist Empire Problem?, <https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/11/12/does-america-have-a-gun-problem-or-a-white-supremacy-capitalist-empire-problem/>)

But it's important to reflect: even Obama's liberal theory of **gun violence explains little. It describes the situation we are in**, yes, **but without giving us a sense of how or why we have come to it, without telling us what it means**. How has the USA come to the point that so many people feel compelled to own guns—and to use them—in the first place? Citing lax gun laws—or even the influence of the gun lobby—again does not so much answer as beg the question of why and how it has come to be that the US is characterized by such gun culture, laws, and lobbies. Nor does it help to explain the particularly traumatic form of the mass public (school, movie, church) shooting that has become so common.[iv] Liberal hubs have often brought Michael Moore himself into the current fray, citing his “anti-gun violence” documentary to support the case for greater gun control. (Moore has also interjected himself.) But instrumentalizing *Bowling for Columbine* in this way threatens to suppress what it was that made it such a vital intervention in the first place. At its best, the film insists on broadening and radicalizing the gun violence ‘debate,’ in ways that push well beyond even Moore's own liberal affiliations. What struck me when I first saw *Bowling* in 2002, and what has kept me coming back to it as a teaching tool ever since, is the way the film powerfully reintroduces key context for grasping violence in the USA, context that too often falls out of the mainstream ‘liberal-conservative’ back and forth about gun laws and gun lobbies. Elements that Barack Obama—and maybe even Michael Moore himself—would prefer we not dwell upon, and that a film like *Requiem for the Dead* won't go near. *Bowling* does not simply fixate on bad US gun laws or the tragedy of lives taken too soon. It **pushes further to link US gun violence to underlying legacies and systemic problems: from the history of white supremacy, to the racialized post-911 paranoia inflamed by corporate media and politicians, to the long-standing normalization—indeed the sanctification— of American violence in the form of US militarism and empire**. Just as powerfully, the film refuses to engage in demonizing or pathologizing the killers it considers, instead tying their violence to the pressures put on young people today and to the despair affecting so many US ‘post-industrialized’ working-class communities in the age of predatory capital's devastating abandonment. Granted, the film does begin and end by lampooning and lamenting America's gun-excess—from the absurd opening, where Moore receives a free rifle for opening a new account at a bank, to the bittersweet ending, where he shames K-Mart executives and then NRA President Charlton Heston himself for their complicity in the wake of Columbine. But Moore himself admits that his closing **attempts to ‘make a difference’ (by eliminating bullets from K-Mart shelves etc) is really just picking around the edges. Lacking a proposal to take on the systemic crisis** he's exposed, he **turns to ways to ameliorate, rather than to cure**. And yet the heart of the film rumbles deeper, reverberating radical suggestions, even as the film-maker himself can't bear to speak them aloud. Put simply, the film implies that **what the USA has is not just a ‘gun problem’ but a white racist empire capitalism problem, the trend in gun violence being but a symptom of a deeper malady.**



1NC Root Cause

US Imperialism is the real cause of violence in the Middle East and Latin America

Engler 06, Senior Analyst at Foreign Policy in Focus (Mark, The Latin American Roots of U.S.

Imperialism, <https://www.motherjones.com/media/2006/05/latin-american-roots-us-imperialism/>)

In the Vice President's soliloquy, the bad old days of "dirty war" in the 1980s in Central America—the death squads and "Made in U.S.A." weapons, the raped nuns and Jesuit professors murdered on campus—were recast as a noble crusade. "A guerilla insurgency" fell, Cheney said, "terrorists" were defeated, and **El**

Salvador today is "a lot better" because the U.S. stepped in. Of course, a few facts went unmentioned: That **a U.N.-sponsored truth commission held the U.S.-backed regime responsible for massive atrocities; that the civil war stretched on for over a decade** after American arms and advisors arrived; **and that half of the country lives in poverty**

today. Cheney's warped use of Latin American history is not an isolated case. The region appears to hold a special place in the conservative imagination. In recent years, Weekly Standard editor William Kristol has cited Central America as "an amazing success story" for the U.S. The National Review has depicted Reagan-era policy in Central America as "a spectacularly successful fight to introduce and sustain Western political norms in the region." And personalities from the dirty wars—John Negroponte, Elliott Abrams, Otto Reich, John Poindexter—have reappeared to take posts in the Bush administration, rejoining the effort to spread "freedom" throughout the globe. In Empire's Workshop: Latin America and the Roots of U.S. Imperialism, Greg Grandin, professor of Latin American History at New York University, raises such examples as signs that **the ideology behind current U.S. intervention in the Middle East was**

actually shaped much closer to home. "In their search for historical precedents for our current imperial moment," he writes, "intellectuals invoke postwar reconstructions of Germany and Japan, ancient Rome, and nineteenth-century Britain but consistently ignore the one place the United States has projected its influence for more than two centuries." Grandin convincingly argues that **Latin America served as a crucible in which the ingredients of current U.S. foreign policy were first blended. It's where this country first exerted**

imperial power in the name of promoting democracy. It's where today's alliance of neoconservatives, evangelicals, and capitalists first joined forces around foreign policy. And it's where figures like Abrams, Reich, and Negroponte first put their ideas in to action. For in the Reagan-era conflicts in Central America the neocons "had near free rein to bring the full power of the United States against a much weaker enemy in order to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam," and begin to rebuild confidence in the righteousness and effectiveness of U.S. dominance. To explain why this history is so often overlooked by pundits, Grandin quotes a Jorge Luis Borges quip about the notable lack of camels appearing in the Koran. The absence proves that the holy text is a truly Middle Eastern work, Borges said, because only a native author, taking the animal for granted, would neglect to mention it. Grandin relates a long list of past **U.S. actions**

that would be labeled, in contemporary parlance, as "regime change," "preemptive war," or "transformative diplomacy." These **culminated in bloody interventions in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua** in the 1980s. As author of two previous works rooted in the area, 2000's *The Blood of Guatemala* and 2004's *The Last Colonial Massacre*, and as a contributor to the truth commission investigating the Guatemalan genocide, Grandin is well-equipped with details illustrating the White House's ruthless prioritization of business-friendly regimes. "Real counterinsurgency techniques," says a U.S.

colonial quoted in Empire's Workshop, "are a step toward the primitive." Based on **the tactics condoned** by the younger neocons **in Central**

America, Grandin **urges skepticism toward the lofty moralism of the Iraq invasion**. "In Nicaragua," he writes by way of example, "the U.S.-backed Contras decapitated, castrated, and otherwise mutilated civilians and foreign aid workers. Some earned a reputation for using spoons to gorge their victim's eyes out." Brutality in Guatemala and El Salvador was no less extreme. Clearly, the American people are not reminded our government's role in such crimes often enough. (It would have been nice if John Edwards, for one, had called Cheney on his gross distortions.) But these histories, like the listings of U.S.-supported coups, are hardly original. With its vivid depiction of neocon militarists, religious evangelicals, and neoliberal economists coming together, Empire's Workshop offers a cogent analysis of how past interventions in Latin America provide the Bush administration with a troubling model for present policy. What it has to say about the future is less clear. Tellingly, Grandin skirts over the Democratic White House of the 1990s, primarily noting that support for U.S. militarism and corporate globalization have become bipartisan. President Clinton "had the good fortune to inherit a 'largely pacified third world,'" he writes, "and so [Clinton] was able to use an earlier language of political liberalism and multilateral cooperation to sell free trade." But Grandin sees this as merely a "bridge" period between

George H.W. Bush's political retirement and his son's ascendancy. He argues that **"the United States is once again relying on hard power to protect its interests and guard against the resurgence of a new, continent-wide democratic left," and thus implies that increasingly** **militaristic conflict with Latin American states is all but**

inevitable. Clinton's legacy, however, arguably merits more than an aside. Addressing the global Good Neighbor policy adopted by Franklin Delano

Roosevelt—in which the U.S. renounced direct intervention in favor of a more subtle imperialism—Grandin contends that it saved "the United States from its own worst instincts" allowing it to reap windfall profits from a stable and relatively prosperous region. In a similar vein, Bill Clinton, who was able to remain personally popular among Southern neighbors by implementing "globalization" policies with a gentler hand, today might look like an attractive model to business leaders and

lingering Republican realists alike, **especially as Iraq descends into a** **deepening civil war**.



1NC Invasion

Arms sales are a way to have limited US involvement in conflict – if we stop arms sales than we will have a military invasion instead with worse consequences

Thrall 18, Associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute (Trevor, Risky Business The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy, <https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-836.pdf>)

Arms sales remain attractive to presidents for three main reasons. First, **arms sales are less risky than sending American troops**, providing explicit security guarantees to other nations, **or initiating direct military intervention**, even long distance. **In cases where allies or partners are likely to engage in conflicts with their neighbors, providing weapons rather than stationing troops abroad can lessen the risk of American entrapment in crises or conflicts.** Taiwan is an example of this sort of arms-for-troops substitution. On the other hand, in instances where the United States has an interest in conflicts already underway, arms sales can be used in attempts to achieve military objectives without putting American soldiers (or at least putting fewer of them) in harm's way. This tactic has been a central element of the American war on terror, with sales (and outright transfers) of weapons to Afghanistan and Iraq to support the fight against the Taliban, al Qaeda, and ISIS, as well as to Saudi Arabia for its war in Yemen. In both situations the reduction of military risk, in particular the risk of American casualties, also helps reduce the political risk. Presidents who would otherwise abstain from supporting a nation if it entailed sending American troops can sell arms to that country without the political fallout that sending American troops abroad would incur. Second, arms sales are an extremely flexible tool of statecraft. **In contrast to** the blunt nature of **military intervention**, or the longterm commitment and convoluted politics that treaties involve, **arms sales can take any form from small to large and can take place on a one-time or ongoing basis; they can be ramped up or down and started or stopped relatively quickly**, depending on the circumstances. Selling arms to one nation, moreover, does not prohibit the United States from selling arms to any other nation. And thanks to their capacity and prestige, American weapons serve as useful bargaining chips in all sorts of negotiations between the United States and recipient nations.



1NC Invasion

The risk of United States military action is real – the plan gives Trump the excuse he’s been looking for

Wright 19, Foreign affairs analyst, journalist, and contributing writer to the New Yorker (Robin, Is Trump Yet Another U.S. President Provoking a War?, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/is-trump-yet-another-us-president-provoking-a-war>)

The United States has a long history of provoking, instigating, or launching wars based on dubious, flimsy, or manufactured threats.

In 1986, the Reagan Administration plotted to use U.S. military maneuvers off Libya’s coast to provoke Muammar Qaddafi into a showdown. The planning for Operation Prairie Fire, which deployed three aircraft carriers and thirty other warships, was months in the making. Before the Navy’s arrival, U.S. warplanes conducted missions skirting Libyan shore and air defenses—“poking them in the ribs” to “keep them on edge,” a U.S. military source told the Los Angeles Times that year. One official involved in the mission explained, “It was provocation, if you want to use that word. While everything we did was perfectly legitimate, we were not going to pass up the opportunity to strike.” Almost eight decades later, in 1976, the American admiral Hyman Rickover concluded that the battleship was destroyed by the spontaneous combustion of coal in a bunker next to ammunition. In 1846, President James Polk justified the Mexican-American War by claiming that Mexico had invaded U.S. territory, at a time when the border was not yet settled. Mexico claimed that the border was the Nueces River; the United States claimed it was the Rio Grande, about a hundred miles away. One of the few voices that challenged Polk’s casus belli was Abraham Lincoln, then serving in Congress. Around fifteen hundred Americans died of battle injuries, and another ten thousand from illness. **Today, the question in Washington**—and surely in

Tehran, too—**is whether President Trump is making moves that will provoke, instigate, or inadvertently drag the**

United States into a war with Iran. Trump’s threats began twelve days after he took office,

in 2017, when his national-security adviser at the time, Michael Flynn, declared, in the White House press room, “As of today, we are officially putting Iran on notice.” Flynn, a former three-star general, was fired several weeks later and subsequently indicted for lying to the F.B.I. about his contacts with Russia. **The Administration’s campaign against Iran,**

though, **has steadily escalated**, particularly in the past two weeks. On May 5th, a Sunday, the White House issued an unusual communiqué—from the national-security adviser, John Bolton, not the Pentagon—announcing that a battleship-carrier strike group, led by the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, and a bomber task force, including B-52s, were deploying off Iran’s coast. The Lincoln was headed to the Middle East anyway, but its deployment was fast-tracked, U.S. officials told me. Bolton claimed that the Islamic Republic was engaged in “a number of troubling and escalatory indications and warnings,” but did not provide specifics. The Administration’s goal, he said, was “to send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with unrelenting force.” Bolton, who was a key player behind the U.S. war in Iraq, advocated bombing Iran before he joined the Trump White House. Five days later, on May 10th, the Pentagon announced a second display of force: the U.S.S. Arlington and a battery of Patriot missile systems would join the Abraham Lincoln. The Arlington carries U.S. Marines and an array of aircraft, landing craft, and weapons systems to support amphibious assault, special-operations teams, and “expeditionary warfare.” A Patriot battery defends against ballistic missiles and aircraft. Both are meant to respond to “indications of heightened Iranian readiness to conduct offensive operations against U.S.

forces and our interests,” the Pentagon said. **The Trump Administration is concerned that Iran, or its proxies, could strike**

U.S. assets in the Middle East, including in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and Syria. The Iranians “have demonstrated the willingness and ability to attack our people, our interests, and our friends and allies in the confusing, complex zone just short of armed conflict,” General Kenneth McKenzie, the head of U.S. Central Command, said last week, at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, in Washington. Iran does, indeed, have a growing array of surrogates across the region. Lebanon’s Hezbollah—inspired, armed, and trained by Iran—is now the most powerful militia outside state control in the entire Middle East. In Syria, Tehran has mobilized Shiite allies from four countries—Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—to supplement its own forces helping President Bashar al-Assad reassert control over his fractured nation. Tehran has reportedly shipped short-range missiles to allies by boat through the Persian Gulf and deployed kits in Syria that convert imprecise rockets into missiles with greater range, accuracy, and impact. The U.S. still has regular interactions with Iranian ships. “It’s not unusual to have several attack craft come out and approach our ships and take pictures. But now they routinely stop at a safe distance or approach in manner that is not escalatory,” he said. “We continue to remain vigilant.” The U.S. military deployments are the latest steps in the Administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign. The U.S. designated Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organization last month and has imposed a steady stream of sanctions on Iran’s economy, the most recent of which were imposed last week and covered industrial metals produced in

Iran. **The Administration has vowed to keep increasing pressure** until Iran changes its behavior—on its weapons-development programs,

human-rights violations, support for militant movements, and intervention in other Middle East countries. So far, Tehran has not changed course. **Frustration is building**

up in Washington, as maximum pressure has produced minimum strategic results, and the clock is

ticking. Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran program at the International Crisis Group, told me. **Some in Washington** and the region **would welcome**, or try

to provoke **a confrontation** in an effort to achieve what sanctions have failed at so far—cutting Iran down to size.” Vaez outlined two scenarios: Iran digs in, “prompting a frustrated White House to double down yet again on measures that alienate key allies and risk regional escalation,” or Iran calculates that it has little left to lose “and decides to escalate further in the nuclear realm or in the region.” Iran has made aggressive moves of its own. “We felt that the nuclear deal needs a surgery, and the painkiller pills of the last year have been ineffective,” Rouhani said, in a televised address. “This surgery is for saving the deal, not destroying it.” **The sense of foreboding is tangible, the threats**

from both sides are no longer rhetorical. Before the nuclear-deal negotiations began, in 2013, Washington was consumed with hyped talk of the United

States or its allies bombing Iran. If the nuclear deal formally dies, talk of military confrontation may again fill both capitals—even if neither country wants it. “Make no mistake, we’re not seeking a fight with the Iranian regime,” McKenzie, the Centcom commander, said last week. “But we do have a military force that’s designed to be agile, adaptive, and prepared to respond to

a variety of contingencies in the Middle East and around the world.” **The problem, as U.S. history proves, is that the momentum of**

confrontation is harder to reverse with each escalatory step.



1NC Deterrence

Studies show that decreasing guns increases violence

Mill 18, Attorney specializing in labor and employment and public administration law (Adam, Does Gun Control Reduce Murder? Let's Run The Numbers Across The World, <https://thefederalist.com/2018/04/03/gun-control-reduce-murder-lets-run-numbers-across-world/>)

It really doesn't matter how you slice this data. The conclusion is inescapable: **High concentrations of private, legal gun ownership do not correlate positively to increased murders. Indeed, you can look at almost any slice of data and conclude the opposite: Higher private ownership of guns can be strongly correlated to lower murder rates.** The data also exposes some myths I have heard about gun control. For example, I've heard activists tout Australia, which supposedly banned all guns. Australia has advanced a number of gun control measures over the years. Nevertheless, according to the data, Australia has a rate of private ownership of guns of 13,100 per 100,000 and a murder rate of .98. Australia has almost twice as many guns per capita as the United Kingdom, for example, and a comparable murder rate. **New Zealand has almost twice as many guns per capita as Australia but a lower crime rate.** Countries with both a low rate of private gun ownership and a low murder rate exist, but they are clearly data outliers. These include the Netherlands (3,900 guns per 100,000, for a murder rate of .61) the United Kingdom (6,200 guns per 100,000, for a murder rate of .92), Japan, and Portugal. Places like Norway, Austria, Switzerland, and Germany overwhelm those examples because they all have high rates of gun ownership and enviable crime rates. This isn't a perfect study. I didn't take the effort to include every country in the world, and I did skip many Asian countries. Nevertheless, it's worth considering why so many countries that have relatively successful programs of limiting private lawful ownership of guns are so dangerous and why countries with such high rates of private gun ownership are relatively safe. Even in a place like the United Kingdom, where the gun control seems to be effective (with a low murder rate of .92 per 100,000), it's arguable that the UK's peer countries such as **Germany and Austria have had more success controlling crime in spite of allowing greater freedom of gun ownership.** The ratio of murders per gun works as a decent measure for how responsible a country's citizens are with their firearms. Measured in this light, an owner of a private legal gun in America measures as one of the most responsible in the world. A gun in America is 387 times less likely to be used in a murder than in El Salvador. Even in Japan, which has one of the lowest murder and gun ownership rates in the world, there are ten times as many murders per gun than in America. Before U.S. governments makes anything illegal, it should be demonstrated that gun restrictions will have the desired effect. **The perverse effect of increasing murder rates by reducing private gun ownership has been demonstrated in numerous studies. Places like Chicago, Washington DC, and New York have repeatedly experienced unintended consequences of aggressive gun control laws.**



1NC Fill In

If the United States sells less guns other countries will sell more and our former customers will start to make their own guns instead which will be more dangerous than US arms sales

Bromund 18, Senior Research Fellow in Anglo–American Relations in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. (Ted, Why the U.S. Must Unsign the Arms Trade Treaty in 2018, <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/why-the-us-must-unsign-the-arms-trade-treaty-2018>)

But even the Obama Administration recognized that “not getting a universal [ATT] agreement would make any agreement less than useless.” Today, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and many other major arms exporters and importers are not party to the ATT. By the U.S.’s own criterion, the ATT is therefore “less than useless.” This is because, **to the extent that the treaty reduces arms exports**

from the West, it can only have the perverse effects of driving potential importers to buy from China or Russia—or to develop their own indigenous arms industries that will not fall under the treaty’s

purview. As a result of these facts, the ATT deservedly lacks support in Congress. A bipartisan group of 55 current Senators, led by Senator Jerry Moran (R–KS), has signed letters opposing the ATT. A series of appropriations acts (most recently, Section 534 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017) have banned implementation funding, as does Section 1279B of the fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act. The House, led by Representative Mike Kelly (R–PA) has repeatedly opposed the treaty. The Republican Party Platform adopted on July 19, 2016, explicitly rejects it. When the Obama Administration transmitted the ATT, Senator Bob Corker (R–TN), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that “nothing has changed over the last four years to suggest the treaty is in our national interest, and it will remain dead in the water.” In October 2017, the U.S. abstained in a vote on the treaty in the U.N. First Committee. What the U.S. Should Do The rise of treaties like the ATT and the nuclear “ban” poses a fundamental challenge to U.S. diplomacy. The U.S. can no longer afford to take a reactive approach to such treaties. It is not enough for the U.S. to sit back as others formulate the ideas on which these treaties are based, afterwards seeking to mitigate their flaws. This approach cedes leadership to progressive activists who always blame America first, and it usually results in treaties that the U.S. regards as irresponsible but which it is pressured to sign on the grounds that many of its allies are on board. The long-run challenge to the U.S. is to take a new, more active approach that would focus not on opposing bad ideas, but on advancing good ones. In the interim, however, the U.S. must respond to the world, and to the ATT, as it is, by taking the following steps: Recognize the consequences of the U.S.’s responsible approach to treaties. The United States rightly takes treaties seriously. As a result, it should only sign and ratify high-quality treaties. The ATT is in every way a low-quality treaty that relies on aspirations, not carefully defined, verifiable commitments. By signing the ATT, the U.S. has bound itself to uphold standards that the treaty does not define—and for which the U.S. is not responsible. Because the ATT is based on evolving standards, it is better understood not as an event, but as an ongoing process. **As it reduces or controls arms transfers, it will do so only in nations like the U.S.** that have an open and democratic political process and which respect the treaties they have signed. **It will have no effect on the incompetent, and it will**

drive purchasers into becoming the customers of unconstrained, malevolent actors



1NC 3D printed guns

It's impossible to control the spread of guns – they can be made from a 3D printer

The Economist 18 (Why it is difficult to regulate 3D-printed guns, <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/26/why-it-is-difficult-to-regulate-3d-printed-guns>)

IN 2013 Cody Wilson, a self-described anarchist, fired **the world's first 3D-printed handgun**. It was a crude, single-shot pistol made almost entirely of plastic. He called it the Liberator (pictured) and posted the printing manual, in the form of software code, online. It **was downloaded nearly 100,000 times** and reposted elsewhere. Five days later the American government ordered Mr. Wilson to remove the files, which he did. But he contested the order in court, and years of litigation followed. Last month the case finally settled in his favor. On August 1st Mr. Wilson plans to repost the guide. Why did the government lose and what does that mean for gun regulation? To stop Mr. Wilson from posting his guide online, the federal government deployed an unusual and rather dubious legal strategy. The State Department accused him of violating export-control laws that prohibit disclosing technical data about military equipment and munitions to foreigners. These laws were designed to stop someone from, say, copying the blueprints of a nuclear submarine and passing them on to China. Mr. Wilson countered that the application of these laws to his case was misguided, given that gun-making manuals already exist in the public domain. His argument that the government order violated his free speech won out. Even if he had lost the case, it would have had little practical effect. Other sites had already reposted the manual. And Mr. Wilson had been lawfully mailing the code to American citizens. He has since focused on selling **a more sophisticated product**: a machine, **dubbed the "Ghost Gunner"**, that **carves the key component of an untraceable AR-15 rifle out of aluminum**. Amateur gun-making is not new. Federal law allows anyone to manufacture guns at home; a license is required only to sell or trade them. But **gun-control advocates worry about the 3D-printed type for two reasons: traceability and detectability. They lack the serial numbers that register mass-produced guns** with the federal government, so they cannot easily be traced. **Made of plastic, they can also slip through metal detectors**. Neither feature is unique to 3D-printed guns, but the concern is that **the technology's ease of use can turn anyone**—especially those who might fail a background check—**into a gunsmith**. **Technical know-how would no longer be required to make a firearm. And as 3D printers get cheaper or easier to rent, costs will go down too**. Chuck Schumer, now the Senate minority leader, summed up this fear in 2013 when he warned that 3D printing would allow any bunch of felons or terrorists to "open a gun factory in their garage." There are some ideas for containing the risk. One measure—which passed in California and took effect there this month—would require anyone who makes a gun at home to register it and apply for a state-issued serial number. The Californian law also bans the sale or trade of homemade guns. But enacting a law and enforcing it are separate matters. Arrests for non-compliance are likely only after an untraceable gun is used to commit a crime. And with some 300m firearms in America, skirting the rules to acquire a gun is not difficult, regardless of how it was made. As one gun-control expert put it, "It's a hell of regulatory challenge."



1NC Circumvention

The plan only reduces arms sales but if Trump really wants to get the guns out there he can give them away

Holden 16, Historian and researcher (Paul, Indefensible: Seven Myths that Sustain the Global Arms Trade, Google Books)

The treaty only covers sales. This is distinct from covering other forms of arms transfer we've discussed above, such as weapons that are loaned, leased, bartered or given as part of an aid package. The treaty also excludes arms transferred as part of a "defense cooperation agreement", that is, an arrangement where the militaries of two countries work together. It would be easy for most states to simply claim that controversial weapons sales fall under the rubric of these sorts of agreements and bypass the treaty altogether.



2NC/1NR Root Cause

US imperialism and interference caused the conflict in Yemen and will continue to destabilize the region even if we sell less guns

Geopolitics Alert 17 (Blame US Imperialism for al-Qaeda in Yemen — Not the “Houthi” Uprising, <https://geopoliticalalert.com/al-qaeda-in-yemen>)

Like most countries in the middle east, western involvement in Yemen dates back many decades. Shortly after British occupation ended in 1967, South Yemen became a socialist state with strong ties to the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and radical Palestinians. North and South Yemen unified in 1990 shortly before the Soviet Union officially dissolved. This unified **Yemen has seen some degree of conflict and corruption** ever since. **US imperialism in the broader middle east region has not only exasperated but also contributed to this chaos. Both directly and indirectly.** Let’s start with al-Qaeda in Yemen. Many western outlets like to credit the rise of al-Qaeda in Yemen to conflict caused by Houthi rebels in 2011. They explain it as if the takfiris used the chaos from the uprising to gain footing in the country’s tribal areas. This description is not only shortsighted but also factually inaccurate. Osama bin Laden called Yemen the last refuge. The hills of Yemen have long been a place of recruitment and planning for al-Qaeda long before officially announcing their branch in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2006. **In the 80’s the United States was busy arming sectarian groups in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union** and collapse the communist government in Kabul. **These groups would later form al-Qaeda and the Taliban.** Many mujahideen fighters traveled from all around the middle east for their distorted version of jihad in Afghanistan. **Rural tribal areas in Yemen were ideal for recruiting fighters to take-on what locals saw as Soviet invader**s. Many of these fighters came from parts of Africa and of course, Saudi Arabia. Yemen simply became the takfiri thoroughfare. Ultimately, the corrupt conditions in Yemen coupled with **imperialist influence from Saudi Arabia and the U.S.** has only **allowed groups like AQAP to grow.** After all, al-Qaeda in Yemen is a de facto U.S. ally since they are both fighting against the movement of Ansarullah. The former president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was a close ally of George Bush Jr. and enjoyed considerable military support totaling in the millions during the so-called “War on Terror.” Without an al-Qaeda insurgency, US aid would vanish. As a result, Saleh did just enough to keep AQAP at bay without cutting them off completely. Saudi Arabia also has a long history of arming, educating, and supporting questionable political groups and militants throughout Yemen — many of which either belong to or have strong ties with AQAP and other takfiri groups. **Famine & Man-Made Health Crisis But US imperialism is also directly responsible for the devastating situation in Yemen we see today.**



2NC/1NR Root Cause

Reducing arms sales doesn't decrease conflict because it doesn't address the cause of conflict – it actually makes violence more likely because it will affect one side more

Tierney 05, Professor of political science at Swarthmore (Dominic, Irrelevant or Malevolent? UN Arms Embargoes in Civil Wars, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40072112.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0c5bff630b6e161ed245e15eb1ae8043>)^{sw}

Much of **the impact of UN arms embargoes in civil wars can be summarised as irrelevance** or malevolence.

Virtually every case of a UN arms embargo applied to a civil war has been a failure. Much of **the intuitive promise of arms embargoes** in civil wars **is illusory, and the increasing frequency of their adoption can be contrasted with their dubious record at ending or ameliorating conflict, and the range of unintended**

negative consequences that can be engendered. Although **arms embargoes** are often seen as a wise middle option between

doing nothing and military intervention, they **can be the most problematic option.** Whilst it is possible that UN **arms**

embargoes led to a marginal reduction in the total amount of weaponry that reached the combatants in civil wars in which they were

applied, such embargoes failed by any reasonable measurement. For the most part, they were unenforced; **proved** quite **unable to**

change the political positions of civil war participants; criminalised target societies; benefited arms suppliers willing to

break the rules; undermined the credibility of the UN; and may have served to satisfy calls for action without threatening to have any tangible

positive impact. The only real evidence of progress in recent years is the modest improvement in the embargo applied against UNITA in Angola.

There is an important distinction necessary between partial arms embargoes, which remain a useful tool, but which require improved

enforcement; and impartial arms embargoes, which even when enforced, may serve to shape the conflict in unexpected and undesirable ways.

Whilst partial embargoes are sometimes appropriate despite their limitations, it is much more difficult to establish the benefits of an impartial

arms embargo in a civil war situation, and there is a strong case for severely restricting their use. Impartial embargoes, for example, those

applied to Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, aim to increase the difficulty of procuring weapons for all sides, and thereby

reduce the total amount of arms in the conflict, compared to a situation without the embargo. If all other factors are held constant, then this

reduction in total weapons is welcome and should make marginally easier the task of disarming the combatants after the war. However, this

theoretical benefit must be weighed against the usual negative effects: the criminalisation of embargoed societies and the inability to change

the behaviour of target groups. Unlike partial embargoes, impartial embargoes do not increase the total incentive to negotiate amongst

combatants. Rather, they increase the incentive to negotiate for groups that suffer from the embargo and decrease the incentive to negotiate

for groups that benefit from the embargo, with the net benefit being marginal. Furthermore, like partial embargoes, impartial embargoes have

rarely been enforced. In fact, the single case of substantial enforcement of an impartial embargo was in Yugoslavia after 1991. Yet the

Yugoslavian embargo turned out to be a debacle. Enforcement is not a panacea for impartial embargoes, because more effectively

restricting the flow of weapons to the combatants can actually make the situation worse. Whilst an

enforced partial embargo, in theory, leads to predictable results, in that **it denies one side arms** and thereby limits their war-making

potential, an enforced impartial embargo will tend to affect actors asymmetrically **and thus unintentionally shape the course**

of the civil war. As the international community moves from minimal enforcement to substantial enforcement of an impartial embargo,

we may simply move from the irrelevant Somali embargo, to the malevolent neutrality of the embargoes in Yugoslavia in 1991 and the Spanish

Civil War in the 1930s. An enforced embargo in Yugoslavia in 1998 would have undermined the KLA, benefited the Serbs, and subverted the

Security Council's wider policy. Meanwhile, enforcing the embargo against Rwanda in 1994 would have done little or nothing to prevent the

genocide, committed largely with machetes. A watertight embargo in a civil war, however improbable, would lock in place existing military

imbalances. At the very 83 Michael Brzoska, 'Putting More Teeth in UN Arms Embargoes', p. 131. This content downloaded from

192.31.105.196 on Thu, 27 Jun 2019 23:17:32 UTC All use subject to <https://about.jstor.org/terms> 664 Dominic Tierney least therefore, in any

situation where impartial embargoes are employed, it is essential that their impact should be carefully measured, and if they backfire, the

international community should protect affected minorities. Arms embargoes now generally have twelve-month terms, which is a welcome

reform.



2NC/1NR Deterrence

Reducing the number of guns in a country increases the amount of violence that occurs

Malcolm 18, Vice President of the Institute for Constitutional Government (John, Here Are 8 Stubborn Facts on Gun Violence in America, <https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/here-are-8-stubborn-facts-gun-violence-america>)

The Crime Prevention Research Center notes that, if anything, **the data indicate that countries with high rates of gun ownership tend to have lower homicide rates**—but this is only a correlation, and many factors do not necessarily support a conclusion that high rates of gun ownership cause the low rates of homicide. **Homicide and firearm homicide rates in Great Britain spiked in the years immediately following the imposition of severe gun control measures**, despite the fact that most developed countries continued to experience a downward trend in these rates. This is also pointed out by noted criminologist John Lott in his book “The War on Guns.” Similarly, **Ireland’s homicide rates spiked in the year**s immediately **following the country’s 1972 gun confiscation legislation**. Australia’s National Firearms Act appears to have had little effect on suicide and homicide rates, which were falling before the law was enacted and continued to decline at a statistically unremarkable rate compared to worldwide trends. According to research compiled by John Lott and highlighted in his book “The War on Guns,” Australia’s armed and unarmed robbery rates both increased markedly in the five years immediately following the National Firearms Act, despite the general downward trend experienced by other developed countries. **Great Britain has some of the strictest gun control laws in the developed world, but the violent crime rate** for homicide, rape, burglary, and aggravated assault **is much higher than that in the U.S.** Further, approximately 60 percent of burglaries in Great Britain occur while residents are home, compared to just 13 percent in the U.S., and British burglars admit to targeting occupied residences because they are more likely to find wallets and purses. It is difficult to compare homicide and firearm-related murder rates across international borders because countries use different methods to determine which deaths “count” for purposes of violent crime. For example, since 1967, Great Britain has excluded from its homicide counts any case that does not result in a conviction, that was the result of dangerous driving, or in which the person was determined to have acted in self-defense. All of these factors are counted as “homicides” in the United States. 7. Legally owned **firearms are used for lawful purposes much more often than they are used to commit crimes** or suicide. In 2013, President Barack Obama ordered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to assess existing research on gun violence. The report, compiled by the Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council, found (among other things) that firearms are used defensively hundreds of thousands of times every year. According to the CDC, **“self-defense can be an important crime deterrent.”** Recent CDC reports acknowledge that studies directly assessing the effect of actual defensive uses of guns have found “consistently lower injury rates among gun-using crime victims compared with victims who used other self-protective strategies.”



2NC/1NR Deterrence

Countries with more guns don't experience more violence

Kiger 13, Contributing Writer at HowStuffWorks (Patrick, Do countries with stricter gun laws really have less crime or fewer homicides?, <https://people.howstuffworks.com/strict-gun-laws-less-crime1.htm>)

The fight for more stringent gun control laws derives in part from the idea that more guns mean more violence. As it turns out, though, **in the United States and the rest of the developed world, total murder and suicide rates, from all causes, do not increase with rates of gun ownership** -- or drop under tougher gun **laws** [sources: Killias, van Kesteren and Rindlisbacher; Liptak]. The effect of gun laws on gun-related violence is fuzzier and far more controversial but, in general, more guns mean more gun-related violence [sources: Killias, van Kesteren and Rindlisbacher; Liptak; Luo]. We'll examine this further below. First, let's look at the relationship between gun laws and violence in general. **It is possible to have a violent society without guns. Prime evidence of that is** the former Soviet Union and its successor states such as **Russia, which despite stringent gun control laws, posted murder rates** from 1965-1999 **that far outstripped the rest of the developed world** [sources: Kates and Mauser; Kessler; Pridemore]. **The killers in question did not obtain illegal firearms -- they simply employed other weapons** [source: Kleck]. **On the other hand, Norway, Finland, Germany, France and Denmark, all countries with heavy gun ownership, have a history of low murder rates.** According to a 2014 United Nations report, Germany's murder rate of 0.8 killings per 100,000 inhabitants was identical to Luxembourg, where the law prohibits civilian ownership of handguns and gun ownership is rare [source: UNODOC, Kates and Mauser].



2NC/1NR Invasion

US military planners are looking to find a way to justify military action against Iran – it would be a globally destructive conflict

Taibbi 19, Contributing Editor at Rolling Stone (Matt, Next Contestant, Iran: Meet America's Permanent War Formula, <https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/iran-trump-america-permanent-war-formula-850712/>)

This is often true! Sometimes, however, it isn't. **The pretext for invasion of Iraq was a supposed violation of a United Nations Security Council resolution requiring disarmament.** You might remember Colin Powell saying Iraq was in "material breach." **Iran has just announced that 10 days from now, it will be in breach of international agreements** on its permitted levels of enriched uranium. Added to the intelligence about the tanker "attacks" and warnings of "multiple threat streams," **the political justification for invasion will be there.** Precedent suggests Trump could just use the AUMF again to attack Iran because, why not? We've been doing that all over the Middle East for nearly two decades. The "violation of international law" argument would probably carry more weight if it weren't also true that basically every American military action in the last half-century has been considered illegal under international law by someone. This is a conclusion that's been reached about the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the NATO bombing of Kosovo, the entire U.S. drone assassination program, the coalition bombing of Libya, and other campaigns. Trump's decision to exit the Obama-era nuclear deal may have led to increased belligerence by the Iranians, or it may not have. Did we send spy drones toward Iran to be shot down because we no longer have the access we might have had under the Obama deal, or because we've been spying on Iran with drones anyway, for a while now (Iran even built a "copy" of an RQ-170 Sentinel drone that crashed in Iranian territory in 2011)? The bizarre consolation in all of this is that Trump himself doesn't appear thrilled with the idea of going to war with Iran. When Iran shot down the drone, Trump said it was "hard to believe it was intentional" and might have been done by someone who was "loose and stupid," despite the aforementioned General Salami saying Iran was "ready for war" after it happened. This is an area where we actually want to encourage the all-hat-no-cattle side of our president. The seeming ambivalence of Trump while the likes of Bolton and Mike Pompeo burn through the same old invasion-pretext script presents a powerful case that this is just how the American state operates, irrespective of who sits in the White House. What we end up calling "aggression" abroad is often more like resistance to our plans to control a region. Sometimes the "aggressor" is genuinely behaving badly, and sometimes not, but for decades we've been lightning-quick to opt for military solutions to almost any crisis, for increasingly obvious reasons. **The politicians running the United States often owe their careers to military contractors. Their children typically don't fight in wars. The mayhem, death, and environmental catastrophe that result from modern war never occur in their home states. It long ago became too easy to make this decision, and we're on the brink of making it again.** At least with Iraq we pretended to argue. **Iran isn't Iraq**, Serbia, Panama, or an airstrip in Grenada. **This country has real military strike-back capabilities** that the backwater states we're used to invading simply do not, **meaning war would present a far heightened danger** not only to our troops but to civilians in the region. **All our recent wars have been stupid, but this one would be really stupid.** Just once, could we not do this? Does the script always have to end the same way?



2NC/1NR Fill in

If we don't sell guns other countries will instead – Saudi Arabia proves

Thompson and Gause 10, Chief Operating Officer at the Lexington Institute and Professor and chair of political science department at the University of Vermont (Loren and Gregory, Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea>)

If Congress delays or modifies the proposed transaction, the Saudi government will probably move to purchase modern weapons from other sources such as Britain or France. The kingdom needs to replace its aging Cold War arsenal, and it is surrounded by nations potentially posing a threat to its security.

Little purpose would be served by declining to assist Saudi Arabia in meeting its legitimate defensive needs.

Whatever the differences may be between our governments and cultures, the Saudis have been reliable allies of America for decades and have exercised a moderating influence on the behavior of other oil-producing states. Helping them means helping ourselves. F. Gregory Gause III, Professor and chair of political science department, University of Vermont The Saudi arms sale will not buy much security in the long run in the Persian Gulf. But there are no good reasons not to sell the Saudis those weapons, and there are some potentially positive results (besides the economic benefits to the U.S.) that might come from the sale--most importantly U.S. leverage on Riyadh on nuclear proliferation issues. The Iranian regional challenge is based on the political and ideological links with important state and sub-state actors in the region: Hezbollah, Hamas, various Iraqi parties, the Syrian regime, and Shia activists in the Gulf monarchies. Better fighter jets and attack helicopters will not help the Saudis to contain or roll back this kind of Iranian ideological influence. Still, one good reason to move ahead with the sale is that there is no good reason not to. Though some might oppose it on grounds of disliking the Saudi political system, selling or not selling the arms is not going to affect Saudi policies on democracy, women, Islam, or anything else one whit. Moral purity would be purchased at the price of reduced American regional influence. If the arms sale could destabilize the Saudi regime, that would be a reason not to do it. Many think that U.S. arms sales to the Shah [of Iran] in the 1970s helped to bring him down, but arms were part of the larger strategic relationship, to which many Iranians objected; the arms themselves did not cause the relationship or the popular reaction against it. The Saudis and the United States are similarly tied together in the eyes of Saudi citizens and others in the region. But this arms sale would not change that perception. The larger issue is whether we are selling arms to a stable regime in Riyadh. The short answer is "yes." Also, there are two positive foreign policy consequences that could come from the sale. Its psychological effect could give the Saudis more credibility with regional elites in their contest for influence with Iran, making potential Saudi allies in places like Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen more confident in throwing in their lot with Riyadh. And if Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability, the Saudis would undoubtedly consider the option of proliferating themselves. If they are confident of their American security guarantee--and these big arms sales are warrants of the American commitment to their security--American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight. **In the end, the Saudis are going to buy weapons. If**

we do not sell them, Moscow, London, Paris, and Beijing will.



2NC/1NR Fill in

Russia and China will eagerly sell guns if we don't

New York Times 19 (State Department Defends Saudi Arms Sales Before Hostile House Panel, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/us/politics/arms-sales-saudi-arabia.html>)

A senior State Department official on Wednesday defended the Trump administration's use of an emergency declaration to push through arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, telling a hostile House committee that **holding back the weapons would have offered an opening to commercial rivals in China and Russia.** In a contentious hearing, lawmakers from both parties pressed R. Clarke Cooper, the assistant secretary of state in the bureau of political-military affairs, to detail when the administration first developed the plan to declare an emergency and sell weapons to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Congress's will. Lawmakers are outraged by the decision by President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in late May to use a loophole in the Arms Export Control Act to push through more than \$8 billion worth of weapons sales, almost all to **Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.** The two countries **are leading an air war** against rebels **in Yemen** that has resulted in a humanitarian disaster and thousands of civilian deaths, many of them children. In both chambers, bipartisan groups of lawmakers are already moving to block the sales, many of which Democrats had informally held up since last year. Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee asked whether the emergency declaration was being discussed within the administration when Mr. Pompeo and Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan briefed legislators in a closed-door meeting on threats posed by Iran, which took place three days before Mr. Trump declared the emergency on May 24. During that briefing, lawmakers "did not hear a single word about an emergency or a plan to move ahead with this sale," said Representative Eliot L. Engel, Democrat of New York and the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. "It's a slap in the face." Mr. Cooper repeatedly declined to discuss what he called the "predecision" timeline of events but testified that the move came in response to a "significant increase in intelligence threat streams" related to Iran. Some American officials and European allies have said the administration has been overstating threats tied to Iran. He continued to make the case that **if the United States ceased providing the Saudis with arms, competitors like Russia and China would seize the opportunity.**



2NC/1NR Fill in

Russia and other sellers are actively seeking out new arms deals

Khlebnikov 19, RIAC Consultant on Russia and the Middle East (Alexey, Russia looks to the Middle East to boost arms exports, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-looks-middle-east-boost-arms-exports>)

By contrast, **across the Middle East, the demand for arms is only expected to grow, driven by ongoing conflicts** (such as those in Syria, Yemen, and Libya), the fragile security situation, and the threat of military confrontation between state and non-state actors. According to SIPRI, over the last decade the region's arms imports grew by 75% from 20% of the global total in 2009-13 to 35% in 2014-18. **Russia is not alone in looking to the Middle East as a source of growth**, however. Indeed, **as the most attractive and lucrative arms market, the Middle East attracts all the major arms exporters and the competition is fierce**. At present, Middle Eastern countries import only 10% of their arms from Russia, while 54% comes from the U.S. and 9% from France. Therefore, Russia's presence in the market is quite limited, although it is growing thanks to the Kremlin's outreach to regional arms importers. In last year's SIPRI report Russia was not even in top three arms exporters to the region. As it looks to ramp up its exports, Moscow is highly dependent on the broader political and economic situation in the Middle East. Given the fact that the majority of the regional actors — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait — are U.S. allies and importers of American arms, Russia finds itself in a very tricky situation. European exporters are also ramping up their regional presence. In recent years, the leaders of the European arms industry — France, Germany, the UK, and Italy — increased their share of the global arms market by boosting their exports to the Middle East. France is the major Russian competitor in Egypt, which imports 37% of its arms from France against 30% from Russia. In this sense, Egypt plays both sides, trying to diversify its suppliers: In 2015 Cairo signed a deal with Moscow for 50 Russian MiG-29 fighters as well as with Paris for 24 Rafale jets. Algeria, a long-time major customer, imported 66% of its arms from Russia in 2014-18, although imports from Germany account for 10% of its total as well. The current political turmoil in Algeria might well result in a change in Russia's market share and a shift in favor of European producers. The UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey — where Russia is currently seeking new contracts — also import a significant share of their arms from the U.S. and European suppliers. Therefore, Russia's position in the regional and global arms market is getting more complicated and difficult given Moscow's declining share of total exports, decreasing imports in Asia and Oceania, and rising competition in the Middle East. In addition, growing U.S. pressure on Russia via its secondary sanctions puts Moscow in a very challenging situation that will make it harder to sign big new contracts and increase its arms exports. Despite all of these difficulties **Moscow is working hard to get new deals, both in the Middle East** — the world's fastest-growing and the most attractive arms market — **and elsewhere, as part of a broader effort to maintain its status as a leading arms supplier**. However, given the geopolitical headwinds and intense competition, maintaining that status looks like it will be an increasing challenge in the years ahead.



2NC/1NR 3D printed guns

3D printed guns will be even more dangerous than what the US is selling

Walther 15, Policy analyst at the Fraunhofer Institute for Technological Trend Analysis INT (Gerald, Printing Insecurity? The Security Implications of 3D-Printing of Weapons, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-014-9617-x>)

While **3D guns** may thus only be regarded as a curiosity item for a gun collector, there are some elements to 3D guns that do **pose problems to law enforcement. While unlicensed guns are in circulation**, but **one needs to get into contact with a third party to acquire one. In contrast, printing a 3D gun can be done in complete secrecy. And the gun can also be easily destroyed by melting the plastic again, which would leave no trace of its existence. So while there is a possibility for the police to trace weapons** and **based on bullet identification, or even match a gun to a certain bullet** and thus a crime scene, **this option is unavailable for 3D gun crimes**. Of course, given the rather unique shape of the Liberator and its components, it may be possible for law enforcement to conclude that the gun used was indeed a plastic gun. However, with the ease of destruction of a plastic gun, police can only search for 3D printers. However, if the culprit also deleted any cache and buffer files on the printer and the computer, and erased (and/or hid using tools like 'The Onion Router') his internet activities when downloading the files, **it would be impossible link a suspect to a crime by way of gun use and ownership**.



2NC/1NR Circumvention

Presidents have lots of secret ways to transfer guns and avoid restrictions – Iran Contra proves

Waltz 07, Public Policy Professor at Michigan (Susan, US Policy on Small Arms Transfers: A Human Rights Perspective, https://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/2007/43-waltz-2007_rev.pdf)

Over time, **Presidents** and their advisors **have been inventive in their use of government resources** and agencies, as well as outside actors, **to deliver various aspects of the shadow policy. To** stay within the bounds of law (and **circumvent Congress**), for example, **the Reagan Administration turned to members of its National Security Council to carry out the Iran Contra project—which involved surreptitious supply of weapons to both Iran and the Nicaraguan Contras. Although the Boland Amendment explicitly forbid using appropriated funds and engaging US intelligence agencies to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, NSC conspirator secretly sold US weapons to Iran and diverted the proceeds to arm the Contras.**

Arms sales restrictions don't cover transfers

Jain 18, Research student at the University of Cambridge and earned her masters in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University (Sangeet, Why India's Position on the Arms Trade Treaty Endures, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-indias-position-arms-trade-treaty-endures>)

The treaty also contains some **gaping loopholes** which **leaves options open for arms transfers such as "gifts, loans, leases and aid "**. **Under any of these labels, exporting states could arm political allies which would otherwise be barred** under the treaty. This loophole, in this author's opinion, nullifies the whole rationale for the treaty itself. **The treaty** is also clearly not in tune with the times as it **fails to cover technology transfer – an increasingly crucial component of arms deals today**. According to Max Mutschler of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (Dorrie Peter, 2015), **arms deals** come with intellectual property which **allows recipients to produce arms locally as well**. Mutschler also argues that the reporting requirements have fundamental lacunae such as the exclusion of ammunition and weapons parts and components.



2NC/1NR Circumvention

The President has overwhelming power when it comes to arms sales – there are no effective checks and balances

Capito 07, JD Washington and Lee University of Law (Charles, Inadequate Checks and Balances: Critiquing the Imbalance of Power in Arms Export Regulation? 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 297, <http://lawdev.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/64-1%20Capito%20Note.pdf>)

Subpart A described four devices that **Congress can** use to **counter executive action**. This section argues that **none of those tools is an adequate check on executive autonomy in arms export regulation**, and in particular on the State Department's interpretation at issue here. First, although congressional amendment of the AECA would certainly be an effective check on the State Department's incorrect interpretation of 5 129, it is neither a timely nor reliable one. The process by which Article I legislation is enacted is cumbersome and predictable. The path by which a bill becomes law is fraught with pitfalls and hurdles. Not only must a bill survive the traditional obstacles associated with lawmaking, but it must also compete with other legislation for committee time and floor time, as well as meet with the approval of various individuals such as committee and subcommittee chairmen and the leadership of each house. "The institutional obstacles to formal congressional response are likely to be overcome only when the agency's position has incited widespread or well-organized discontent, and most agencies are politically adept enough to avoid taking many such extremely provocative actions."³⁹ Without such widespread disapproval, many contested agency interpretations are left wanting. The second congressional device, the "resolutions of disapproval" that Congress can issue regarding a proposed agency rule, are applicable only to proposed "rules."⁴⁰ Informal interpretations of a statutory provision, such as the State Department's current stance on the brokering provision of the AECA, will not qualify for this sort of congressional response. Furthermore, the State Department is an executive department with a Cabinet level secretary who serves at the behest of the president.¹⁴¹ "Thus, **when the President has a firm preference on the policy issue, that preference will often exercise a more powerful constraint on the agency than congressional monitoring.**"¹⁴² In other words, even if Congress officially disapproved of the State Department's interpretation, it is unlikely to have any effect on that interpretation if the President and the Secretary of State feel strongly about the issue. Congress's political oversight⁴³ is an "integral part of the on-going relationship between Congress and the agencies,"¹⁴⁴ but is often restricted by the interests of committee chairmen, leadership, and other individuals who have the power to organize widespread support. ¹⁴⁵ Additionally, political oversight is subject to constraints similar to those that affect "resolutions of disapproval." The State Department is at the heart of the Executive branch and deals with issues that heavily influence the President's foreign policy. **Congress can have all the hearings it wants, but at the end of the day the Office of Defense Trade Controls answers to the Secretary of State who answers to the President.** The final congressional device, budgetary constraints, is often an effective tool. Even this traditional tool, however, has a limited effect on the current issue. The State Department performs such an integral role in foreign relations and national security that suggesting a reduction in the department's budget as a threat would be met with insurmountable disapproval—especially in the realm of weapons control. To illustrate, President Bush's 2007 proposed budget asks Congress to reduce spending in almost every area of government except those areas associated with national security.¹⁴⁸ Since September 11, suggesting cuts in programs with security implications is politically unwise. Thus Congress is highly unlikely to propose cuts in DDTC's budget as punishment for DDTC's inconsistent interpretation of 8 129.¹⁴⁹ In conclusion, **the checks and balances that animate our system of government are absent in the context of arms export regulation.** **Judicial review is discouraged because of deference to the Executive and explicitly precluded by procedural safeguards in the APA** and within DDTC. Congress's traditional oversight devices are also ineffective or limited. Article I legislation is cumbersome and unpredictable. Congress's "resolution of disapproval" is not applicable to informal interpretations and would probably fall on deaf ears at the executive controlled State Department if it were available. Congress's political oversight is not an adequate solution. And **budgetary constraints are not likely to gain traction in a Congress that dare not suggest reducing the appropriations of an office with national security responsibilities.** This set of ineffective restraints leaves the State Department unchecked in their recent interpretation of 5 129. Such unfettered autonomy is a sharp departure from our government's fundamental principle of checks and balances.¹⁵⁰



2NC/1NR Circumvention

The military has multiple ways to avoid arms sales restrictions

Lumpe 10, Senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (Lora, U.S. Military Aid to Central Asia, 1999–2009: Security Priorities Trump Human Rights and Diplomacy, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/f405dbbf-18c6-470e-a4fa-505313014346/OPS-No-1-20101015_0.pdf)

Gordon Adams, former associate director for international affairs and national security programs at the Office of Management and Budget, estimated that **15 different Pentagon programs** would **provide** \$8.6 billion in **military aid worldwide** during 2009—outstripping the similar programs that operate under State Department authority.³⁶ It turns out he was undercounting. A 2009 DOD handbook on “security cooperation” identifies **at least 49 programs and** authorities (read: **pots of money**) that **the DOD can now utilize to arm and train foreign forces**. The military committees of Congress, acting at the behest of the Pentagon, include in their annual DOD funding bills provisions that grant the Pentagon the right to use certain amounts of DOD Operations and Maintenance funds for foreign military aid programs.³⁸ Many of the new DOD-funded programs that Congress has authorized in the past decade directly parallel State Department–funded programs. But with these, the Pentagon is “the decider” (in President Bush’s words) about who gets aid, as well as the implementer. **While U.S. law caps these authorities at certain amounts, there are no public reports on most of these programs, so determining actual expenditure levels and programming is difficult.**³⁹ As a result, piecing together the entire picture of U.S. military aid to, and involvement with, Central Asia is very complex and perhaps not even possible. **This opacity also means that such funds could be used when Congress directs a cessation of other military aid accounts** for a particular country.